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SUMMARY
From the early 90’s until the recent years we have seen a significant amount of protocols
and applications being built on top of the Internet Protocol (IP). The ever growing use of
off-the-shelf solutions and vertically integrated software is quickly transforming the Inter-
net to an end-to-end encrypted network. This creates a great burden on security applications
and the security industry as a whole, which rely on techniques like Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) to secure networks. However, the Domain Name System (DNS), the Internet’s phone
book, is still available to the security community for both research and applied security. At
the same time, DNS monitoring is less invasive, since it is separate from applications using
it, preserving the privacy level encryption attempts to set. Hence, DNS is expected to be
available to security applications for the foreseeable future and can still be used to reason
about the IP even though encryption may make the underlying data unavailable to network
security solutions.
This thesis shows how to actively query domain names in order to assist in detecting
security threats and provide context around Internet Protocol addresses. Specifically, it
introduces the Active DNS data, a public dataset that maps almost 70% of the registered
domain names to IP addresses from 75% of the Top Level Domains (TLDs) in an active and
scalable fashion, as an alternative to extensively used passive DNS datasets. Moreover, this
thesis, describes problems faced after operating the Active DNS data generation system for
almost five years and how architectural changes improved system availability, reliability,
and scalability. Finally, it demonstrates the value in the Active DNS data by performing
the first large scale study of Combosquatting, an attack technique that utilizes over 2.1M
domain names, resolved more than 10B times per day, and attempts to hide malicious




The Internet Protocol (IP) [1] provides the foundation for communication over the Internet.
For the last four decades, IP has also become an integral part of almost every application
that needs to exchange data with another one across multiple hosts. Apart from the out-
standing benefits the Internet has provided in the Information Age, it has also become the
medium used by miscreants for illicit activities. Securing information and communication
systems against adversaries is paramount.
Over the last few decades, we have been basing our network defenses on understanding
the IP infrastructure and the way it is being used. Passive collection and monitoring of
network traffic has been the cornerstone of our measurements around the IP infrastructure,
expressed primarily through Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. These
systems can take advantage of the context and extensive information around applications
communicating and classify communication events as benign or malicious. Thus, it is easy
to take action and properly defend a network against malicious activity.
However, the growing volume of traffic on modern networks makes inspection of pack-
ets in real time, as well as storage of every communication event, particularly hard. Pro-
posed solutions to this problem include network traffic summaries like NetFlow [8], which
can result in a significant reduction of the sheer size of data otherwise collected (e.g., com-
plete network traffic captures) at the expense of losing application information and context.
IP traffic summaries are easier to obtain, store, and analyze, compared to network traffic
captures, but lack the application layer context that Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) used to
provide. Network security solutions that rely on IP summaries are less effective than alter-
natives that rely on DPI [9, 10]. At the same time, the growing use of encryption in online
communication is making DPI more challenging. Implementing encryption standards has
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been made easier for developers to protect against illicit eavesdropping, and it is as simple
for cybercriminals to also use encryption standards (e.g., symmetric cryptosystems [11],
Certificate Pinning [12], etc.) in the same fashion that effectively bypass monitoring sys-
tems. The large volume of network data generated on the Internet and the extensive use
of encryption make the use of techniques that rely on network traffic visibility (e.g., IDS)
more difficult, while DPI is becoming very expensive in large networks. These challenges
suggest better techniques are necessary to study IP infrastructure.
The Domain Name System (DNS) [13, 14] is a distributed hierarchical database that
acts as the Internet’s phone book. The main goal of DNS is to translate human readable
domain names to IP addresses that computers require in order to communicate. This thesis
shows how to actively query domain names in order to assist in detecting security threats
and provide context around Internet Protocol addresses. It attempts to bridge the gab be-
tween the information that was becoming available through full packet inspection, and the
endured losses from the lack of it, through a novel dataset publicly available to the scientific
community and operational researchers.
The first study discussed in this thesis addresses issues revolving around IP intelligence
and attempts to ease the burden of data collection, for both research and applied security
purposes. It describes a system, Thales, which is able to generate large amounts of DNS
queries and collect the corresponding responses from the Internet. The system resolves
hundreds of millions of domain names, via billions of DNS resolution requests, responses
to which provide an adequate view of the infrastructure used on the Internet. After col-
lecting approximately six months of data, we provide empirical evidence which suggest
that actively collected DNS data (referred to as Active DNS) can be used in several security
applications and related research. In fact, we demonstrate that Active DNS data provides
much larger breadth, when it comes to identifying portions of the IPv4 and IPv6 address
space, compared to passive DNS data collected over the same period of time. However,
Active DNS does not provide as much depth as passive DNS. In the context of a bipartite
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graph between domain names and IP addresses, Active DNS provides a larger and sparse
graph, whereas passive DNS provides a smaller but more dense graph. Finally, we show
that Active DNS data can be used in security research and applications, since it includes
vital information around domain names and IP addresses, long before we are aware of
whether either are used for benign or malicious purposes. Therefore, Active DNS can be
a viable alternative source of intelligence to passive DNS. The Active DNS data is made
freely available to the security community for research purposes.
The next study focuses on architectural changes and lessons learned from our Active
DNS system. After operating Thales for more than four years and daily aggregating
and providing data to the security community, we discuss problems that we faced with
our system architecture and how we solved them by adopting new state-of-the-art big data
technologies, as they were becoming available. We detail issues around older technologies
that we had been using for instrumentation (e.g., LXC, LXD, etc.) and data collection (e.g.,
tcpdump, pcapdump, etc.), and how they affected the completeness of our collected
data. Moreover, we show that appropriate new distributed computing technologies, have
made Thales more reliable, scalable, and easily distributed. Finally, we show that as the
system’s robustness and reliability grows, we can extract more DNS related information
and better understand how infrastructure on the Internet is being used. After operating the
system for years, we evaluate the completeness of our data once again and show that Active
DNS data is still valuable and a viable alternative to passive DNS. To date, more than 70
organizations are using Active DNS data for security research related purposes.
The final part of this thesis provides the first large scale study of Combosquatting, a
technique widely used by miscreants to hide attacks in plain sight. A combosquatting
domain name is composed of two parts: (1) a well known trademark or popular domain
name, and (2) a mixture of words and characters, prepended, appended, or both, to the
“base” domain name (1). For example, given the domain name gatech.edu, one could
generate and register the combosquatting domain name gatech-login[.]com. We
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show that most combosquatting domain names lack a generative model, unlike other types
of domain squatting (e.g., typosquatting, bitsquatting, etc.), and have a long lifetime, that
spans more than a year, inline with similar work conducted in the past [15]. These suggest
that combosquatting domains are hard to detect, predict, take down, or defensively register.
Moreover, we see very few instances of the domain names in Open Source Intelligence
(OSINT), which also suggests that combosquatting domains usually go unnoticed. At the
same time, we find more than 2.1M combosquatting domain names registered over the
course of approximately five years, which have been resolved more than 10B times per day,
in several occasions. Lastly, we attempt to understand the way combosquatting domains
are used on the Internet, through a passive and active analysis. We collect screenshots
and the source code of the websites hosted on combosquatting domain names, and find
that combosquatting is used in several different types of abuse, including, but not limited
to, phishing, social engineering, affiliate abuse, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), and
trademark abuse (i.e., capitalizing on the popularity of trademarks to sell own products and
services).
Through the empirical studies discussed, we demonstrate a system that can provide in-
formation adequate to widely used passive DNS data, that can help the security community
tackle emerging threats. We also discuss how this system can be replicated and what are
the problems that one will face in doing so. After operating Thales and providing Ac-
tive DNS data to the community for almost five years, we discuss architectural changes
and their benefits. Finally, our research in combosquatting domain names demonstrates the
value in the Active DNS data and how researchers can take advantage of Active DNS to
study and understand different phenomena on the Internet.
1.1 Hypothesis
Passive DNS data (1) is expensive to purchase, collect, and store, (2) comes with legal
obligations (e.g., anonymization, access control), (3) is local to the monitored network,
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and (4) is limited to data points for domains resolved in the network. We hypothesize that
actively generated and collected DNS data, in a systematic, scalable, and consistent fashion,
can both complement Passive DNS data, and also provide a viable alternative when Passive
DNS data is not available, for security research and operational applications.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis shows how actively queried domain names can assist in detecting security
threats and provide context around Internet protocol addresses. Specifically, we show how
actively collected DNS data (1) provides approximately 200 times more data points than
Passive DNS data collected at a large University network, (2) includes information about
malicious infrastructure from days to months before the infrastructure is known to be ma-
licious, and (3) enables research into previously unknown attack techniques, like Com-
bosquatting, millions of instances of which can be monitored on a periodic fashion.
1.3 Contributions
Active DNS Measurements: Domain Name System datasets have been used for a long
time in security research and security applications [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 15, 29], with passive DNS being the most popular source of intelligence. However,
passive DNS data is very expensive to purchase and collect, comes with legal obligations, is
only local to the network being monitored, and has limited DNS resources. To make access
to DNS data easier, free of charge, and available to the security community and researchers,
we design Thales, a system that collects DNS data by actively submitting DNS resolution
requests for domain names. This study shows that actively collected DNS data, like Active
DNS, can be of significant value for security research and security applications.
Active DNS Collection for a Quinquennium: The Active DNS data has been col-
lected and shared with the research community for almost five years. Over this time, we
have identified several architectural issues that has led us to better the system that performs
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the collection and the way we process, store, and share data. This thesis describes problems
with older technologies, new technologies used to replace components of the Active DNS
data collection system, and what the future holds. It also demonstrates the added value in
the Active DNS data while we adopt new techniques and the system evolves.
Combosquatting Domain Name Threats: Adversaries have been devising several
techniques for attacks, which evolve and adapt to new defenses. Combosquatting domain
names is an attack technique that relies upon the value and trust users have on legitimate
popular brands and domain names. Taking advantage of information the user expects to
see (e.g., the word gmail when viewing their Google email inbox), adversaries trick
users into downloading malicious software, entering credentials in fraudulent websites,
purchasing counterfeit products, or even miss an ongoing attack. We thoroughly study the
combosquatting technique and shed light in this type of attack. We find that millions of
domains, resolved billions of times, are used for at least seven different attack types over
almost five years. At the same time, we see an increasing trend in the use of combosquatting
domains and lack of detection and mitigation from security systems.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
Chapter 2, provides a background of related material, important in the context of this the-
sis. It will provide the foundation of the research discussed later, including technical de-
tails around DNS, DNS packets, the resolution process, and data collection (Section 2.1).
Finally, it concludes with an overview of previous work in the DNS security field (Sec-
tion 2.2) related to this thesis.
The next chapter, Chapter 3, presents our Active DNS related measurements. It starts
by describing Thales, the Active DNS data collection system (Section 3.2), and then pro-
vides an overview of the collection methodology. It compares the Active DNS to passively
collected DNS data (Section 3.3), and shows the value of Active DNS in network security
research. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.4.
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We continue with Chapter 4, which paints a picture of issues we faced after running
Thales for almost five years. We start by explaining architectural decisions we had made
when designing the original system, given technologies that were available. We continue
by providing an overview of the current state of the system, technologies it uses at the time
of writing, and reasons why we adopted them. The chapter concludes with a comparison
between the older system and the capabilities we have achieved with the newer implemen-
tation.
Chapter 5, provides an empirical study of the Combosquatting security problem. It
starts by defining the problem and providing the methodology used to study combosquat-
ting. We measure the extent of the problem, using passive and active DNS data, and per-
form a lexical and network based analysis around combosquatting domain names. We,
then, demonstrate the ways combosquatting domains are used on the Internet for various
attack types, and conclude with a discussion around potential remedies.
Lastly, Chapter 6, concludes this thesis, with a summary of the findings presented pre-




2.1 The Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a core component of the Internet, used since the
very early days, and is responsible of translating human readable and memorable domain
names to computer-understandable Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Similar to the Inter-
net’s phone book, it is far easier for a user to recall the domain name www.example.com,
rather than the complex IP address 93.184.216.34. DNS’s responsibility, is to retrieve
an IP address for the domain name provided by a user, or system, namely, the stub resolver,
or simply stub.
2.1.1 Domain Names
For DNS to work efficiently and reliably, it takes a hierarchical approach when a resolution
occurs. Before we dive deeper into the resolution process, we need to first understand how
a domain name is formed. Based on RFC 1034 [30], a domain name consists of labels,
linked together by a null value. For presentation purposes, we visualize the empty value
with a dot. Every label in the domain name can be up to 63 characters in length and
must follow the rules for ARPANET host names [31]. Figure 2.1 depicts the four parts that
compose a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Even though we read a domain from
left to right, when it comes to DNS and resolutions, we follow a right-to-left approach. We
can see that the four parts that comprise a domain name are: (1) the root (light blue), (2) the
Top Level Domain (blue) (TLD), (3) the domain name label (green), and (4) the subdomain,
or subdomains that might follow (red).
The root refers to the root DNS servers, which are responsible of knowing “where” the
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Figure 2.1: Distinct parts of a domain name.
Top Level Domain servers are on the Internet. In other words, they will provide a client
with the IP address of the next part of the domain name. In our particular example, the
roots will be consulted about the IP address of the com TLD. The dot at the very end of
domain names is usually implied and therefore it very rarely appears in writing.
There are 1,514 TLDs, at the time of writing, each one responsible to know the IP
address of the host that is authoritative for a domain name that follows. In this example,
the com TLD will know the IP address of the server that has information about example.
com. Hence, when consulted, the TLD will provide this information to the requester.
Finally, the example part of the FQDN, which we refer to as the domain name label
(also, label, registered portion of the domain name, etc.), is tied to the server responsible
for everything under the example.com domain. Therefore, when asked, this server is
able to respond with the IP address that the domain name www.example.com points to.
2.1.2 Domain Resolution
The way domain names are formed help towards the resolution process of a domain name.
One thing that we have not discussed yet, is the notion of DNS zones. A zone, in DNS,
refers to the smallest stand-alone delegated part of domain names. DNS is not only hier-
archical, but also highly distributed. For the distributed system to work, certain pieces are
delegated to different entities. As hinted earlier, while we traverse a domain name from
right to left, we can identify certain entities that are responsible for entities “under them”.
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Figure 2.2: Example of the DNS hierarchy.
Figure 2.2 depicts the hierarchy in DNS. The light blue boxes grouping levels together
represent different types of zones. For instance, we can see the root zone at the very top,
followed by TLD zones, which are next followed by the authoritative zones. An
authoritative zone is the most specific delegation in the hierarchy. For example, in this
particular figure, the example.com zone has been delegated to the authoritative
nameserver labeled as “example.com”. The term authoritative nameserver is often
shortened to nameserver, ns, or authority. These terms are used interchangeably
in this thesis, and they all refer to an authoritative nameserver, responsible for a particular
zone, unless otherwise specified.
Resolving a domain name refers to the process of retrieving the IP address that a par-
ticular domain name “points to”. For instance, www.example.com points to 93.184.
216.34. This information is stored in the authoritative nameserver of the registered do-
main example.com. However, a problem that is immediately apparent, is that we have no
idea how to contact example.com in order to “ask” for this IP address. The hierarchical
model in DNS allows for a tree traversal from top to bottom, discovering more and more in-
formation as we ask. This process is taken care of, for the system, by a recursive DNS
resolver (also referred to as recursive server, or recursive — terms used interchangeably
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Figure 2.3: Domain name resolution process.
in this thesis and all refer to a recursive DNS resolver, unless otherwise specified).
Figure 2.3 shows the process of resolving the domain name www.example.com for
a client “Client”. At the very fist step 1 , the client asks the recursive server “Recursive”
about the IP address (A record, see 2.1.3) of the FQDN www.example.com. Assuming
that the recursive does not know the answer already (see step 8 ), it will first ask the root
server whether it knows the IP address of the provided FQDN (step 2 ). The root server
will (most likely) not have the answer, therefore redirecting the recursive to the com TLD
3 . The recursive will then forward the same query to the TLD server 4 , which will also
(most likely) not have the response ready. The TLD, will then redirect the recursive to the
authority for the example.com zone 5 . Next the recursive, will ask the authority 6 for
the FQDN. Provided that there is no further delegation for www under the example.com
zone, the authority will provide an authoritative response, which will contain the IP address
of the FQDN 7 . In that response, the authority will also hint the recursive towards the
longevity of that domain to IP association, using a specific field called Time-To-Live (TTL).
The recursive will save the response in its local cache (and evicted TTL seconds later) and
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then forward the response to the client, in step 8 .
Throughout this process several DNS packets will traverse the Internet and will be
exchanged between multiples entities. Usually, the IP addresses of popular TLDs and
authorities will be in the local cache of the recursive, hence reducing the time it takes to
retrieve a response. Overall, the whole process will take approximately a couple to 100
milliseconds, with several exceptions. The default timeout for the process is three seconds,
after which the recursive might retry, or reply back to the client with message stating the
problem.
2.1.3 DNS Packets & Contents
During the resolution of a domain name, at least two DNS packets are involved; one that
goes to the recursive from the client, and one that carries the response from the recursive
back to the client. At this point, we should note that DNS by default works over the UDP
protocol, with datagrams of up to 512 bytes in size. In case UDP is unavailable, as a
fallback mechanism, or in case a response is larger than 512 bytes, DNS can also run
over TCP. The default port that is used by DNS authorities and recursives is 53. That
is effectively the port they listen for requests coming in to. However, DNS requests are
submitted over a higher ephemeral port. For security purposes, and to avoid DNS cache
poisoning attacks [32, 33, 34], DNS queries will leave through a random port, different for
each outgoing query. The incoming response must be received by the correct port for it
to be validated and accepted by the client. This is an important characteristic that could
present a bottleneck when submitting DNS requests at scale. Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1,
explains how we work around this issue in our Active DNS work.
Figure 2.4, shows an example DNS response to the client from a recursive server. We
can clearly see the FQDN www.example.com being queried by the stub at the very top
of the figure. The rest of the packet is composed of five main components.
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DNS Headers
First, the DNS headers describe technical information around the response and the packet
itself to assist in interpreting the content:
• OPCODE: A four bit field that specified the kind of the query in the packet. This is
set by the requester (the client in this case) and is repeated in the response.
• RCODE: Stands for Response Code and is visualized with the word STATUS in the
figure. It denotes whether there was an issue with the query. There are several
different RCODEs, which include, but are not limited to:
– NOERROR (0): the transaction should be considered successful.






Figure 2.4: A DNS response from the dig command line tool.
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– SERVFAIL (2): some error occurred that prevented the server from success-
fully responding.
– NXDOMAIN (3): the requested domain does not exist.
– REFUSED (5): the server will not respond to this client; for example the client
is not authorized to use the particular DNS server.
• TXID: The transaction ID, depicted as id in the figure, which is a unique random
number that was generated by the client and sent back to it from the server to verify
the authenticity of the response.
• Flags: A sequence of flags that describe the packet, including but not limited to:
– AA: The packet is an Authoritative Answer from an authority that is authorized
to respond for the requested zone.
– TC: When set, the packet has been truncated, because it did not fit in 512 bytes;
the client should retry over TCP.
– RD: The client is asking the recursive to pursue the query recursively, until it
receives a response. An alternative to recursive resolution is the iterative
one, during which a server without an authoritative answer (AA) will reply with
a reference to a server who might have the answer. On the right-hand side of
the resolution process in Figure 2.3, the queries sent between the recursive and
the DNS hierarchy, are iterative queries.
– RA: The DNS server supports recursion. Stands for Recursion Available, and
notifies the client that it will perform a recursive resolution to identify the an-
swer to a question.
• QUERY: The number of questions in this packet.
• ANSWER: The number of authoritative answers in this packet.
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• AUTHORITY: The number of authority entries in this packet.
• ADDITIONAL: The number of additional entries in this packet.
Resource Records
The rest of the packet is formed with a sequence of Resource Records (RRs). A Resource
Record is a complete piece of information in DNS. It consists of five items, as seen in Fig-
ure 2.5. The leftmost item, example.com, is the name that is being queried or resolved.
This is commonly referred to as the QNAME (query name) or the RNAME (response name),
depending on whether it is in the question or response section, respectively. More about
these two sections later. In this thesis, the term qname will be used several times and it
always refers to an FQDN, whether that is a QNAME, or an RNAME, unless specified other-
wise. The term QNAME is very often used as an abbreviation of the term “domain name”,
because it is the domain that a client wishes to resolve.
The second item is the TTL, or how long this RR is valid for, in terms of caching for
the recursive and the client, as discussed earlier, in Section 2.1.2. This is an integer that
represents time in seconds.
The third item is the RR CLASS code. The class defines the kind of the record; for
example, IN stands for Internet, which hints that this RR is an Internet related RR. Other
classes include CS for the CSNET class (obsolete), CH for the CHAOS class queries, related
to Chaosnet [35], and HS, for Hesiod, a name service part of Project Athena [36].





Figure 2.5: The format of a Resource Record (RR).
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The fourth item in the RR is the TYPE. Similar to the NAME, depending on whether it
is in the query or response section, we will see the abbreviations QTYPE for query type
and RTYPE for response type, respectively. Like the term QNAME, in this thesis, the
term qtype is used to represent the type of a DNS record, irrespective of the section
of the packet, unless otherwise specified. Hence, the terms qtype and rtype can be used
interchangeably. There are more than 100 different qtypes used in DNS, each of which has
a specific role and provide context to the RDATA that follows. That is, when the qtype is
equal to A (1), we know that the RDATA must be an IPv4 address. When it is equal to AAAA
(28), we know that the rdata must be an IPv6 address. Other popular qtypes include, but
are not limited to:
• NS (2) — Nameserver: an FQDN that defines the authority responsible for the
queried zone.
• CNAME (5) — Canonical Name: an alias to a different FQDN.
• SOA (6) — Start of Authority: a seven-field rdata structure that defines information
about a particular zone.
• PTR (12) — Pointer: a pointer to a canonical name, but instead of continuing with
the resolution, the server will simply return the name; very often used in reverse
lookups, when the FQDN that points to an IP address is retrieved.
• MX (15) — Mail Exchange: a two-field rdata structure that includes a priority number
and an FQDN to the email exchange responsible for receiving email messages on
behalf of the QNAME.
• TXT (16) — Text: an arbitrary string.
• SRV (33) — Service Location: the FQDN for a particular service described in the
QNAME; similar to the MX record, but for other protocols.
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• AXFR (252) — Zone Transfer: asks the authority to exchange all zone information
for the specified zone; effectively return the zonefile for the zone.
• ANY or * (255) — Everything: asks the authority to return any RR it has in its cache.
The final part of an RR (rightmost in Figure 2.5) is the RDATA. The RDATA, or Re-
sponse Data, is the data that the client will eventually receive. In order to understand the
context of it, we have to look at the RTYPE for the particular RR. As mentioned earlier,
when the RTYPE is, for example, A, the RDATA will be an IPv4 address. However, when
the RTYPE is MX, we expect to find a more complex data structure in the RDATA, which
will include both a priority number, and the FQDN for the email exchange service for that
particular domain. For example, in Listing 2.1, a client that receives these two RRs should
use the one with priority 10 as the email exchange to send an email to [user]@kael.pw.
Here, the command line utility dig, takes care of visually representing the RDATA in a
meaningful way for the user, although the actual contents of the packet are slightly differ-
ent.
1 $ dig MX kael.pw
2
3 [...]
4 sink.kael.pw. 0 IN MX 10 mx1.kael.pw.
5 sink.kael.pw. 0 IN MX 20 mx2.kael.pw.
6 [...]
Listing 2.1: DNS Response
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Response Sections
Finally, the RRs we discussed earlier are organized in four different sections in the packet.
Each section is related to a part of the communication events that took place throughout a
DNS transaction.
The first section is the QUESTION SECTION, which includes information about the
domain(s) that were queried. As mentioned earlier, cases where more than one question
is ever asked are extremely rare, hence, the Question Section will almost always include
just one RR. The RR in the Question Section will have a domain name (the QNAME), the
query class (QCLASS), which is most often IN (for Internet), and the query type (QTYPE).
The ANSWER SECTION, which immediately follows, will contain any response re-
lated RRs. These RRs are similar to Figure 2.5, and will include the RDATA that the client
needed in the first place. In the example in Figure 2.4, we can see that the client is pro-
vided a single RR, which states that example.com can be found on the server with IP
address 93.184.216.34. Multiple RRs could be encountered, similar to Listing 2.1. In
that case, the client can choose to use whichever RR it wishes, unless specified otherwise
by RFC 1035 [31] (like in MX records).
The AUTHORITY SECTION of the packet includes the domain names of the authorita-
tive nameserver of the QNAME being resolved.It is often omitted by the recursive when the
answer is created for the stub. For example, in Figure 2.4, we can see that the authorities
for example.com are both a.iana-servers.net and b.iana-servers.net.
We can tell that these are the authorities because of the NS RTYPE in the RRs in the Au-
thority Section.
Lastly, the ADDITIONAL SECTION, and last section of the packet, again omitted by
the recursive oftentimes, includes the IP address(es) of the RDATA for each RR in the
Authority Section. We can see the A and AAAA RTYPEs in the RRs in the Additional Sec-
tion, which denote an IPv4 and IPv6 address respectively. Moreover, we know that these
are the authorities for the example.com zone, since the RNAMEs in the ADDITIONAL
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SECTION, are the RDATA in the AUTHORITY SECTION. This part of the packet is also
known as the Glue and the RRs as Glue Records. These records come directly from the
TLDs (or the authority responsible for the parent zone in general), and help break cycles
in resolutions. Although not mandatory to be set by parent zones, Listing 2.2 shows an
example of a cycle where resolution would have been impossible if the TLD was not aware




4 ;; ANSWER SECTION:
5 www.rylai.pw. 0 IN CNAME sink1.rylai.pw.
6 abcbabd10ffffe73734870e0c4.sink1.rylai.pw. 0 IN A 143.215.215.212
7
8 ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
9 rylai.pw. 3595 IN NS ns2.rylai.pw.
10 rylai.pw. 3595 IN NS ns1.rylai.pw.
11
12 ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
13 ns1.rylai.pw. 3595 IN A 143.215.215.211
14 ns2.rylai.pw. 3595 IN A 143.215.215.211
15 [...]
Listing 2.2: DNS Response
To make the issue clear, one would need to consider one small step that we omitted in
Section 2.1.2 during the resolution process. When the recursive is given the “location” of
the authority responsible for a domain name (e.g., rylai.pw), it is actually given the do-
main name of the authority (e.g., ns1.rylai.pw). Then the recursive will try to resolve
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that domain name (ns1.rylai.pw) and effectively retrieve the IP address of the author-
ity. Glue can help speed up this process, if the TLD already knows the IP address of the
authority and simply append it to the packet it replies with to the recursive at step 5 in Fig-
ure 2.3. Assuming that the TLD did not have the IP address of the authority readily avail-
able, it would only reply with the NS record, hence just providing the recursive with a new
domain name, which would need to be resolve in order to get the IP address of the author-
ity. In the case of Listing 2.2, the TLD will reply to the recursive with rylai.pw $TTL
IN NS ns1.rylai.pw. and rylai.pw $TTL IN NS ns2.rylai.pw.. Keep
in mind that the question which initiated the whole process was what is the IP address
of www.rylai.pw?. So at this point, the recursive is asking about rylai.pw and is
told that the entity who knows where www.rylai.pw is ns1.rylai.pw. When the
recursive starts a resolution process for ns1.rylai.pw, it will get stuck by receiving the
same response from the TLD, or rylai.pw $TTL IN NS ns1.rylai.pw., since
all wwww, ns1, and ns2 are under the same zone (rylai.pw). Therefore, the recursive
will not be able to resolve the domain name. Glue will solve this cyclical problem. The
TLD “hints” the recursive about the IP addresses of the authorities (or more specifically, the
IP addresses the authority domains point to), even when those authority domains are under
the same zone as the QNAME being resolved. The domain names that have their authori-
ties’ domain names under the same zone that they serve (e.g., the case of rylai.pw), are
referred to as tucked zones or domains. In the work from Kintis, et al [37], you can see an
even more important problem that DNSSEC [38] introduces, since it does not promote the
Authority and Additional Sections to authoritative, hence, not cryptographically signing
them, which means that the recursive has to ignore them. That makes resolving domains
like this practically impossible under DNSSEC. We will not go any deeper into DNSSEC,














Figure 2.6: Collection points of DNS data in a network around the recursive.
2.1.4 DNS Data Collection
Collection of DNS data has been in the spotlight of the security community for more than
a decade [39]. Data collected on the network passively is referred to as Passive DNS data.
There are several application that utilize DNS data, as we discuss in Chapter 3. Before
we go any further in talking about collected DNS data, however, we need to explain the
approaches in collection and differences that lie in each one.
Figure 2.6, demonstrates two of the most popular collection points of Passive DNS
data: below the recursive (Point A) and above the recursive (Point B). There are a few
significant differences in each approach that we should note. Data collected below the
recursive, or at Point A, will include every single request that reaches a recursive from a
local (or remote) network that utilizes said recursive. In other words, every DNS packet
that leaves a network and reaches the recursive will be visible. That has some unique
properties, like the ability to identify the IP address of the client that requests the resolution
and receives a response, or the fact that every single resolution request will be visible. On
the other hand, data collected above the recursive will not provide the IP address of the
client that performs a resolution request, nor will requests that are being replied to by the
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local recursive cache will be visible. However, above the recursive is a good vantage point
if we are interested in the DNS hierarchy and information about which authority replies
for which domain name, information that is not available below the recursive. As one
can easily realize, data collection above the recursive is going to be much more efficient




The collection of passive DNS data has been proposed by Weimer et al. [39] over a decade
ago as a method that network operators could use to investigate security events in their
environments. Zdrnja et al. [21] was the first to discuss how passive DNS data can be used
for spotting security incidents using domain names. Notos [40] and Exposure [41] used the
idea of building passive DNS reputation by statistically modeling various properties of the
successfully resolved passive DNS traffic. Plonka et al. [42] introduced Treetop, a scalable
way to manage a growing collection of passive DNS data and at the same time correlate
zone and network properties. Since then, several researchers were able to use proprietary
passive DNS data to build systems that can detect abuse in the Internet [17, 18, 43, 19, 44,
45]. Clearly, passive DNS is considered to be a very valuable tool that network operators
and security researchers use in the fight against Internet abuse. As already discussed, our
active DNS project can provide researchers open access to DNS datasets, comparable to the
very useful passive DNS, but without any concerns on personally identifiable information
(PII) or other legal barriers to repeatable DNS research.
There have been many commercial and nation efforts to create passive DNS reposi-
tories. The costs for the commercial offerings 1 often pose a barrier for researchers and
network operators. Now, some of the national efforts are hindered by DNS policy, and
1For example, https://www.farsightsecurity.com/
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thus have yet to be widely adapted by the community. Perhaps the most successful has
been passiveDNS.cn, which was quickly dismissed as an unreliable source of DNS in-
formation. The reason behind this development is very simple. The Chinese operators 2
passively collected DNS records that have been already censored by their egress sensors.
In our project, we do not censor the views of the recursive DNS servers that Thales uses to
resolve the seed domain names on a daily basis.
With the respect of active scanning efforts, most of the efforts have been conducted from
the side of the industry. In the last year, however, new work surfaced from the academic
community [25] that provides the ability to researchers to scan the entire IPv4 space and
use the results for open security research. This is the work that is closest to the proposed
system. The key difference, however, is that Censys was not designed to scan the domain
name space, rather, IPv4. Thus, while researchers could find some DNS logs into this great
public project, our work both complements Censys and also is designed to deal with DNS
scanning.
2.2.2 DNS Abuse
Weimer et al. [39] proposed collecting passive DNS data for security analysis. Since then,
researchers have used passive DNS data to build domain name reputation systems using
statistical modeling methods to detect abuse on the Internet [16, 41, 17, 18, 43, 19, 44, 45].
More recently, Lever et al. [23] used passive DNS to identify potential domain ownership
changes. Hao et al. [46] uses only registration features to build domain reputation system.
Liu et al. [47] revealed that dangling DNS records pointing to invalid resources can be eas-
ily manipulated for domain highjacking. Chen et al. [24] used passive DNS data to estimate
the financial abuse of advertising ecosystem by a large botnet.
2http://www1.cnnic.cn/ScientificResearch/LeadingEdge/fymly1/
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2.2.3 DNS Squatting Abuse
Several studies have focused on domain squatting in general. Jakobsson et al. [48, 49] pro-
posed techniques for identifying typosquatting and discovered that websites in categories
with higher PPC ad prices face more typosquatting registrations. Wang et al. [50] pro-
posed models for the generation of typosquatting domains from authoritative ones. Agten
et al. [51] studied typosquatting using crawled data over a period of seven months finding,
among others, that few trademark owners protect themselves by defensively registering
typosquatting domains. In addition to typosquatting, Nikiforakis et al. [52] quantify the ex-
tent to which attackers are leveraging bitsquatting [53], where random bit-errors occurring
in the memory of commodity hardware can redirect Internet traffic to attacker-controlled
domains. Their experiments show that new bitsquatting domains are registered daily and
monetized through ads, affiliate programs and even malware installations. The authors
later performed a measurement of the so-called “soundsquatting”, where attackers abuse
homophones to attract users and confuse text-to-speech systems [54].
The only work on combosquatting other than this paper is a brief 2008 industry whitepa-
per [55]. Starting with 30 trademarks and up to 50 generic keywords the authors constructed
possible combosquatting domains and then attempted to get traffic data for the 500 domains
that were registered. The authors found that most sites were filled with ads, thereby abus-
ing the popularity of trademarks and diluting their revenue. Motivated by the findings of
that nine-year-old whitepaper, we performed the experiments described in this paper find-






The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental component of the Internet. Most net-
work communication on the Internet starts with a DNS lookup that maps a domain name to
a corresponding set of IP addresses. Cyber criminals frequently leverage DNS to provide
high levels of network agility for their illicit operations. For example, most malware relies
on DNS to locate its command-and-control (C&C) servers. Such servers are used to send
commands from the attacker, exfiltrate secret information, and send malware updates.
DNS abuse is an enduring, if not permanent, feature of the Internet, which might at
best be managed through various policies, remediation technologies and defenses. Tradi-
tionally, network operators have relied on static blacklists to detect and block DNS queries
to malware domains. Unfortunately, static blacklists, which are often manually compiled,
cannot keep pace with the quantity of network agility of modern threats. This results in
blacklists that are incomplete and become outdated quickly.
To overcome the limitations of static blacklists, new analytical systems have been pro-
posed [40, 41, 17, 18, 43, 42] to shorten the response time necessary to react to new threats
and secure networks. Those systems rely on the efficient collection and presentation of pas-
sive DNS datasets. However, such datasets are difficult to find, challenging to collect, and
often require restrictive legal agreements. These obstacles make further innovation difficult
and are an impediment to repeatability of research.
The lack of open and freely available DNS datasets puts the security community at
a disadvantage because they lack access to datasets describing a critical component used
by adversaries on the Internet. Clearly, the security community is in need of open, freely
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available DNS datasets than can help increase the situational awareness around modern
threats. This is illustrated by the fact that most modern threats rely on DNS for their illicit
activities.
This chapter provides a solution aimed at filling this gap. We introduce the concept of
active DNS and discuss a new large scale system, Thales, which is able to systematically
query and collect large volumes of active DNS data. The output of this system is a distilled
dataset that can be easily used by the security community. Thales has been reliably active
for more than six months and collected many terabytes of DNS data, while causing only a
handful of abuse complaints. Access to this dataset is currently available to the community
from the following project website: https://www.activednsproject.org/.
3.1.1 Contributions
We present a system, Thales, that can reliably query, collect, and distill active DNS datasets.
Due to the public nature of our seed data, our active DNS datasets do not contain any
potentially sensitive information that preclude their use by the security community. Thales
has been collecting active DNS data for more than six months with almost zero down time
(only three days). During this time, the system has generated more than a terabyte of
unprocessed DNS PCAPs along with tens of gigabytes of de-duplicated DNS records per
day. Thus, the active DNS datasets represent a significant portion of the world’s daily DNS
delegation hierarchy.
We provide in-depth comparison between the newly collected active DNS datasets and
passive DNS collected from a large university network. We show that the active DNS
datasets provide greater breadth (i.e., reaches out to a larger portion of the IPv4, IPv6, and
DNS space). Conversely, passive DNS yields a denser graph between the queried domain
names and the remaining IP and DNS infrastructure.
We practically explore how active DNS can be used to improve the security of modern
networks through several case studies. We show that the active DNS datasets can be use for
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early detection of financial and other Internet threats. Our analysis shows that more than
75% of malicious domain names appear in the active DNS datasets months before they get
listed in a public blacklist. We demonstrate how active DNS can be used to implement and
extend existing DNS related research, specifically, by implementing an algorithm used to
detected potential domain ownership changes. Finally, we show how active DNS can be
used as a signal to identify malicious campaigns on the Internet.
3.2 Active DNS Data Collection
With this section we introduce Thales. We will begin by discussing the network and sys-
tem infrastructure necessary to systematically and reliably collect the active DNS datasets.
Then, we will discuss the details of the domain names that compile the daily seed for
Thales. The section will be concluded by discussing the long term measurement behind the
collected active DNS datasets.
3.2.1 Infrastructure
The reliable collection of DNS data is far from easy. Thales was designed to retain high
levels of availability, efficiency and scalability. The goal of Thales is clear; the generation
of active DNS datasets that will provide systematic snapshots of the DNS infrastructure,
several times per day. These datasets will enable the security community to construct a
timeline of the evolution of threats in the broader Internet.
Our system, Thales, is composed of two main modules as seen in Figure 3.1: (a) the
traffic generator and (b) the data collector. The first is responsible for generating large
numbers of DNS queries using a list of seed domain names as an input to the system. The
second module is responsible for collecting the network traffic and guiding these raw DNS


















Figure 3.1: The Seed API is responsible for collecting the seed domains from various
sources and the Seed Generation reduces them to a list of unique domains. The LXC Farm
corresponds to the query generator which is connected to the internet through a Network
Span. That in turn is sending traffic to the Collection Point from where data is being
reduced and stored for long term on our Hadoop Cluster.
Traffic Generation
In order to achieve high availability, redundant systems are used to generate traffic. Linux
containers (LXC) [56] are setup across several physical systems, creating a DNS scanning
cluster of 30 LXC containers. Each LXC contains its own local recursive software 1 and
is assigned a job, where a subset of the overall daily seed domain names will have to be
resolved by a particular container. High efficiency is achieved by increasing the rate of
DNS resolution requests (a.k.a. queries per second) that can be handled by the recursive in
the LXC container. However, just increasing the resources of the LXC container will not
suffice for the container to handle a large enough number of DNS requests. This is because
the local recursive in the LXC is bounded by the maximum number of ports that can be
used for UDP sockets. This means that the number of requests that can be sent by a host
have to be limited to the number of available concurrent ports that the local recursive (in
the LXC container) can handle.
1We used the Unbound (https://www.unbound.net/) recursive software in every LXC container.
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At any given point in time, a container could theoretically handle up to 64,512 (215 −
1024) sockets per IP address – and therefore 64,512 UDP query packets in transit. The
LXC containers support custom network interfaces, which support assigning a different IP
address to each container. More specifically, we use 30 contiguous IPs out of an assigned
IP block of 63 available addresses (/26). Thus, they are able to send and receive up to
30 × 64, 512 ≈ 221 simultaneous DNS resolution requests from the infrastructure. These
results are achieved by deploying the containers on two physical systems. Each of these
two systems has 64 processing cores and 164GB of RAM. It is worth pointing out that
using LXC containers allows us to scale the infrastructure horizontally by simply adding
more systems to our scanning cluster.
Data Collection
The requests submitted by Thales are collected at two vantage points. The first one is on the
LXC container that has submitted the resolution request for a given domain name, whereas
the second one is at the SPAN of a switch that routes traffic for all our containers. As
mentioned earlier, we are utilizing several IP addresses from several local virtual LANs
(VLAN). These VLANs have been “trunked” to a single 1Gbit interface on a host that
collects all port 53 UDP traffic. We are collecting traffic at both points for redundancy and
verification of correctness for the daily active DNS datasets.
Capturing network traffic results (on average) in a massive 1.67TB of raw data in packet
capture format (pcap). This data is transferred in a local Hadoop cluster composed of 22
data nodes. The Hadoop cluster is responsible for parsing the pcap files, deduplicating
the resource records (RRs) and converting the RRs into meaningful DNS tuples of follow-
ing format: (date, QNAME, QTYPE, RDATA, TTL, authorities, count)
as seen in Figure 3.2. Deduplication is a critical step, since many responses we collect
remain the same throughout a day. Thus, after removing duplicate RRs, we are left (on
average) with approximately 85GB of data per day. Detailed measurements for both daily
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Figure 3.2: A sample record from our dataset that shows the data fields that are stored.
The authority ips field represents the authoritative nameservers that replied for this
domain name and the hours variable captures the hour of the day that this record was seen
in a 24 bit integer.
raw and deduplicated RRs will be discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Domain Seed
Before Thales can begin scanning the domain name system, it has to be provided with a list
of domain names that will act as candidates for resolutions. We will refer to these domain
names as the seed for Thales. The seed is an aggregation of publicly accessible sources of
domain names and URLs that we have been collecting for several years. These include but
are not limited to Public Blacklists, the Alexa list, the Common Crawl project, and various
Top Level Domain (TLD) zone files.
More specifically, we are using the zone files that are published daily by the admin-
istrators of the zones for com, net, biz and org. In Figure 3.3 we present the number of
domains obtained by each zone file. Because of the relative number of small daily changes,
compared to the size of the zone files, the daily changes are not that apparent in Figure 3.3.
We note that the number of domains obtained by zone files changes as new domains get
registered and old ones expire (and get removed from the zone). In Thales we input these
zone files that we collect daily to our domain seed. This way our seed includes the current
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Domains in the Seed by Source
.biz .com .net .org PBL Security Vendor
Figure 3.3: Number of domains over time per seed input. The security vendor list contains
about 1.5 billion domains and from the TLDs com is obviously the largest one with about
127 million domains.
state of each zone every day.
We also add the entire Alexa [57] list of popular domains to the domain seed. This
provides us with a large number of domains that would most likely be queried in a network
by users.
In order to capture domains that might not be available in one of the zone files, we built
a crawler that collects and parses domains seen in the Common-Crawl dataset [58]. The
Common-Crawl dataset is an open repository of web crawl data that offers large volumes
of crawled pages to anyone. We used components (i.e., URLs, HTML code) from the
common crawl dataset to extract only the domains of the pages visited. Due to the size of
even the Common-Crawl “metadata section” from the common crawl, we are still using the
data published for last September 2015 and will start updating that list regularly. Because
the common crawl data is published in monthly releases, the domain list that we extract
from it and use in our seed list remains the same between updates.
A different list of data that we utilize in our domain seed is a feed of “interesting” do-
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Figure 3.4: Volumes of IPs, resource records and domains observed with Thales. March
7th was the day when we started querying for the QTYPEs: SOA, AAAA, TXT and MX.
There have been two full outages on October 25, 2015 and January 23, 2016. On December
6, 2015 we had an outage that lasted for most of the day but we were able to recover the
system later in the day.
mains that have been provided to us by a security company. This feed provides us with
domains that have been observed to engage in forms of potentially malicious Internet ac-
tivity. Because the feed provides us with new domain names constantly, we gather all new
information and append it to the already existing list of interesting domains. We push the
updated list to our collection infrastructure daily. The feed provides us with tens of thou-
sands of new domains each day, making this list one of the fastest growing lists we use.
Finally we use a collection of public blacklist data in order to provide our data with in-
teresting hand curated domains that originate from malicious activity. More specifically the
public blacklists we employ are: Abuse.ch [59], Malware DL [60], Blackhole DNS [61],
sagadc [62], hphosts [63], SANS [64] and itmate [65]. We aggregate these lists daily and
we input them into our domain seed by replacing the old list.
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3.2.3 Measurements
Thales has been collecting data for a little less than six months. For the purpose of this
paper we are focusing on analyzing all data in this section and then limit in depth anal-
ysis to the last 12 days of March (the last full week forth) for more specific measure-
ments, unless a different window is explicitly stated. Over six months, Thales identified
approximately 10,714,784 unique IP addresses, 199,110,841 unique domain names and
662,319,389 unique RRs per day. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of IP addresses, do-
main names and RRs on average per day from October 5th to March 3rd 2016.
During these months, we experienced two outages. The first was when the system
was initially setup because of an update which was not rolled out correctly and caused the
system to go off-line. Therefore, there is no data available for October 25, 2015, and policy
has been updated to avoid future interruption since then. On January 23, 2016, our campus
data center was undergoing maintenance for the cooling infrastructure, which caused a
temporary shutdown of all our systems. Such cases can now be mitigated by Thales. We
have made the system portable, which gives us the ability to move it to another location
within a day’s prior notice. Also on December 6, 2015 early in the day we had a hardware
failure on our system that was detected early in the morning. We were able to recover the
system and perform a check of the system by the same afternoon. After the system check,
we immediately restarted the collection, but there was not enough time in the day to go
through the entirety of data in our seed list. This is depicted by the significant dip in the
data. This incident was not a full outage since we were able to collect some data for the
day.
3.3 Comparing Active And Passive DNS Datasets
Passive DNS has been an invaluable weapon in the community’s arsenal for research com-
batting malware, botnets, and malicious actors [40, 17, 18, 66, 67]. Passive DNS, though,
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is rare, difficult to obtain, and often comes with restrictive legal clauses (i.e., Non Dis-
closure Agreements). At the same time, laws and regulations against personal identifiable
information (PII), the significant financial cost of the passive collection, and storage infras-
tructure are some of several reasons that make passive DNS cumbersome. The primary
goal for the active DNS dataset is to reduce the barrier for (repeatable) security research on
DNS. In this section, we show how active DNS relates and contrasts to passive DNS. We
will see that, while not a true replacement for passive DNS, Thales is able to create active
DNS datasets that in many cases contain an order of magnitude more domain names and
IP addresses.
3.3.1 Datasets
We first discuss how we obtain our passive DNS datasets. Our passive DNS dataset consists
of traffic collected at our university network. The collection point is both below and above
the recursive. This means that we collect the responses on the both paths; (1) between
the (anonymized) clients and the local recursives and (2) between the local recursives and
the upper layers of the DNS hierarchy (i.e., name servers, top level domains, etc.). For
the active and passive DNS comparison, we decided to utilize datasets collected during the
entire month of March 2016.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show eight detailed plots of the distribution of records in both our
active and passive DNS datasets. Note that all plots are log-scale for the y-axis. As we
can see, the active DNS dataset does not fluctuate a lot, compared to the passive DNS
one. This is primarily an artifact of the collection technique, since the daily changes in
the domain name seed we are using is minimal. On the other hand, the passive DNS
dataset, is is primarily driven by the behavior of the users on the local network, which
may fluctuate on weekends, holidays, and during certain periods such as exams. This
also explains the sudden increase in traffic for passive DNS, since our campus network
experienced a reduction in traffic from March 21st until March 25th during spring break.
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Therefore, Figure 3.5c shows an increase to more than double the unique resource records
(RRs) identified per day after Monday, March 28th, when the spring break ended. Table 3.1
shows a breakdown of the datasets over the last 12 days of March, in much greater detail.
It is worth noting that Thales is able to generate an order of magnitude more unique do-
main names, IP addresses and RDATA in the active DNS dataset (see Figure 3.5, subfigures
a to e), in comparison to the passive DNS data collected in a large university. This means
that in actual DNS records, the active DNS dataset is more than comparable to the passive
DNS that someone can collect in a large university. Now, as we can see from Figure 3.5,
(f), active DNS is not able to create as dense graphs of resource records, as someone would
expect to find in passive DNS data. This is somewhat to be expected, as in active DNS,
Thales is scanning all possible domain names that can be seen in our public sources. This
inevitably will include domain names that are rare, and in the context of a graph compiled
by RRs, they will form islands. While not necessarily bad, we would advise researchers to
take cautionary sanity steps when they utilize the active DNS data for spectral processes.
The diversity of the different query record types (QTYPEs) we are able to identify, in
the two different datasets compared can been seen in the two figures in Figure 3.6. Although
there is a big difference regarding the volume of the records available, on average the
visibility is very similar, since we are collecting the most popular QTYPEs when querying
for the active DNS datasets.
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● Active DNS Passive DNS
(a) Unique domain names per day.










































































● Active DNS Passive DNS
(b) Unique IP addresses per day.

















































































● Active DNS Passive DNS
(c) Unique resource records (RR) per day.
● ● ● ● ●














































































● Active DNS Passive DNS
(d) Unique responses (RDATA) per day.












































































● Active DNS Passive DNS
(e) Unique effective second level domain names
per day.



































































● Active DNS Passive DNS
(f) The density of the Resource Records graph in
the active and passive DNS dataset.
Figure 3.5: The distribution of different records in our active and passive DNS datasets.
The plots show that Thales is able to generate orders of magnitude more data than the

























A NS AAAA MX TXT CNAME SOA
Number of Resource Records Per Dataset
Figure 3.6: The distribution of different query types (QTYPE) in the active (bottom) and passive (top) DNS datasets. The active DNS
dataset is almost sustaining the same volume of records per day, whereas the passive DNS dataset is fluctuating more over time. Note
the growth after March 28, when the Spring Break was over and the Institute was operating at full capacity again.
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Table 3.1: Number of data points collected over the last 12 days of March 2016. Values are in thousands (×103).
Domains IPv4/IPv6 RDATA RR e2LD
Date Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive
3/20 258,702 6,759 41,360 1,130 150,629 3,356 1,350,118 92,218 219,009 831
3/21 259,305 6,056 43,333 1,292 162,366 3,845 1,360,660 110,379 219,009 1,072
3/22 260,676 7,535 44,090 1,180 164,685 4,364 1,400,427 109,896 219,985 1,028
3/23 260,420 8,267 43,538 1,255 147,190 4,338 1,352,019 111,247 221,466 1,105
3/24 259,389 7,635 41,273 1,206 137,491 4,024 1,367,554 112,513 222,464 1,037
3/25 261,883 8,008 44,769 1,197 155,830 4,125 1,399,724 114,518 228,119 1,024
3/26 260,011 7,479 41,830 1,127 152,918 3,616 1,362,978 111,646 226,030 1,009
3/27 260,506 6,727 42,556 1,190 148,728 3,871 1,382,096 120,624 223,313 1,043
3/28 261,551 9,100 44,216 1,340 144,365 4,499 1,375,399 199,023 223,345 1,208
3/29 261,171 9,145 42,189 948 140,225 3,658 1,369,100 204,017 225,513 789
3/30 261,513 8,200 42,992 921 157,477 4,030 1,370,090 202,702 225,642 754
3/31 261,766 9,195 42,651 956 161,387 3,798 1,399,218 202,511 225,128 809
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Table 3.2: The distribution of QTYPEs for the active and passive DNS in our datasets.
Aggregate (×103) Mean Median
QTYPE Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive
A 3,082,960 813,485 256,913,375.92 67,790,485.33 257,181,439.5 54,989,441.0
AAAA 292,278 81,992 24,356,555.67 6,832,692.33 23,918,026.5 5,920,971.5
CNAME 174,881 136,901 14,573,484.5 11,408,450.0 14,582,732.0 8,495,216.5
MX 2,222,465 908 185,205,470.67 75,690.83 184,075,003.5 83,309.0
NS 5,822,874 586,695 485,239,507 48,891,296.25 485,117,732.0 39,316,201.5
SOA 3,498,172 28,162 291,514,366.5 2,346,885.75 291,172,940.5 2,022,850.0
TXT 701,689 14,499 58,474,102.67 1,208,253.83 58,304,209.5 1,205,094.5
Other 694,067 28,655 57,838,938.5 2,387,929.75 57,693,964 2,380,550
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3.4 Case Studies
To this point, we exposed several of the data properties from the active DNS datasets. In this
section, we demonstrate the security value of these new active DNS datasets. We should
clarify that our goal is not to claim as a contribution any of the following abuse detection
processes. All of them have been discussed by previous work in the field. Rather, our goal
is to practically demonstrate, using the actual active DNS datasets, the security merit that
active DNS data can offer to the research and operational communities.
3.4.1 Enhancing Public Blacklists
Due to the nature of Thales we can make use of the collected data in ways that can reveal
abuse signal about domains before they are identified as actual malicious use. Blacklisted
domains, for example, are an interesting category of candidate indicators of abuse that can
be registered, set-up, and pointed to an IP location well before they are actually used in
malicious activities. Thus, active DNS could be used as a potential source of raw datasets
that can be used for timely domain abuse detection.
As we have already discussed, alongside the active DNS data collection, we were also
able to gather a plethora of public domain name blacklists. As expected, domain names
in these blacklists also appeared in the active DNS traces we collected using the active
DNS project. For all domain names seen in both the public blacklists and active DNS data,
we identified two important dates. The first denotes the first day the domain name was
probed by Thales. This behavior is driven by the addition of the domain in our seed list
that can be caused by a change in any of the zone files collected daily from the top level
domain authorities. The second important date we identified is the first day one of the
many blacklists we collect (on a daily basis) actually listed this domain name as part of a
particular abusive activity.
We compared the first seen dates of blacklisted domains and the first seen date of a
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domain resolved by Thales and we plotted the results in a cumulative distribution function
(CDF) that depicts the time difference in days between a resolution in our passive or active
DNS data and the appearance of the domain in a public blacklist. Negative values represent
the number of domains that have first appeared in our active or passive DNS data before
getting eventually blacklisted. On the other hand, positive values represent domains that
had been blacklisted before they had a resolution in our data.
It is worth pointing out that not all the public domain names blacklists were used as a
seed domain source for Thales, rather the ones that are described in Section 3.2.2. That is,
we should expect a fair amount of both positive and negative values in these CDFs. Positive
values indicate that a domain name was first seen in a blacklist and then in either the active
or passive DNS data that we present in Figure 3.7, while negative values indicate that the
domain was first seen in DNS before being blacklisted.
Thales resolves domains that came in part from zonefiles for major top-level domains.
It queries any domain registered in that zone within a day after it was registered and added
in the zonefile. This creates a temporal history of the DNS activity capable of describing the
IP infrastructure history that supported the domain name, before blacklisting, at the time,
and after it was blacklisted. This is a new property that active DNS datasets will freely
offer to the security community, and it is a property that is rarely seen in passive DNS
data. The reason for this behaviour that active DNS exhibits compared to passive DNS is
simple; infections get remediated and hosts are mobile, thus making it hard for the network
operator to passively observe the network evolution of the infrastructure that supports a
domain. Thus, Thales should be able to offer a strong signal augmenting existing passive
DNS data to which researchers and network operators have access.
Figure 3.7 shows the CDF plots for different classes of malicious domain names (Fig-
ures 3.7a to 3.7d). The values plotted include the domains in our active and passive DNS
datasets that have been blacklisted. Several instances of these domains are found in our


































































(e) Difference of days from the first time a do-
main name was seen in active and passive DNS











(f) The difference between the first date a black-
listed domain was seen in active DNS versus
the passive DNS dataset, for the domains that
were seen before they were blacklisted. Approx-
imately 70% of the 17,000 domains that exist
in both datasets and were blacklisted, were first
seen in active DNS.
Figure 3.7: Cumulative distribution of the first seen date in active and passive DNS, sub-
tracting the first seen date of the same domain in a PBL for Zeus, Spam, Phishing, and
Exploit domains.
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spam were queried approximately 2.5 months before they were blacklisted. On the other
hand, we do not have the same visibility for ephemeral types of attacks, like phishing and
exploit kits. In the latter two cases, approximately 75% of the domain names are queried
by Thales at least one day earlier, with the 50% mark being at around 50 days earlier.
In total 42,000 domain names have been blacklisted and also appeared in our active
DNS dataset. From this set, 30% were queried and data have been collected for approxi-
mately 100 days before the blacklisting instance (Figure 3.7(e)). For 75% of the blacklisted
domain names, we have collected data for more than a week before they appeared on a PBL.
Considering that PBLs have been used as ground truth for various security systems [43, 68,
69, 70], we are planning to utilize this data over time to model the behavior of these do-
mains and identify the threats long before current systems, or even before they are utilized
by the adversaries.
On the other hand, we were able to identify 20,000 domain names in the passive DNS
dataset that also appear in blacklists. The dashed line in Figure 3.7 plots represents these
domain names. Approximately 50% of the domain names that are blacklisted appear in
the passive DNS data feed, with only 25% revealing themselves 50 days earlier than the
blacklisting event, as shown in Figure 3.7e. In this case, there are only 20,000 domain
names that have been blacklisted and the visibility that we have is approximately 15%
for the 100 days mark. About 50% of all the domain names were seen roughly two days
before they were blacklisted. This clearly supports our claim about the merit of active DNS
datasets, and how well they complement existing passive DNS repositories. The early
linkage between domain names and IP infrastructure witnessed by the active DNS data
will be able to enrich the signal that passive DNS data contains, potentially making local
DNS modeling efforts easier for researchers and operators.
In most cases, the active DNS dataset contains domain names far before they appear in
either the passive DNS or the blacklist dataset. Note that the intersection between active
and passive DNS records that have been blacklisted is approximately 19,000. This is almost
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half of the domains in the active DNS dataset and 95% of the domain names in the passive
DNS dataset. Passive DNS seems to show better results in early days for the spam domain
names case (Figure 3.7b), but active DNS catches up very fast (within 15 days) and then
loses the advantage again at the time of the blacklisting events (0 point in the plot).
Lastly, Figure 3.7f depicts the difference between the day a blacklisted domain name
was first seen in our active DNS dataset and the day it was seen in our passive DNS dataset.
This includes only the domain names that were seen before the PBLs included them. Ap-
proximately 17,000 domain names have been found in both active and passive DNS before
they were blacklisted. The vast majority of them were first resolved by Thales, at least one
day before it was visited by a system in our university. Approximately 40% of the domain
names were already being resolved by Thales for more than 100 days before they appeared
in the passive DNS dataset.
3.4.2 Enhancing The Detection Of Domain’s Residual Trust Change
On the Internet, domain names serve as trust anchors for numerous systems and services,
and for many, ownership of a domain is enough to prove one’s identity. Work by Lever et.
al [71] discussed the problems caused by the use of domains as trust anchors and showed
that residual trust, implicitly inherited by domains after an ownership change, is a root
cause of many seemingly disparate security problems. Therefore, identifying changes in
ownership, due to expiration or some other cause, is an important problem in protecting
against the abuse of residual trust. WHOIS [72] is typically used to discover more infor-
mation about the owner of a particular domain, and thus, it would a appear to be a natural
fit for creating a remedy to this problem. However, collecting WHOIS at scale is outside
the grasp of most organizations due to rate limiting imposed on automated collection of
WHOIS records. To make matters worse, these limits frequently vary by registrar, further
adding to the complexity of collecting WHOIS data at scale. To circumvent this problem,
Lever et al., proposed Alembic, a lightweight algorithm for locating potential ownership
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changes that relies solely on passive DNS. This algorithm relied upon three different com-
ponents: changes in infrastructure, changes in lookup volume distribution, and change in
SOA records.
While passive DNS is much easier collect, it is also very sparse, and this results in two
limitations with respect to Alembic. Scores can only be computed for domains observed in
passive DNS and that have sufficient historical resolutions. Active DNS can help improve
upon these limitations. First, Figure 3.5e shows that active DNS captures many more ef-
fective second level domains than passive DNS. Given that the passive DNS dataset used
for comparison was generated from a large university network, this result is particularly
important. It demonstrates that even large networks have difficulty matching the breadth
of domains that can be collected using active DNS querying. Next, active DNS querying
can consistently gather specified DNS record types over time. In particular, the two plots
in Figure 3.6 show that active DNS results in substantially more SOA records than passive
DNS each day. Since one of the key components of the Alembic scoring is SOA records
active DNS should be able to enhance the performance of the Alembic scoring algorithm.
While active DNS provides many benefits, it is important to note that the one component
Active DNS cannot enhance is the lookup volume distribution of domains. This component
is derived by user behavior observed in passive DNS, and therefore, there is no analog in
the active DNS dataset.
To evaluate whether Alembic could work using only active DNS, we implemented a
modified version of the algorithm that excluded lookup volume distribution as a compo-
nent and used a fixed window size of two weeks. Then we computed scores for March
27, 2016 using our modified algorithm. In total, this resulted in 63,332,836 domains with
non-zero scores, where larger scores indicate a higher confidence in an ownership change.
The distribution of those scores can be seen in Figure 3.8. The majority fell in the range
between 0.4 and 0.5, and further inspection revealed that the SOA component contributed














Figure 3.8: Histogram showing the distribution of Alembic scores for March 27, 2016.
in the SOA record for the domains. Since we saw very little change in hosting infrastruc-
ture, it is possible these scores could simply be the result of minor changes within the SOA
record. The next largest range was between 0.9 and 1.0 and consisted of 5,652,910 do-
mains. According to the algorithm, domains with a score in this range are most likely to
have undergone a change in ownership. 5,625,397 (99.5%) of these domains had a score of
1.0, indicating that both infrastructure and SOA records had undergone complete changes.
Indeed, we found 10,885 of these domains on a public service’s list [73] of expired domains
for March 27, 2016. The remainder of these domains provide interesting cases for further
study.
Our modified version of the Alembic algorithm, originally proposed by Lever et al.,
provides an interesting example of how active DNS can be used to enhance or extend
existing research. Without active DNS, deploying an algorithm like Alembic would require
access to a large scale passive DNS dataset (e.g., university, enterprise, Internet service
provider). However, using openly available active DNS data, as offered by this research,
can help remove the barriers to using or deploying existing DNS research.
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3.4.3 Tracking Malicious Domain Names In Non-routable IP Space
Bogons are private, reserved, or otherwise unallocated network blocks [74, 75, 76]. Bogons
should be boring since by definition they should not be hosting anything in the context of
the global Internet. But occasionally, a domain name, like messisux.bix, resolves to
a bogon like 0.0.0.0 despite the fact this IP can not host anything. The presence of a
domain name, however, indicates a service that should be globally reachable exists. These
“nonsense” resolutions are at times caused by misconfigurations, brand protection services,
and occasionally, malicious actors. To investigate further, we don our threat researcher hats
and analyze domain names that resolved to bogon IP space during our analysis. Here
we focus on malicious infrastructure as it is a primary interest of the security community.
However, we also note that active DNS data that resolves to bogons would be useful in
other contexts such as identifying potential trademark infringements.
We identified two known malicious campaigns in the subset of bogon data: “Operation
Hangover” and “CopyKittens.” The former is infrastructure of a cyber espionage threat
targeting government, military, and private sector networks with some ties to India [77].
Domain names seen in active DNS data for this threat are shown at the top portion of
Table 3.3. The latter is infrastructure for threats targeting “high ranking diplomats at Israel’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some well-known Israeli academic researchers specializing
in Middle East Studies” [78] and its active DNS domains are shown at the bottom portion
of Table 3.3.
These are useful indicators despite the fact these attacks are known and likely inactive.
Neutered, yet unidentified, infections are likely still operating in networks today, which
should lead to incidence responses and damage assessments. For example, knowing the
specific internal machine that was infected with targeted malware is useful even after an
attack has taken place. An end-user machine on a company’s corporate network has differ-
ent implications than a locked down server in a data center, or the CEO’s personal laptop.
Interestingly, some targeted threats do resolve to bogon space, while active, to reduce their
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network footprint [79]. This suggests signal for malicious detection in active DNS’s non-
routable IPs.
3.5 Conclusion
DNS is vital to the operation of the Internet. Users, systems, and services rely on its
operation for most network communication—often without even realizing it. Malware is no
different. It makes use of DNS to locate C&C servers and provide network agility. Despite
all its uses, it is incredibly difficult to gain access to large, open, and freely available DNS
datasets, and even when possible, such data is often encumbered with privacy regulations
or access restrictions. This severely limits the pool of security researchers than can leverage
DNS in their work. Furthermore, it limits the repeatability of existing DNS based research.
Clearly, there is a need in the research community for access to large, open, and freely
available DNS data. To that end, this work built a new system, Thales, to query and collect
massive quantities of DNS data starting from publicly available lists of domains (e.g., zone
files, Alexa, Common Crawl, etc.). We are releasing the resulting active DNS data from
this system to the public, and since this data is derived from public sources, it can be
easily incorporated into new or existing research without having to worry about privacy
regulations or access restrictions.
To prove its merit, we provide an in-depth comparison between active DNS and a pas-
sive DNS dataset collected on a large university network. This analysis showed that active
DNS data provides a greater breadth of coverage (i.e., greater quantity and greater variety
of records), but passive DNS data provides a denser, more tightly connected graph. Due
to these differences, we provided case studies demonstrating how active DNS can be used
to facilitate new research or even re-implement existing DNS related research. It is our
sincere hope that by opening up active DNS to the security community we can spur more
and better research around DNS.
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CHAPTER 4
ACTIVE DNS: THE FIRST QUINQUENNIUM
4.1 Introduction
The Active DNS 1 data, since its first public release in 2015, has become an important tool
in researchers’ toolkits. More than 70 different entities across academia and the private
industry obtain the data and use it in network and security research [27, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84].
The work from Kountouras et al. [85], in 2016, presented the value that the Active DNS
data brings to the community and described volumetric characteristics and case studies
where the data could provide significant value.
However, after operating the Active DNS data collection system, Thales, for almost five
years, we have experienced several issues and problems that were being addressed as they
manifested themselves. Most of these issues revolved around the robustness and availability
of the system and not the resulting dataset. Unfortunately, when the system’s integrity was
compromised, for instance during a network outage, then the data integrity was at stake as
well. Hence, we have made several architectural changes to the original system, depicted
in Figure 3.1, p. 28, which we expect to provide much better performance and much more
data coverage, while minimizing user involvement and operational oversight.
This chapter provides a detailed description of the issues we have faced over the years
and the way they have been dealt with. It explains the architectural changes we have made
and outlines the new architecture for the new Active DNS data collection system, Thales
2.0. As we will show later, the disadvantages of Thales, which led us to the need for an
upgrade, revolve primarily around infrastructure and data management. We should note
that architectural decision made in the design and implementation of Thales were bounded
1https://www.activednsproject.org
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by the technology available at the time and resource constraints imposed by the environ-
ment within which the system ran. Several components, like the DNS querying engine for
example, had to be overhauled in the process. However, we thoroughly evaluated changes
to facilitate a new system that can produce at least the same quality and quantity of data.
The changes to transition from Thales to Thales 2.0 took place over the course of ap-
proximately a year and we have been running both systems for approximately a year in
parallel to quantitatively and qualitatively verify the data collected by Thales 2.0. Sec-
tions 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 present the respective quantity- and quality-based analysis and demon-
strate the value added to the data both in terms of raw DNS records, and in terms of signif-
icance for security research, similar to Section 3.4, p. 40.
We expect that the transition to the new system, Thales 2.0, will increase the availability
and reliability of the data, as well as the sharing capabilities and applicability to research.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We describe issues that we came across while operating Thales for almost five years.
We go over the technologies that were used and how we changed core components
of the system to tackle problems with orchestration, scalability, and deployment.
• We demonstrate how newer available distributed computing technologies have en-
abled Thales 2.0 to horizontally scale much better than Thales and integrate with a
distributed Extract, Transform, Load (ETL) pipeline. New technologies allow for
further collaboration and system deployment to remote locations, enabling potential
looking glass capabilities for DNS data.
• Finally, we demonstrate the quantitative and qualitative value added by Thales 2.0
to the Active DNS data. We show that the new Active DNS data has an order of
magnitude more records than before, and that it can provide data points days, or even
months, before Thales, which can be a significant advantage in security research and
applications.
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4.2 Thales 2.0 Architecture
This section describes the architecture of Thales 2.0, the current version of the Active DNS
data collection and processing system. Over the last few years, Thales has evolved and
significantly changed to accommodate requirements either from our team or from external
sources, given the public nature of the resulting datasets.
The initial Active DNS data collection system (Thales) was designed in 2014 with
technologies available at the time and requirements set by our research team. However, over
the years, many new technologies have become available and we identified cases where we
can better the system. The overall architecture has not changed significantly. Figure 3.1
depicts the architecture of Thales. For comparison, Figure 4.1 represents the architecture
of Thales 2.0, where we can see the seed generation, data collection, and permanent store



























Figure 4.1: Overview of the current Active DNS system architecture, Thales 2.0.
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At the very first step, 1 , the system generates the seed of domain names that will
be resolved. Like previously, we obtain popular Zone Files from large TLDs (e.g., com,
org, net, etc.) and data provided to us by security companies. We have extended our
list of domain names in the seed by subscribing to the Centralized Zone Data Service
(CZDS) [86], an online portal where interested parties can request access to Zone Files
from participating generic-TLDs (gTLDs). This provides us access to more than 1,000
new TLDs where we can obtain every registered domain they are responsible for.
Right after collecting the domain names that will be queried, we organize them and
push them to a RabbitMQ [87] First-In, First-Out (FIFO) queue at step 2 . The RabbitMQ
message queue is a central component of the new system that is responsible for manag-
ing domains to be looked up (i.e. the seed list). RabbitMQ is a very powerful messaging
platform that supports Access Control Lists (ACLs) for multiple users, asynchronous mes-
sages, and FIFO queuing out-of-the-box. RabbitMQ has a very wide user base, is actively
maintained, and easy to deploy and manage. RabbitMQ has client implementations in
many popular languages, including Python, Golang, Java, C, Ruby, and others. The wide
selection of client libraries combined with the powerful features of RabbitMQ made it an
obvious choice given our use case. A client application handles submission of domains
to RabbitMQ. It is written in Golang 2, which allows us to generate a small binary that is
easily distributed, either by itself, or in a lightweight Docker container, so that third parties
or third party applications can contribute domains to the RabbitMQ queue.
The worker is at the core of the contribution to ActiveDNS. This is the component
of the new system that is responsible for performing the DNS lookups. The worker is
implemented in Golang. Golang was chosen because of the powerful DNS libraries that
have been implemented in it, as well as for the performance of the language itself. The
worker makes extensive use of Miek Gieben’s DNS library [88] and ZDNS [89] to perform
and process resolution requests. Workers are containerized for simple deployment through
2https://golang.org
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Docker [90]. Containerized applications are simple “contained applications” which op-
erate atomically to perform some functionality and are then discarded. This allows us to
deploy as many applications as we need in order to maximize our data collection rate, while
minimizing the maintenance “cost”.
A collection of commodity hardware servers are using Docker Engine on a Debian-
based Linux distribution to instantiate workers. Hence, at step 3 , we expect the aforemen-
tioned servers to startup containerized workers, which will take care of resolving domain
names. The worker will first pull a batch of domains, at step 4 from RabbitMQ. It will
then utilize ZDNS 5 to perform the DNS lookups iteratively and process the incoming
DNS packets from the DNS hierarchy 6 . This processing involves extracting the rele-
vant information from the DNS packet, namely the Resource Records (RRs), which are
then reshaped and restructured along with their respective metadata. The resulting records
are formatted into Apache Avro [91], a data serialization system that allows for structured
and atomically contained records. Avro makes the next step much more efficient and is
a Hadoop native format that is particularly important for our long-term storage. Finally,
the worker will push these Avro records to our Confluent Kafka [92] cluster for temporary
storage 7 .
Kafka is a powerful log aggregation and data streaming platform. One of the hallmarks
of Kafka is its performance and scalability on commodity hardware. We knew we would
have many terabytes of data to process, based on volumes of data generated by the original
system. Kafka has been shown to easily handle volumes of messages well in excess of
what we generate on relatively small clusters [93, 94, 95, 96]. Kafka has an extensive user
community and Confluent maintains its own distribution that is actively supported. We
selected Confluent’s distribution of Kafka over the Apache one because of the tools that
ship with it. Confluent includes a tool called Kafka Connect, which provides a seamless
way to interface between the Hadoop Filesystem (HDFS) and Kafka. In addition to Kafka
Connect, we take advantage of Confluent Schema Registry, a service that allows for cen-
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tralized management of data schemas and transparent deployment across different services
(e.g., Hadoop, Kafka, Spark, etc.). This makes moving the ActiveDNS data from Kafka to
HDFS robust and fault tolerant. The data is pushed to HDFS at step 8 , once the Hadoop
cluster is ready to ingest it.
Finally, once the Apache Avro data has been copied from Kafka to HDFS we use
Apache Spark [97] to convert the Avro into Apache Parquet [98], a columnar storage for-
mat (in contrast to the row-oriented Avro format). For the Active DNS data, Parquet is
a farm more efficient way to store data, since it can achieve very high compression and
reduction rate, when there is a small number of columns for a very large number of rows,
especially when values in each column are repeated. As we will see later in Figure 4.2a,
p. 71, there are several boolean and string values that are expected to repeat themselves
throughout every individual partition of data. Therefore, in step 9 , the Hadoop cluster will
instantiate Spark workers that will read the Avro data, generated by Thales 2.0 10 , from
HDFS and write the resulting output back to HDFS 11 for long-term storage.
The redesigned architecture provides several benefits to the Active DNS data collection,
some of which solve significant problems discussed in Section 4.4, but most importantly,
allows for increased availability and extensibility. Therefore, at the time of writing, it is
particularly easy for Thales 2.0 to be extended to query more and more domain names as
we see fit, we can add new QTYPEs we might consider interesting in the future or per
request, and we can allow third parties and collaborators to simply submit domain names
to be queried to our global queue. Hence, we manage to open the system even further to
the security community, to not only use the data that we produce, but also contribute to the
data that the rest of the community will be able to use.
4.3 Challenges With Thales
The new architecture of the Active DNS data collection system has provided significant
benefits and has solved various issues that were uncovered over the years. This sections
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dives deeper into the different problems we faced and how they have been resolved with
the architectural decisions we made for Thales 2.0.
4.3.1 Data Collection & Temporary Storage
In the original system, data was collected via a network span port. As we can see in
Figure 3.1, the Network Span was expected to mirror traffic destined to the LXC Farm
(a), to the Collection Point (b). This replication, allows us to simply run a network packet
capture tool (e.g., tcpdump, pcapdump, etc.) and collect data in PCAP format. The
PCAP format is very popular for network data dumps and easy to use for network traffic
analysis. However, it starts becoming increasingly difficult to use as the data size grows
and processing needs to be almost as fast as the collection.
Our original Extract Transform Load (ETL) pipeline pushed the aforementioned PCAP
files from the collection point to HDFS, where they were temporarily stored. For backup
purposes, we kept a rolling window of the last 14 days of data in PCAP format. Given the
sheer size of the Active DNS data (approximately more than 2TB of network data per day),
we were using more than 80TB of disk space (accounting for a 3x replication on HDFS for
availability and disaster recovery) at any given point.
Once the PCAP files were in HDFS we needed to convert them to a more Hadoop
friendly and user-oriented format for researchers to access it. Therefore, we needed to parse
the data into a format like Avro [91], which would allow for faster and easier use on HDFS.
At this point, we should note that Hadoop shines when data can be split into small units that
can be processed individually and independently, and then merged again, like in the Map-
Reduce (MR) paradigm. Unfortunately, PCAP is an unsplittable file format, which means
that every individual file needs to be processed by a single worker. One can immediately
imagine a significant bottleneck. If parsing 1GB of data in a PCAP takes 10 minutes, then
processing 300 files of 1GB each (300GB in total), in parallel (optimal for Hadoop), would
take 10 minutes. However, if we were to process 200 files of 1GB each and a single file
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that is 100GB (still a total of 300GB), the process would now take 1,000 minutes, or more
than 16 hours.
In our case, the distribution of file sizes was not skewed towards a particular file,
since Thales used to be working for almost all 24 hours of a day. However, our parsing
performance was bounded to the number of PCAP files we had, rather than the number
of available processing units on our Hadoop cluster; the later was always multiple of the
former. For our parsing needs, we utilized textttthadoop-pcap [99], a PCAP Serializer-
Deserializer (SerDe) for Hadoop, built and maintained by RIPE-NCC. Unfortunately, the
last time this library was actively being maintained was in 2016 (more than a year after the
original Active DNS system), which made us reconsider it being in our critical path. We
had two options; either maintain a fork of the library ourselves, or switch to a different ap-
proach. Since the library was not Hadoop native and never picked up by Apache itself, and
given the deficiencies discussed earlier, we chose to not use this SerDe any more, neither
waste computing power on our Hadoop cluster for PCAP parsing. Instead, we initially built
a Nomad [100] cluster specifically for parsing PCAPs so we could move this entirely out
of Hadoop. In fact, the use of the containerized microservices that submit the DNS queries
(Figure 4.1, 3 ), allowed us to completely remove PCAPs from Thales 2.0, that provided
us with even more benefits, discussed later.
4.3.2 Data Size & Data Transfer
The original Active DNS data collection system, as mentioned earlier, used to be collecting
data using the network PCAP format. Since PCAP contains data from every network stack
layer, the data files tended to be drastically large. Given a network packet, a lot of data
points would go unused for the purposes of the Active DNS data itself, that was later made
available to the community. For example, the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
Layer 1 and Layer 2 information, the destination IP address of the packet (our servers),
most of the Layer 3 headers, are some of the data points that are being discarded after
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parsing the PCAP format into what Active DNS stores long-term. The total size of the
aggregate PCAPs for a day’s worth of raw Active DNS data is approximately 2TB.
The data collected at the Collection Point (Figure 3.1, (b)) was transferred to our
Hadoop cluster. Data transfer between clients and HDFS in the Hadoop ecosystem is not
optimized by default and could take a considerable amount of time, depending on the data
size. In our case, we had to wait for several hours until 2TB of data was transferred be-
tween the Collection Point and HDFS. Several solutions to that problem have been built
over time, including Flume [101], NiFi [102], Gobblin [103], Kafka [92]. Most of them,
however, require structured data and do not perform well with binary data files they cannot
process (e.g., PCAP). Hence, moving away from PCAP files also provides a significant
benefit towards using tools that are made particularly for use cases like ours.
Finally, the large PCAP files, introduce another burden to Hadoop. Since HDFS will
need to replicate files (at least three times in our case), transferring large files to HDFS,
makes nodes that store these files to also transfer them to at least two other nodes. Large
files will take longer to transfer between HDFS data nodes, which might result in time-
outs, or availability issues, that will force a new transfer to another node, over-utilizing the
network and spending resources in vain. Even if the files were smaller, we would still be at-
tempting to transfer 2TB to HDFS nodes, which would in turn transfer four more terabytes
to other nodes. Considering that the Active DNS resulting dataset is only around 100GB
per day, we are looking at an overhead of 5.9TB transferred and processed on Hadoop.
These problems are solved in the new architecture because of the preprocessing hap-
pening before we send any record to HDFS. Since the new querying engine can reduce
data to individual records, we reformat the data into Avro [91], which is both splittable and




An important aspect of the Active DNS system is the seamless and transparent operation.
Our initial system, Thales, had the very basic principles of distributed systems, in an at-
tempt to abstract as much of the day-to-day operation from the users. However, there were
significant steps that could be taken towards fully automating the system and making it not
only continuously available, but also fault tolerant and disaster recoverable.
LXC Container Management
When development began on the original system, container software was still in its very
early stages. The first version of Linux Containers (LXC), namely LXC 1.0.0 was re-
leased in February 2014. At the same time, Docker, another container management engine,
was using LXC to support containers and containerized applications. Our decision to use
LXC over Docker at the time, was primarily driven by the lack of Virtual Local Area
Network (VLAN) support in the Docker ecosystem. LXC was closer to the “bare metal”
implementation, which had benefits, like the support for VLAN mapping to containers, but
also drawbacks, like the very limited command line tooling and orchestration.
Since VLANs were necessary in the implementation of Thales, as noted in Section 3.2.1,
we manually built a toolkit to overcome the LXC limitations. Unfortunately, as Thales
grew, so did the requirements we had from an operational standpoint (e.g., scaling, uptime,
etc.), making the Active DNS project large enough to require much more attention on a
daily basis, than the capacity of our research team. For example, unexpected power out-
ages at our datacenters required manual effort to restart services and containers. Similarly,
fallback mechanisms for LXC failures were not put in place by LXC itself, which mandated
more and more management scripts from our side for contingency. This process resulted in
a lot of ad-hock code, written to patch issues in the underlying software itself. Maintaining
that code was a significant burden that had to be alleviated.
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Seed Management
At the very beginning, the seed for Active DNS was pretty small and only consisted from
a handful of Zonefiles that we were downloading on a daily basis. As the program grew,
more private parties wanted to provide domain names and more registrars allowed us ac-
cess to their Zonefiles. Therefore, our initial plan, that consisted of a script to download,
process, and format Zonefiles into a seed-list for Thales, started to also get out of hand.
Every different source of domains would have a different way to make data available to us
(either we had to pull data or they had to push data) and the final seed list started growing
significantly. Eventually, splitting a list of domains into the number of available worker
nodes was not enough.
Workers would unexpectedly “die”, or a server with several workers would stop oper-
ating, or network connectivity would become unavailable, were just some of the problems
any distributed system can face. Thales was effectively no different, therefore, such issues
were devastating for recovery and made managing the seed particularly cumbersome. Thus,
even though the initial design was expected to support a relatively small and stable number
of different seed sources, we quickly realized that it would be very hard to maintain this
process long-term and with more entities committing data.
Resolver
Unbound [104] was the recursive we used to facilitate the actual DNS lookups in Thales.
This is a tried-and-true solution that certainly works, but it required us to separate the task of
submitting a DNS resolution request from the lookup mechanism itself. That means there
were two distinct services running in a single container, going against the containerization
philosophy and introducing two points of failure into every container. Having multiple pos-
sible points of failure in a container can defeat the purpose and make troubleshooting much
more difficult. A potential failure scenario given this setup would be if the Unbound pro-
cess dies inside the container, but the code going through the seed and submitting requests
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continues for long before realizing Unbound is not working. In that case we would lose
data and have no way of recovering lost ground. This setup was also the primary reason for
ingesting data in PCAP format during the first phase of our ETL pipeline.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, we were submitting DNS resolution requests asyn-
chronously to Unbound, in order to achieve maximum capacity and for speed benefits. In
short, our application would asynchronously submit a DNS resolution request to the local
Unbound process running on the same container and never wait for the response to arrive.
Therefore, we were simply “blasting” a recursive with questions, responses to which were
simply ignored. Section 3.2.1 details how the collection of the DNS responses was taking
place, via network traffic collection software. Another alternative was to turn on Unbound
logging of DNS queries and responses, but that seemed to degrade performance beyond
acceptable levels in order to perform lookups across our entire seed.
4.3.4 Data Collection
One more important part where Thales was lacking, revolved around the Transform and Load
parts of our ETL pipeline. The low-level architecture and lack of proper tooling when the
system was initially built, led to problems with data integrity, availability, and sharing.
Integrity & Availability
Collecting data as packet captures meant we needed a vantage point with visibility into
the entire VLAN space we used for DNS lookups. Naturally this meant we had to further
decouple the software performing lookups from the services responsible for collecting their
results. If the server collecting data across the span port (Figure 3.1) went offline there was
no straightforward way to signal the LXC containers performing lookups to pause until the
collection was properly handled again. During that window we would lose all data coming
in, namely DNS responses that carry the valuable data, and our seed would also continue
to be exhausted. Adding redundancy to this part of the collection phase would have been
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expensive and linearly scaled the amount of data we would need to transfer and process on
our Hadoop cluster.
This collection scheme also meant we had no way to validate an one-to-one mapping
between queries and responses. Given that queries were simply handed off to the Unbound
recursive and the responses were never inspected for completeness, there might have been
query responses that we have not recorded, or there might have been query responses that
we never asked a question for, like Internet Background Radiation [105, 106]. This last
part, effectively opens the system to potential cache poisoning, since we just collected any
DNS packet that crossed our span port without validating whether or not a given DNS
response had been solicited. Finally, we would also miss instances where an authority
fails (e.g., SERVFAIL, REFUSED), but could respond at a later time had the query been
performed again after some backoff period.
Schema
The schema previously used by Thales (Figure 3.2, p. 30), was designed based on antic-
ipated use cases for the Active DNS datasets and considering our limitations given the
query generation and response collection. Over the years, we came across several different
requirements either from our own research or based on what data consumers needed.
While some fields stored were intuitive, such as qname and rdata, others were more
convoluted. For example, the hours field is a 24-bit encoding of the hours of the day
during which a domain was looked up. Simply put, every bit represented one hour bucket
in the 24-hour clock, which was set to one if the query response was received within that
hour and zero otherwise. This was both expensive to compute and cumbersome to work
with at scale, especially in big data settings.
After realizing the complexity of this single field we put example code on our website
(https://activednsproject.org/about.html) for collaborators to work with
it. Feedback that we received indicated that few entities ever used this field and found little
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value. Similarly, the authority ips field was fairly complex as well. It denoted the
authorities that replied with that particular RR, in order for the user to be able to iden-
tify mismatches in expected responses and observed data (e.g., cases of cache poisoning).
However, the lack of more context around the RR, made this field less useful than initially
thought it would be. For example, such context would have been provided by including
the section of the packet a given RR was found in (i.e., AUTHORITY, ADDITIONAL, or
ANSWER). Today, this field has been moved to an ip src field, which indicates where
that specific record came from. Using the source IP as is, removes an aggregation step that
was required in order to compute the authority ips field for every tuple of qtype,
qname, rdata in the dataset.
The schema was initially designed for simplicity and with a small amount of informa-
tion, which, unfortunately, made it incompatible with other schemas commonly used for
passive DNS due to the aforementioned fields. One of the goals of the project is to replace
passive DNS data sources, and having an inconsistent schema makes that integration less
seamless, so the redesigned schema was intended to help bridge that gap.
Long-Term Storage
Once the data had been collected and processed we stored it long-term in Apache Avro [91]
format. Avro is Hadoop native and widely supported among libraries built on top of
Hadoop, so it was a natural choice given our technology stack. Avro was available for
HDFS when Thales was initially designed. Parquet, the format used at the moment, was
at very early stage and had its first stable releases around the same time when Active DNS
was becoming stable.
Avro is a row-based format, which makes it very easy and fast to write into, but very
expensive and slow to read from. Therefore, it is a very commonly used format for data
exchange, since it will provide a certain level of data summarization and compression very
fast, but is not recommended for long-term storage any more. That is primarily because
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of Parquet, a columnar storage format, which achieves much faster data access and data
compression, at the cost of slower and more expensive data writes.
4.3.5 Altera Pars
The aforementioned issues are significant drawbacks to the original Active DNS data col-
lection system. In fact, we have made radical architectural changes based on these issues.
However, these do not diminish the value in the Active DNS data itself. We had been
collecting a massive amount of DNS data, addressing integrity and availability issues man-
ually, making sure that the data collected will be adequate for security research. As we
demonstrate in Chapter 3, the Active DNS data collected in the first six months the system
ran for, was not only a viable alternative for passive DNS, but also an invaluable source of
intelligence when it comes to cyberthreats.
However, since human interaction with a highly distributed system should be mini-
mized in order to achieve higher reliability, we performed the changes mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.2. The following section describes the benefits we get from the updated architecture.
4.4 Redesign
Each part of the new architecture in Thales 2.0 (Figure 4.1) was chosen carefully to address
the issues mentioned above in Section 4.3. In this section, we detail how the seed gener-
ation, the orchestration, data processing, storage, and schema have been updated to either
increase availability and overall reliability of the system, or accommodate research needs.
Table 4.1 summarizes the technologies used in the components between Thales and Thales
2.0.
4.4.1 Seed Management
The first issue that had to be addressed revolved around the seed management. In the orig-
inal system static files were split among the LXC containers and read linearly by container
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Table 4.1: Issues and related components from Thales and Thales 2.0.
Issue Components
Thales Thales 2.0
Seed Mgmt Split & Ship RabbitMQ
Orchestration LXC Docker w/ Docker Compose
Data Processing PCAP Collection ZDNS
Hadoop Parsing Miek Gieben DNS lib
Kafka
Storage Apache Avro Apache Parquet
Schema Figure 3.2 (p. 30) Figure 4.2b (p. 71)
index (i.e., LXC-0 reads split-0, LXC-1 reads split-1, LXC-N reads split-N).
This scheme made scaling the system particularly difficult and required significant manual
effort in order to rearrange splits for potential changed.
To tackle this limitation, we introduced RabbitMQ [87], which allows for a producer-
consumer model in a distributed system. Therefore, the only change from our side, had
to do with populating the queue and making sure that worker nodes now read from the
queue instead of a static file. Using this approach, worker nodes can come and go without
affecting the domains that will eventually be resolved. In the case where a large number
of workers disappears, we still have a potential bottleneck that might affect speed, but with
our current redundancy, we can tolerate more than half of the servers to shut down, without
missing the opportunity to query every domain in our seed at least once a day.
Moreover, the queue allows us to arbitrarily accept incoming requests for domains to
be added to the queue. Thus, instead of having to coordinate with data providers, we can
either provide them with the capability to push data to the queue, or provide us the data and
we can run a small application that appends it to our FIFO queue.
4.4.2 Resource Orchestration
Another component that needed to be updated was the reliance on LXC containers. At the
time of writing, LXC (and the updated LXD) is a technology that lacks significantly behind
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Docker. Unfortunately, our need for VLANs did not allow us to experiment with Docker
until 2017, when the macvlan network type became available. However, Docker has
been extensively updated with a plethora of new features added. Some of those features,
like Docker Compose, make management of containers extremely easy, via templates and
images that are immediately loaded and managed by the Docker service, instead of third
party software.
Once our services had been moved to Docker, we were able to take advantage of Docker
Compose to manage our services. Docker Compose makes scaling Docker containers triv-
ial, and allows us to scale our lookup capacity rapidly as needed based on consumption
rates in RabbitMQ. Docker is also supported by more modern solutions, like Kubernetes,
which is a complete solution for automating application deployment, scaling, and manage-
ment. The introduction of Docker in Thales 2.0 will allow for further exploration of newer
technologies, like Kubernetes, to continue scaling and providing the Active DNS data to
the community.
4.4.3 Data Processing
The next part of the system, after generating the seed and managing the containerized
workers that will be submitting DNS requests, is the core component that will perform the
DNS resolution. As mentioned earlier, Thales used to be taking advantage of a combina-
tion of our own code to submit the asynchronous resolution requests and Unbound for the
recursion. After switching to ZDNS we did not only remove Unbound from the containers
themselves, but could also now collect the responses at the container, process them, and
then ship them to Kafka, the next component in the ETL pipeline.
The PCAP collection was problematic for the variety of reasons mentioned earlier, in
Section 4.3.3, and moving away from it was a focal point of the redesigned architecture.
ZDNS gives us the ability to handle responses to queries and manipulate them as they
come in. We leverage this to serialize responses directly to Avro in the same application
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(the worker) that is performing the resolution requests. Therefore, collecting PCAPs is no
longer necessary, and we generate the updated schema.
ZDNS is very lightweight and actively maintained by a private company and the open
source community. The ZDNS project has been accommodating of the Active DNS project
and not only has the ZDNS project accepted our modifications to better the source code,
but have also modified ZDNS to conform to our use case on certain occasions. Among
these changes, we have made the input and output of ZDNS modular, so that a plugin could
be added that would send data directly to Kafka, instead of writing it to a file.
Once we moved away from processing PCAPs we knew we would need a central com-
ponent to the system that could temporarily store parsed results before they can be moved
to HDFS. Kafka was an ideal solution that fitted our use case as it is Hadoop native, widely
supported, and it gives us fault-tolerance in the event of network connectivity issues or
other hardware failures that may arise. Therefore, we built a Kafka cluster that is used to
temporarily aggregate data from workers and store it until HDFS is ready to consume it.
The combination of ZDNS, Kafka, and RabbitMQ, gives us the ability to horizontally
scale our lookup capacity, much easier than before. In Thales we needed to manually
configure new hosts added to the system and take care of functional changes (e.g., seed
splits, PCAP collection distribution, etc.). With Thales 2.0, we can immediately add a
worker node, which will automatically subscribe to both RabbitMQ and Kafka to obtain
domains it should query and a location to store the output.
4.4.4 Long-Term Storage
The new architecture takes advantage of Avro when pushing data to HDFS, as mentioned
earlier. The workers will push Avro data to Kafka, which will then be transferred to HDFS
in the same format. Avro, being Hadoop native, can be processed much faster than the
PCAPs we used to process with Thales. Hence, we take advantage of Spark to transform
the ingested Avro data into a long-term storage schema and format that will be maintained
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for the lifetime of the Active DNS project. Moreover, we utilize the Kafka HDFS Connec-
tor from Confluent, which uses a Schema Registry to validate data in transit. Therefore,
potentially malformed records that find themselves in Kafka will be excluded from the
transfer and not end up in HDFS. This allows for a much more consistent intermediate
data, which would not cause problems when converting to our permanent storage format,
or cause issues later when working with the Active DNS data.
Parquet, a columnar storage format, provides two significant benefits for long-term stor-
age: (1) higher compression rate, since it will remove duplicate values in partitions, and (2)
higher access speed, because it can provide only the relevant data for a given query. How-
ever, in order to create a Parquet partition, much more processing capacity is required, since
the data needs to be loaded in memory for deduplication, repartitioning, and reformatting.
This is an one-time cost, though, that will be paid once the Avro data is in the Hadoop
cluster. From that point forward, any processing of the Parquet data is going to be much
faster and can be done over larger amounts of data, than in the case of Avro. Moreover, the
increased compression rate, allows us to store more information for the same space com-
plexity that we used to tolerate with Avro, which results in more complete context around
resource records we store.
4.4.5 Schema
As mentioned earlier, Parquet allows us to keep more columns in the data we store long-
term. Therefore, we are able to solve issues we had with the older schema, like remove
fields that had very low value for the research community and add ones that will provide
more context and allow for validation and potentially enable other research perspectives.
At this point, we should note that there are two effective schemas that Active DNS
data is stored into. The first one, is the Avro schema generated by the worker nodes,
temporarily stored in Kafka, then temporarily stored in HDFS. This schema is detailed in
Figure 4.2a. Data in the Avro schema is maintained in Kafka for up to seven days, and
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on HDFS for approximately three days, for redundancy purposes. Therefore, there is a
rolling window of seven days available of raw Active DNS data, before any processing has
taken place. Moreover, the temporary schema thoroughly details information regarding the
DNS resolution process, which, if found necessary, can be migrated to the compact Parquet
schema we store permanently.
The compact and permanently stored Parquet schema can be seen in Figure 4.2b. This
schema includes most of the information available in the older schema (Figure 3.2, p. 30),
along with several more fields. For example, the answer, authority, and additional
denote the section of the packet the RR came from, the qname and qtype are now sepa-
rate from the rname and rtype for the user to know what domain was actually queried
when the RR was received, and the rcode that will provide information about what the
authority said regarding the queried domain name. Therefore, more information is now
available for the research community, once they obtain the data in the newer schema. For
consistency purposes and continuity, we have decided to support both schemas for the fore-
seeable future, so that Active DNS data consumers will not have to migrate systems that
are already running on the older schema. Given that the new schema is a superset of the
older one, we are able to do so without any modifications to Thales 2.0.
4.5 Thales 2.0 Value
Changes to Thales described so far have a significant impact on the overall performance
of the system as expected. The new system, Thales 2.0, provides us with a significant
amount of more information around the Internet Protocol and infrastructure used online.
This section presents a series of measurements that demonstrate the value added to the
Active DNS dataset after Thales 2.0 started collecting data. We will focus on a recent time
period, between December 1st, 2019 and May 31st, 2020, where we have three overlapping
datasets: (1) Active DNS collected by Thales (also referred to as old Active DNS), (2)
Active DNS collected by Thales 2.0 (also referred to as new Active DNS), and (3) Passive
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: Active DNS data schemas. (a) The temporary Avro schema used by the collec-
tion system. (b) The long-term Parquet schema the data is stored into.
DNS from a large University. This will shed light into the differences between passive and
actively collected DNS data, similar to the analysis presented in Section 3.3.1, p. 34).
4.5.1 DNS Data
Similarly to the former Active DNS data collection system, Thales, Thales 2.0 is resolving
millions of domain names on a daily basis, attempting to reach at least two successful reso-
lutions for every QTYPE we are interested into, per day. This translates into approximately
four billion resolution requests, for almost 400 million domains per day.
Figure 4.3 shows the daily distribution of the number of unique resource records (RRs)
collected by Thales 2.0, Thales, and the passive DNS dataset. The top portion of the two
plots uses a logarithmic scale for the y-axis, to make the difference between Active DNS
and passive DNS apparent. On any given day, old Active DNS is approximately two orders
of magnitude larger than passive DNS, whereas the new Active DNS is at least two orders
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Figure 4.3: Number of Resource Records (RRs) in the former Active DNS dataset
from Thales, the new Active DNS dataset from Thales 2.0, and passive DNS dataset from
a large University. The top portion of the plot compares the three datasets in logarithimic
scale, whereas the bottom presents the difference between the data collected by Thales,
and Thales 2.0, in linear scale that better depicts the differences.
Before we go in any deeper analysis, we should explain the significant dips in the
plots. Firstly, regarding the new Active DNS, we can see a drop in the RRs collected in
early March. Starting March 2nd and for the five following days, a brief network outage
caused some of our seed lists to not be updated daily, therefore, the system was only using
the available seed data to perform queries, hence, the drop in the dataset. In mid-March,
Georgia Institute of Technology moved to a completely online lecture system, for all grad-
uate and undergraduate programs, due to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic of 2020. We can
see that Thales 2.0 remained stable throughout March, but, after Spring Break for Spring
2020, and students restarted with online classes, several network issues that Georgia Tech
had faced throughout the online transition have made the system fairly unstable. Given
that Thales 2.0 is housed at Georgia Tech’s datacenter and shares the same upstream Inter-
net, this was an expected side-effect. However, the way the system has been designed, we
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can add more worker nodes to share the load in different networks, which should provide
adequate Quality of Service. Nevertheless, we can see that Thales 2.0 is still able to col-
lect data on a daily basis with very high fidelity, even during cataclysmic events, like the
COVID pandemic.
With respect to the old Active DNS and Thales, we can notice approximately eight dif-
ferent events where data was not collected for one to five consecutive days. These random
events, which started occurring much more often after March 2020, depict one of the rea-
sons why we had to migrate to Thales 2.0. When something would go wrong with Thales,
we needed to manually look into it and fix the problem. What we see in this plot are cases
of network outages, power outages, and the lag before a human intervened to bring the
system back online. We can see similar problems with Thales 2.0, however, there is no day
for which Thales 2.0 collected no data at all. On the contrary, even when a network outage
caused the seed to be incomplete (early-March), the system did collect data, demonstrating
the availability capabilities of Thales 2.0.
Finally, the same network outage in early March caused the passive DNS data collec-
tion from the campus to be incomplete. Moreover, the increased bandwidth usage from the
online transition for Georgia Tech is also apparent after March, where we see larger fluctu-
ation. Moreover, we can see that the passively collected DNS data keeps declining between
February and June 2020. This is an inherent problem that passive DNS data has, since in
order to collect DNS data passively, it needs to be generated by a device in the network.
Even though students moved to online classes and were using a Virtual Private Network
(VPN) for most of their academic work, almost every building at Georgia Tech was in
lockdown, meaning that computers, equipment, and Internet-connected systems were no
longer generating traffic. Hence, the steady decrease in network traffic, led to a decrease in
DNS data collected, with the most significant reduction during the Summer semester, after
May 1st.
The bottom portion of Figure 4.3 depicts the difference between the old and new Active
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DNS datasets in a linear scale to make it more comprehensive. As we can see in that
plot, Thales 2.0 (blue) presents an upward trend in unique RRs collected on a daily basis,
whereas Thales seems to be almost stable. Also, we can see that the new Active DNS
datasets contains approximately one billion RRs more than the older Active DNS dataset.
There are two explanations for this discrepancy. First, the new Active DNS has a much
more robust way of updating the seed of domains that will be queried daily; therefore, the
new seed includes more domains than the older one, which come from sources subscribed
directly to the RabbitMQ queue. Second, the old Active DNS dataset contains a plethora of
NXDOMAINs that come from domains that have been removed from the current zonefiles.
In other words, Thales has been using a concept similar to an append-only list for the seed,
which would inevitably include expired and deleted domains, that Thales 2.0 ignores in an
attempt to optimize performance. Thus, querying a domain that does not exist will generate
a single RR (QNAME IN A NXDOMAIN), whereas querying a domain that does exist will
generate from five RRs (one for each QTYPE), to as many as the different RDATA the
domain owner has set.
Similarly, Figure 4.4 demonstrates statistics in the DNS data from all three sources (blue
for Active DNS collected by Thales 2.0, orange for Active DNS collected by Thales, and
green for passive DNS). The number of domain names resolved and number of registered
domains (e2LDs) in Figure 4.4a and 4.4b are almost the same for both Active DNS datasets,
but significantly more than the passive DNS dataset. We can see at least three orders of
magnitude more domains and e2LDs in the Active datasets compared to the passive one
(note that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale for all plots), in line with what we saw four
years ago in Figures 3.5a and 3.5e, p. 36.
On the other hand, we can see that Thales 2.0 collects a larger amount of IP addresses
and significantly larger RDATA overall, in Figures 4.4c and 4.4d respectively. As men-
tioned earlier, the NXDOMAINs and potential mismatch of the seed between the two sys-
tems, with Thales 2.0 resolving more domains than Thales, can easily explain why the new
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Active DNS dataset can create a more complete view of the Internet infrastructure used
to host domain names. At the same time, the increase in RDATA values allows for more
fine-grain research into different data that the security community would need, like TXT,
or AAAA records.
Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the underlying data in each of the three datasets
described so far (new Active DNS, old Active DNS, and passive DNS). Note that the values
in the table are in thousands. We can see that the number of domains is very close for
the Thales 2.0 and Thales, but almost 500 times more than in passive DNS. The same is
true for Resource Records (RRs), which can be explained by the large discrepancy in the
RDATA collected in each dataset. As we can see, the new Active DNS dataset includes at
least twice as many data points in the RDATA section than the older Active DNS dataset
and almost 55 times more than passive DNS. Similarly, Table 4.3 depicts the volume of
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the datasets, the volume of registered domains (e2LDs), and
the graph density of the undirected bipartite graph created from the RRs in each dataset.
We can see that, unlike the overall RDATA, when it comes to IP addresses, the new Active
DNS has approximately 4M more addresses than the older one, but 16M more than passive
DNS. The same stands for registered domains (e2LDs) where we see that the new Active
DNS has approximately seven to 10 million more domains than the older dataset, but almost
200M more than passive DNS.
Overall, we can observe that Active DNS provides a way larger breadth of data than
passive DNS, with Thales 2.0 yielding even more data points, but much less depth in each
zone observed. This is easily noticeable if we take December 1st for example; the new Ac-
tive DNS dataset has approximately 240M domains and 215M registered domains (e2LDs),
leaving just 35M repeated domains (hence, child labels in different zones). On the contrary,
passive DNS has 616K domain names, only 130K of which are unique e2LDs. Therefore,
we can see that almost 80% of the FQDNs in passive DNS are domains under a zone al-
ready observed, compared to just 10% in the new Active DNS. This is also apparent in the
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(a) The number of unique domain names in each of the datasets discussed.














(b) The number of unique registered domains (e2LDs) in each of the datasets discussed.












(c) The number of unique IP addresses in each of the datasets discussed.













(d) The number of unique Response Data (RDATA) in each of the datasets discussed.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of data points in the previous Active DNS dataset collected
by Thales, the newer Active DNS dataset collected by Thales 2.0, and a passive DNS
dataset from a large University.
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graph density we can see in Table 4.3 . The density in passive DNS is much larger than the





) = 2|E||V |(|V | − 1)
where E is the number of edges, or RRs in our case, and V the number of nodes, or
RDATA and domains. Therefore, as the number of domains queried, which are not related
to other domains previously queried, grows, the density of the graph will drop. This is
what we are experiencing with Active DNS, thus, we can conclude that we have a much
larger and much more sparse graph in Active DNS than passive DNS. This is also reflected
in Figures 4.5a and 4.5b, where we can see the daily graph density of domain to RDATA
(RRs) and domain to IPv4/IPv6 (RRs for A and AAAA records), respectively.








Domain to RDATA Graph Density
Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS
(a) RDATA graph density.








Domain to IPv4/IPv6 Graph Density
Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS
(b) IPv4/IPv6 graph density.
Figure 4.5: Density of the bipartite graph of domain name to RDATA (a) and domain name
to IPv4 and IPv6 (b).
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Table 4.2: Number of domains, RDATA, and Resource Records (RRs), collected over the first two weeks of December 2020. Values are
in thousands (×103).
Date Domains RDATA RRs
Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS
Dec 01 239,277 212,858 616 164,000 73,590 3,229 1,691,274 731,712 5,536
Dec 02 239,365 212,975 898 164,231 74,492 4,944 1,692,965 733,932 8,722
Dec 03 239,381 229,907 899 164,294 76,790 5,088 1,691,233 784,048 8,961
Dec 04 239,500 230,586 858 164,494 78,701 4,944 1,692,724 788,245 8,704
Dec 05 239,740 211,758 590 164,750 73,619 3,037 1,695,348 725,264 5,416
Dec 06 239,968 192,641 863 164,784 57,725 5,069 1,695,863 646,096 8,757
Dec 07 240,070 196,583 639 164,715 69,924 3,692 1,696,155 680,977 6,241
Dec 08 240,160 196,526 653 164,808 69,632 3,920 1,696,732 680,782 6,622
Dec 09 240,185 196,580 863 164,981 70,510 4,969 1,697,336 682,088 8,656
Dec 10 240,056 246,473 855 164,611 87,156 4,899 1,696,501 840,471 8,627
Dec 11 240,299 246,973 843 165,273 80,535 4,773 1,701,362 837,063 8,343
Dec 12 240,591 224,592 238 164,603 76,762 1,036 1,700,422 769,859 1,836
Dec 13 240,388 258,687 727 164,424 81,901 3,975 1,698,599 862,807 6,821
Dec 14 240,833 247,109 528 164,947 79,972 2,764 1,701,880 835,679 4,606
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Table 4.3: Number of IPv4/IPv6 addresses, number of registered domains (e2LDs), and RR graph density for the first two weeks of
December 2020. Values are in thousands (×103).
Date IPv4/IPv6 e2LDs RR Density
Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS Thales 2.0 Thales Passive DNS
Dec 01 16,575 12,580 578 215,855 208,065 130 2.08× 10−8 1.78× 10−8 7.49× 10−7
Dec 02 16,588 12,598 765 215,943 208,179 217 2.08× 10−8 1.78× 10−8 5.11× 10−7
Dec 03 16,586 13,092 776 215,979 224,920 220 2.08× 10−8 1.67× 10−8 5.00× 10−7
Dec 04 16,591 13,112 735 216,087 225,564 207 2.07× 10−8 1.65× 10−8 5.17× 10−7
Dec 05 16,626 12,537 562 216,293 206,957 146 2.07× 10−8 1.78× 10−8 8.24× 10−7
Dec 06 16,634 11,944 738 216,518 188,216 206 2.07× 10−8 2.06× 10−8 4.98× 10−7
Dec 07 16,646 12,182 593 216,629 191,928 138 2.07× 10−8 1.92× 10−8 6.66× 10−7
Dec 08 16,653 12,179 591 216,718 191,888 140 2.07× 10−8 1.92× 10−8 6.33× 10−7
Dec 09 16,660 12,196 723 216,743 191,936 212 2.07× 10−8 1.91× 10−8 5.09× 10−7
Dec 10 16,661 13,585 731 216,644 241,291 205 2.07× 10−8 1.51× 10−8 5.21× 10−7
Dec 11 16,687 13,603 715 216,868 241,780 207 2.07× 10−8 1.56× 10−8 5.29× 10−7
Dec 12 16,703 13,030 285 217,134 219,602 59 2.07× 10−8 1.70× 10−8 2.26× 10−6
Dec 13 16,691 13,758 658 216,950 253,403 161 2.07× 10−8 1.49× 10−8 6.17× 10−7
Dec 14 16,719 13,616 520 217,359 241,903 96 2.07× 10−8 1.56× 10−8 8.50× 10−7
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Taking a closer look at the RDATA collected by Active DNS, allows us to paint a
clear picture of the IP infrastructure we can observe. As mentioned earlier, we are able
to retrieve more than 16 million IP addresses on a daily basis from around the world.
If we focus on IPv4, which is the most widely used DNS record, we can identify the
Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) and Owners (ASNames) that announce each IP
address, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) prefix announced for route selection, and the
country each IP is in.
Table 4.4, presents a detailed comparison of the aforementioned data points for Thales
and Thales 2.0 throughout the six months we have been looking into so far (December 1st,
2019 through May 31st, 2020). As we saw in Figure 4.4c, Thales 2.0 is able to collect
more IP addresses than Thales, which translates in almost 100,000 more BGB prefixes an-
nounced, from approximately 8,500 more ASes, which belong to 7,800 more organizations
(AS names). These IP addresses yield visibility to two more countries than what we were
able to identify in Thales. A very similar distribution is apparent if we look at just one day,
December 1st, 2019, which is available in Table 4.6, for reference. Moreover, Table 4.5
presents the percent coverage of the two different systems. We can see that Thales 2.0 pro-
vides approximately 0.2% more coverage in IPv4 addresses, 11% more coverage in BGP
prefixes, 11% more coverage in ASNs, 11% more coverage in ASNames, and 1% more
coverage when it comes to countries identified. The tables also include the correspond-
ing values for the passive DNS dataset over the same time period, to provide an overall
comparison.
At this point, we should note that the numbers in the three tables (Table 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6)
only include non-bogon IP addresses. Bogons [107] are IP addresses that are reserved (e.g.,
RFC 1918 [74], RFC 5735 [75], RFC 6598 [76]), but have not been allocated or assigned
by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), or any Regional Internet Registry
(RIR).
The three maps in Figure 4.6 depict the geographic location of the IP addresses in the
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Table 4.4: Detailed IPWHOIS and BGP information for the RDATA in A records, as seen
in Active and passive DNS for six months of data, from 2019-12-01 through 2020-05-31.
Values in this table exclude Bogon [107] IP addresses.
IP Addresses Prefixes ASNs ASNames Countries
Total in IPv4 3.96B 863K 67,345 65,363 237
Thales 20,432K 330K 46,838 45,852 235
Thales 2.0 28,806K 427K 54,346 53,079 237
Passive DNS 6,923K 252K 44,271 43,454 236
Table 4.5: Percent coverage of IPWHOIS and BGP information for the RDATA in A
records, as seen in Active and passive DNS for six months of data, from 2019-12-01
through 2020-05-31. This table is the result of Table 4.4. Values in this table exclude
Bogon [107] IP addresses.
IPv4 Addresses Prefixes ASNs ASNames Countries
Thales 0.52% 38.23% 69.55% 70.15% 99.16%
Thales 2.0 0.73% 49.51% 80.55% 81.21% 100%
Passive DNS 0.17% 29.16% 65.74% 66.48% 99.58%
three datasets, new Active DNS, old Active DNS, and passive DNS, in that order. As we
can see, all three datasets have a very similar distribution in terms of countries that can be
identified in A records. However, both Active DNS datasets have many more IP addresses
in each country, with China and the Netherlands demonstrating the most significant differ-
ence. Among the two Active DNS datasets, we can see that Thales 2.0 presents a few more
million IP addresses overall, but the difference is not much larger than Thales.
Finally, Figure 4.7, provides a breakdown of the volume of data for each individual
QTYPE we query for and potential RTYPEs we receive during the resolution process
(i.e., NS, and CNAME). We query for five different QTYPEs, A, AAAA, MX, SOA, and TXT,
and we can see that Thales 2.0 is able to collect much more data points than Thales for
every QTYPE (AAAA — Figure 4.7b, MX — Figure 4.7d, SOA — Figure 4.7f, and TXT —
Figure 4.7g), but almost the same number for A records (Figure 4.7a), inline with what we
saw earlier on the daily data collection tables (Table 4.2, and 4.3). The two QTYPEs that
are collected “for free”, NS and CNAME, given they are part of the resolution process, are
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Table 4.6: Detailed IPWHOIS and BGP information, similar to Table 4.4, but for December
1st, 2019 only. Values in this table exclude Bogon [107] IP addresses.
IPv4 Addresses Prefixes ASNs ASNames Countries
Total in IPv4 3.96B 863K 67,345 65,363 237
Thales 12,492K 252K 42,813 42,015 235
Thales 2.0 16,460K 304K 48,200 47,244 235
Passive DNS 575.6K 64.7K 14,935 14,656 204
















(a) Thales 2.0 Active DNS.
















(b) Thales Active DNS.


















Figure 4.6: Geographic distribution of the IP addresses found in the three different datasets.
almost the same for both datasets. This is expected since the number of domains queried
has not significantly changed and many domains from different TLDs are represented in
both systems. Hence, it is reasonable to have adequate visibility in the DNS authorities
that serve domain names around the world. Moreover, CNAME records are very common in
CDNs and, as we have seen, our visibility into the most popular TLDs (e.g., com), provides
extensive information about popular domains hosted in CDNs. Therefore, it is reasonable
to expect to see a very similar distribution between the two systems in terms of CNAME
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Figure 4.7: Number of records in each dataset for the QTYPEs resolved.
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Figure 4.7: Number of records in each dataset for the QTYPEs resolved (continued).
records collected.
On the contrary, passive DNS data has a much lower volume in every QTYPE, ranging
from three (in most QTYPEs) to five orders of magnitude for MX records. This is also
expected, since passively collected DNS requires DNS queries to be submitted by systems
in a network where collection is taking place. User stimulated DNS resolutions, or system
applications communicating on the Internet, will be the only packets collected, significantly
limiting the data available. For example, in the case of MX records, the resolution will only
be visible if someone is attempting to perform an MX query, which is the logical sequence
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of an attempt to send an e-mail. It would be very rare for an application to resolve an MX
record if it is not participating in the sending, receiving, or relaying of e-mail messages.
This is where Active DNS is particularly powerful. It does not depend on any user or system
activity to collect such records, therefore providing a more complete view of the records
available for the domains Active DNS has visibility into. Thus, the more domains Thales
2.0 can query, the more data points we can collect on a daily basis and enhance the resulting
dataset. Changes to the original system allow us now to incorporate many different data
sources and collection nodes (vantage points), which can allow for the resulting dataset to
scale even further.
4.5.2 Active DNS Data in Security Research
So far we have discussed how Thales 2.0 has contributed in the DNS data collected to
compose the Active DNS dataset. This section describes how the increased data volume
and system reliability and performance can impact security research through enhancing
blacklists and malware DNS datasets, similar to Section 3.4.1, p. 40. As we will see, Thales
2.0 has the potential to assist the security community even further than Thales did.
Public Blacklist
Blacklist information, part of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), is often used by the se-
curity community for various reasons, both operationally (e.g., as a blocklist of domains or
IPs a device should not contact), and in research and development (e.g., as a means to train
and evaluate a detection system). As we showed earlier, in Section 3.4.1, p. 40, the Active
DNS data collected by Thales has had visibility into malicious domain names several days,
even months, before they are identified and released in a malicious domains list.
In order to further demonstrate the advantages of upgrading Thales to Thales 2.0, we
perform the same experiment as we did almost five years ago. We collect malicious do-
mains that appear in public blacklists and then indentify them in both Active DNS datasets
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Figure 4.8: The number of days before a blacklisted domain name is found in the old and
new Active DNS before it is identified in a blacklist. The plot on the left (a) includes every
domain name in the last five years Thales has been running for, whereas the plot on the
right (b) includes only domains from the overlapping time period of the last year.
collected by both systems. Figure 4.8 depicts the time before (or after) a domain name
is found in the Active DNS datasets, versus the blacklist. Similar to Figure 3.7, p. 42, the
x-axis 0 is the day that a domain was found in the blacklist data. Therefore, anything on the
left hand side of 0 is found in the Active DNS data before it was found in the blacklist data,
whereas anything on the right of 0 is first found in blacklist data. Moreover, Figure 4.8a
includes every domain found over the almost five year period Thales has been running for,
whereas Figure 4.8b only includes the overlapping time period of almost a year.
In Figure 4.8a, we can see that both systems include more than 60% of the blacklisted
domain before they are found in a blacklist. Even though comparing the two systems
in this fashion is probably not ideal, since Thales has a four year advantage over Thales
2.0, we can still see that Thales 2.0 outperforms Thales in the overlapping time period for
approximately one month (in the x-axis). This is more apparent in Figure 4.8b, where
we focus only on the last year of data for both datasets. Here we can see that Thales has
been lagging significantly behind Thales 2.0. In fact, we can see approximately 40% of
the domain names in Thales 2.0 were seen more than three months before they are ever
blacklisted (100 days) and 80% of the domains are found the day they are blacklisted, or
before. In contrast, Thales has only seen approximately 25% of the domains about 90 days
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earlier, and only 40% the same day or before the blacklisting event.
Figures 4.8a and 4.8b show that the Active DNS dataset from Thales 2.0 is signifi-
cantly richer in domain names and achieves visibility into the blacklisted domains earlier
than Thales. Even though, overall, Thales has identified a total of 245K blacklisted do-
mains over five years, it has only found 626 new domains in the overlapping time period.
In the same (overlapping) time period, Thales 2.0 has found 2,150 domains. This signifi-
cant discrepancy, along with the quantitative performance benefits we saw in Section 4.5.1,
demonstrates the ability of Thales 2.0 to outperform Thales in the future.
Malware Traces
For several years the security community has been collecting malware samples and dynam-
ically executing them to extract behavioral information and data. Among the artifacts that
are obtained, we have been collecting domain names and IP addresses for almost a decade.
These domains are often used in the same way as blacklist data that we discussed earlier.
We perform a similar analysis to the one we did in Section 4.5.2, but for malware DNS
traces. We take domain names that were found in the network traces of dynamically exe-
cuted malware binaries and we compare the day that the sample was found and executed,
versus the day that the domains it used were found in the Active DNS data.
Figure 4.9, similar to Figure 4.8, demonstrates the number of days a domain name is
found in the Active DNS datasets from both Thales and Thales 2.0 before (or after) it is
found in the malware traces data. Like before, Figure 4.9a includes the domain names from
the entire time period Thales has been running for, whereas Figure 4.9b only includes the
last year of overlapping data.
In the first case, Figure 4.9a, we can see that in the long-run Thales outperforms Thales
2.0. Approximately 40% of the domains show up in Active DNS from Thales approxi-
mately four months before they appear in dynamic execution; for four months, Thales 2.0
can only see approximately 18% of the domains. However, this comparison is, again,
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Figure 4.9: The number of days before a malware domain name is found in the old and new
Active DNS before it is identified by dynamic execution of malware binaries. The plot on
the left (a) includes every domain name in the last five years Thales has been running for,
whereas the plot on the right (b) includes only domains from the overlapping time period
of the last year.
not fair and heavily biased towards Thales. Thales had been running for much longer
than Thales 2.0, which can explain the increased performance.
However, if we focus only on the overlapping time period, as if both systems were
started at the same time, we can see that Thales 2.0 outperforms Thales by at least 20% of
the domain names each system has resolved. In fact, Thales 2.0 is able to identify more
than 70% of the malware domains before they appear in dynamic execution, when Thales
can only do so for approximately 55% of the domains. Looking further back in time, we
can see that Thales 2.0 has resolved about 40% of the domains about three months before
they appear in dynamic execution traces, whereas Thales has only resolved approximately
25% for the same time frame.
These results demonstrate the ability of Thales 2.0 to outperform Thales long-term.
Since Thales 2.0 has been performing better than Thales over the last year, we expect this
performance increase to sustain and therefore produce higher quality data for the research
community. Overall, Thales has ever seen 730K malware related domains, but only 10,720
in the last year. On the other hand, Thales 2.0 has resolved almost 54,000 domains in the
last year alone.
The comparison of Thales and Thales 2.0 overall shows that Thales has performed
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better than Thales 2.0 in the last five years. However, when narrowing down the scope of
the comparison to only the overlapping time period of the last year, we can see that Thales
2.0 performs significantly better. Hence, we expect that Thales 2.0 will provide higher
quality data to researchers and the academic community than Thales did.
4.6 Lessons Learned
The Active DNS dataset has been a significant source of intelligence for the security re-
search community, with more than 70 entities taking advantage of it for their needs. So
far, we have described how the data used to be collected, what issues we faced throughout
the years and how we tackled them. In this section, we describe the lessons learned after
running a distributed system that actively collects DNS data for almost five years.
Human Involvement. For a very long period of time, we have been basing much
of the system’s fault tolerance and recovery to system administrators and users. Given
the technologies available at the time of initial design, it was particularly hard to achieve a
level of automation that would have alleviated this burden. As we saw earlier, in Figures 4.3
and 4.4, pp. 72, 76, the lack of automation on disaster recovery has led to brief periods of
inactivity. Unfortunately, in most cases, system inactivity explicitly means data loss. In
our case, the periods when Thales was offline were not alarming us, since Thales 2.0 was
operational at the same time and would collect the data that Thales did not. However, when
resources are limited and operators do not have the luxury of running redundant systems in
different setups, identifying issues very early can be paramount for data integrity.
Coming to the realization that maintaining Thales was almost a full-time job, made it
clear that we had to make radical changes to eliminate multiple points of failure and create
infrastructure that can recover from errors automatically. Moving to a more sophisticated
code-base and management system, like Docker containers, docker-compose, RabbitMQ,
and containerized services allowed us to remove humans from the critical path when un-
foreseen events could cause a temporary interruption to the system.
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Bug Elimination from Open Source. The assembly of scripts and (effectively) “glue
code” that kept Thales together was another significant vulnerability. Having written many
scripts to take care of service deployment, data collection, data aggregation, data pipelines,
data processing, and other components of Thales, we quickly came to the conclusion that
using open-source software would have been much easier. Given that open-source software
is (usually) community based and driven, there are many more sets of eyes that will look at
a piece of code, many more entities that will have deployed it, much more time dedicated
to it. These are just some of the advantages that come with open-source software, which
can rarely be found in code developed in-house by a small group, like a research lab.
As we can see when comparing Thales (Figure 3.1, p. 28) and Thales 2.0 (Figure 4.1,
p. 53), there are several components that have radically changed, or swapped, in favor of
open-source software. For example, the scripts that managed the seed have been replaced
with an intelligent FIFO RabbitMQ queue, the code performing DNS queries and Unbound
have been replaced with zdns, data collection has been replaced with Kafka, and Spark is
now used to write data into the permanent storage format, instead of PCAP parsing with
Map-Reduce Hadoop jobs. Replacing LXC containers with Docker-based containers has
been another significant improvement, which allows not only for faster development, but
also for consistent and transparent deployment, even in remote environments, almost as
a “turn-key” solution. Moreover, we expect that Docker is also future-proof, since active
development around Docker from some of the largest Information Technology companies
(e.g., Google, Amazon, Microsoft, etc.) is flourishing.
Fault Tolerance. As mentioned earlier, making sure that a system can recover from
errors as fast as possible is very important, especially when unrecoverable data loss is in-
volved. The former system, Thales, had several points of failure that had to be monitored
and validated manually. This is a cumbersome process, which is particularly hard to auto-
mate or develop monitoring tools for.
Distributed systems, as the name suggests, have several components that need to be
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monitored in order to verify the well-being of the system as a whole. Moreover, there
are certain controls in place to avoid points of failure and maintain continuity and opera-
tion with high availability. DNS collection, except for the traditional distributed systems
issues [108], has other caveats that need to be addressed.
First, DNS works primarily over UDP, hence, we are looking at a stateless communica-
tion protocol, which has no notion of error detection or correction. Therefore, developing
a system that will submit billions of resolution requests daily, the results to which are not
going to be consumed immediately, requires the developer to build certain controls to ac-
count for successful resolutions and take action on unsuccessful ones, based on the type
of error. For instance, an RCODE=1, or FORMERR, which denotes that the query submit-
ted was malformed, might mean that the server does not support DNS Extensions (RFC
6891, EDNS(0)) [109], or an RCODE=2, SERVFAIL, could mean that the authority is
currently busy and cannot answer to a request at this time, but might be able to respond
later. These issues need to be addressed at the Application Layer, or the software that
submits the DNS resolution requests to maximize data collection. In our case, we try to
account for these errors by querying for every domain name at least twice and at least eight
hours between subsequent queries.
Second, submitting DNS resolution requests is equivalent to sending UDP packets to
several servers (the DNS hierarchy) until a final response for the initial query name (do-
main) has been retrieved. As we discussed in Section 2.1.2, p. 9 and Figures 2.2, and 2.3,
pp. 10, 11, a series of DNS requests will be sent to the DNS hierarchy, until the recursive
receives the IP address of the authority responsible for the particular zone in question. Then
the recursive will query that authority for the RDATA of the domain it has to resolve. The
recursive will cache intermediate (and the final) responses, to avoid wasting time resolving
the IP address of popular TLDs and authorities in the future. One can immediately realize
that if the same authority is responsible for more than one domain name, then it will be
queried more than once by Thales. In fact, given that we query for five different QTYPEs,
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if an authority is responsible for 10 domains, then it will receive at least 50 requests, as-
suming that there were no response packets lost. Similarly, if the authority is responsible
for 10 million domain names, then it will receive 50 million requests. This is usually the
case with very popular authorities, like authorities used by GoDaddy, namecheap, Google
Cloud Platform, AWS, etc. In fact, during the summer of 2017, we found ourselves being
network throttled by GoDaddy, because we were exceeding their Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) Attack detection threshold. This issue was quickly resolved through excellent
communication with GoDaddy’s incident response team, but we might have had the same
happen with other smaller authorities.
Identifying cases where an authority is blocking DNS resolution requests is particularly
hard. Discriminating between intentional traffic blocking, packet loss, or authority down-
time, over UDP, is a non-trivial problem. Since Thales, at first, and Thales 2.0 later, could
achieve a very high query rate, we had to account for the potential of abusing the receiving
end of the requests. Our primary goal is to not overwhelm authorities on the Internet, and
not to simply hide our requests. Hence, we did not choose to use different IP addresses
and mask our behavior, since that would still be abusive. Instead, we take advantage of the
authority server FQDN found in the zonefiles to extract the registered domain (e2LD) and
measure the amount of traffic we would send to each authority. This is not perfect, since the
zonefile might have a different authority record than the actual authority of a domain name,
but it is a best effort. After sorting the authorities based on the number of domains they
serve, we shuffle the largest ones among the long-tail of small ones, so that the requests that
big authorities will receive shall be spread out throughout the day, as evenly as possible.
That way, we are able to avoid DDoS-ing servers on the Internet and eliminate abusive
behavior from Thales 2.0.
Third, as mentioned earlier, a large amount of queries will be sent to authorities around
the world. With tens of workers submitting resolution requests, we have a large amount
of traffic coming back to our systems. Like DNS Amplification Attacks [110], we send
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Figure 4.10: Resolution response for www.google.com from the US (on the left) and
Greece (on the right hand side).
a relatively small amount of data to authorities (a DNS question), but receive a much
larger amount of data. A DNS response, is at least as large as the question (almost equal
in case of an RCODE6= 0), but can grow significantly with multiple responses (up to
13), the AUTHORITY and glue (ADDITIONAL) sections. Therefore, collecting such vast
amount of data, processing it, and storing it in a usable format can be challenging. Our
initial decision to use network packet captures (PCAPs) to aggregate data at a single point
and then process those PCAPs, required a large processing infrastructure that could handle
approximately two terabytes worth of data on a daily basis. Dedicating so many resources
meant an increased cost. At the same time, since the PCAP collection was happening at
a single place, it was very hard to incorporate higher distribution of worker nodes; each
node would need to collect its own data and then push it to the central processing place.
Moving away from this architecture and introducing Kafka, allows us to scale horizontally,
even in remote locations. Workers can now trivially subscribe to the RabbitMQ queue and
push their collected data to the Kafka cluster. From that point on, we can process it in
Hadoop-native formats using Spark on our Hadoop cluster.
Fourth, the difficulty of adding remote nodes mentioned earlier, limited the locations
from which queries could be submitted from. That is, both network and geographic loca-
tions. DNS is using several techniques to load balance and geographically distribute load to
different places around the world. For example, when a stub resolves www.google[.]com
from the US, it will receive an IP address in the US, usually geographically (or network-
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based) close to the its location. On the other hand, someone resolving the same domain
from Greece, will receive a completely different response. Figure 4.10 shows an example
of the response from Georgia Tech (on the left) and University of the Aegean in Greece
(on the right). As we can see, the response is very dissimilar. However, Thales and the
way data aggregation was taking place, was very hard to be deployed into different net-
works and locations in order to identify such differences. Thales 2.0 supports transparent
deployment, which can allow for geographically distributed collection nodes, which can all
contribute to the same data lake, and hence give us the ability to create a “looking glass”
on the Internet for DNS.
After operating the Active DNS collection system for almost five years, we identified
issues and potential improvements that were incorporated into Thales 2.0. The latest ver-
sion of the system can still be extended and further grow through our past experiences and
new requirements. As the Internet evolves, so does infrastructure and DNS. The Active
DNS dataset is very important in security and network research, hence we plan to keep
upgrading and refining Thales 2.0 to enable such research.
4.7 Active and Passive DNS Applications
Passive DNS data has been used by the security community for almost two decades to solve
network security problems. The Active DNS dataset, a novel dataset that we introduced
approximately five years ago, has been an integral part of research and operational applica-
tions. Passive and Active DNS datasets provide significant advantages to researchers and
security professionals. Each dataset has its own advantages and disadvantages, but they
also complement each other. In this section we discuss the ways Passive DNS data is being
used, how Active DNS data has (and can) be used, and what advantages the combination
of the two datasets provide.
Before we go into details about each individual dataset, we should point out five impor-
tant differences among the datasets which will serve as our guide in this analysis. First, and
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most importantly, Passive DNS data usually includes client information. This is the desti-
nation IP address for a DNS response packet. Second, Passive DNS includes significantly
more child labels than Active DNS, since it is traffic generated by devices connected to the
network that are often connecting to complex infrastructure on the Internet. Third, because
devices generate the resolution requests, the DNS traffic in Passive DNS data is also or-
ganic network traffic, meaning that it is not systematically generated, but it is human, or
arbitrary application, driven. Fourth, Active DNS, as discussed earlier, provides a much
higher breadth of data than Passive DNS, since it resolves every domain in the most pop-
ular TLDs. Lastly, Active DNS data is generated by queries Thales 2.0 performs by itself,
hence, it is not organic and it is instrumented by the system operator. Figure 4.11 depicts
these differences and provides an overview of the ways Passive and Active DNS data can
be used.
4.7.1 Passive DNS
Passive DNS data has several important advantages and is used in many different applica-
tions. This section discusses how Passive DNS has been used and what applications can
leverage the data, based on the three differences over Active DNS mentioned earlier.
Clients
Passive DNS data often comes with client IP addresses that have performed a resolution
request. This is a very important attribute in several different applications. First, client
information is very useful in domain name reputation systems. There are several applica-
tions, like Notos [16], that take the number of different clients, the number of queries per
client, time distribution per client, and other features, into consideration when they attribute
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Figure 4.11: Differences between Passive and Active DNS data and the advantages each dataset provides.
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Second, client data can provide domain name popularity information. Many requests
from many different clients can hint towards a more popular domain name than one that is
being heavily resolved solely by one client. Such measurements can also yield information
regarding (third) prevalence of a domain name and (fourth) diversity, both geographic and
network. Prevalence can help in volumetric statistics of cases like, for instance, malware
installation, botnet population, victims of attacks, etc. On the other hand, the geographic
and network diversity of domain names can provide information regarding the differences
in responses an authority will provide based on the geographic location of a client for load-
balancing needs, or the network location, using technologies like the EDNS-Client-Subnet
(RFC 7871 [111]).
Finally, Passive DNS data can provide information regarding the time period a domain
name has been used for. Since the domain resolutions are initiated by devices in the network
or humans using network connected devices, when a domain is resolved successfully, we
can assume that most likely the domain is also in use. That contradicts Active DNS for
example, which will resolve any domain that is resolved just because it is registered. Hence,
Passive DNS can provide lifetime of use information, whereas Active DNS can provide
lifetime of existence information for the same domain.
Child Labels
A child label is the part of the domain name “under” the registered portion of the domain
(e2LD), as mentioned in Section 2.1.1 and Figure 2.1, p. 9. Passive DNS data will mostly
include Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) in the QNAME field of Resource Records
(RRs). On the contrary, Active DNS does not contain a variety of child labels, since it
mostly resolves domain names found in TLD zonefiles, or domain names that have been
registered (the e2LDs).
Child labels can be very useful when analysis of the structure and depth of a zone
is performed. For example, a registered domain like example[.]com can have a va-
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riety of child labels, like foo.example[.]com and bar.example[.]com. These
in turn can have other child labels, like buz.foo.example[.]com, or even a whole
new zone under a child label, like zone.bar.example[.]com. This is referred to as
a zone cut. A zone cut will have a new Start Of Authority (SOA) record and nameservers
for the delegated zone. In this example, there might be ns1/2.example2[.com]
which are the nameservers (NS) for anything under the zone.bar.example[.]com
zone. In order for someone to realize that this is a zone cut, they would need to explic-
itly submit a query that asks for the SOA record of zone.bar.example[.]com. If
a response exists, then this is a new zone. Passive DNS data could have such informa-
tion, since systems could arbitrarily be querying for this, as long as they know that the
FQDN zone.bar.example[.]com exists. On the other hand, Active DNS, which
would rarely know that this FQDN exists, will probably miss this delegation and the entire
zone.
Such complex infrastructure under a particular e2LD is very rare in malicious domain
names. Intuitively, a defender who wishes to protect themselves against malicious com-
munication with a domain name, e.g., a.zone.bar.example[.]com, could simply
block a parent domain name, like bar.example[.]com or the entire e2LD. Hence, ad-
versaries often avoid investing into building these complicated structures, since it is trivial
for a defender to block the whole zone. However, Passive DNS data will include this struc-
ture which can be used to study how an attack might have been rendered or which part
of the infrastructure under a zone was malicious. This knowledge of complex zones can
uncover cases where we can experience fluxing (or fast fluxing) at a child label level. Still
rare, since blocking the e2LD can also block the entire zone, but not impossible to find.
Finally, dynamic domain names from dynamic DNS providers can be found in Passive
DNS data, but not very often in Active DNS. Dynamic DNS providers, like Dyn, easyDNS,
No-IP, DNSimple, etc, register domain names under TLDs and then provide customers with
the ability to register an arbitrary domain under those zones. For example, a dynamic DNS
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provider would register dynamic[.]com and then allow customers to register domains
like foo.dynamic[.]com and bar.dynamic[.]com. Active DNS will be able to
see that dynamic[.]com was registered under the com TLD, but will have no informa-
tion about other domains registered under that zone. Since dynamic DNS providers will
rarely share the zonefile for their zones, it is impossible to know every permutation of a reg-
istered domain under a dynamic DNS zone. On the other hand, if a dynamic DNS FQDN
is in use, it will be visible in Passive DNS data, when someone resolves it.
Organic Traffic
Passive DNS data includes domain names that have been resolved by a device in the net-
work being monitored. Such resolutions can be stimulated either by a user or a system
while operating. Domains resolved by users can uncover user behavior and what users are
trying to browse or what services they are trying to use. For example, when a domain
like netflix[.]com is resolved in a network, a user might be trying to browse content
on Netflix. If such resolution is then followed by resolutions to the Netflix Content De-
livery Network (CDN), then there is a high probability that the user is streaming content
from Netflix. Such patterns can allow analysts to infer user behavior and understand how a
network is being used.
This sequence of events that allows one to infer that a user is streaming content from
a content provider could also be used to infer information about the lifecycle of malicious
software. For instance, if a malware binary is performing a particular sequence of resolu-
tions every time it runs, or the first time it is executed, looking for this pattern in Passive
DNS data, can yield information about a network being compromised. Resolutions of the
same domain names in a particular order and timing could yield information about the ap-
plications running in that network. The conditional probability of two different applications
exhibiting the same resolution pattern drops significantly as the number of unique events
increases. However, such study would require a very precise Passive DNS dataset, with
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no packet loss and very granular timing information, which is particularly hard to create in
practice.
Moreover, organic traffic in the network can be useful to understand how domain names
change over short periods of time. Active DNS data has an interval of approximately 12
hours between two resolutions of the same domain name. However, several attacks can be
much shorter lived than 12 hours; for example, a phishing or a spam campaign can last
a few hours. If those hours fall between the 12 hour window that Active DNS takes to
resolve a domain the second time, it will be impossible to know that a domain has changed
the infrastructure it was using. Passive DNS, however, will include this information, as
long as a client in the network monitored was a victim of such attack. Because the client
will need to resolve the domain in order to visit the phishing page or retrieve the spam
email, the resolution will be recorded in Passive DNS and the RDATA of the domain will
be stored.
Similarly, Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) are very hard to find in Active DNS
data. DGAs are used by malware to find the Command and Control (C&C) server, by
randomly generating domains and attempting to resolve them. One of the domains gen-
erated will be registered by the botmaster, who will point it to the IP address of the C&C
server. Therefore, when one of the randomly generated domains successfully resolves, the
compromised host will attempt to connect to the IP it will retrieve from the resolution pro-
cess. Active DNS will include the randomly generated domain that was registered, but will
not include any other domain that was generated, resolved, but resulted in an NXDOMAIN.
Passive DNS, on the other hand, can have every single resolution request, including the
domains that do not exist. Systems like Pleiades [18] rely on these unsuccessful resolution
requests to detect previously unknown malware families that utilize DGAs in a network
that may have been compromised.
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4.7.2 Active DNS
The Active DNS data includes actively resolved domain names from a variety of different
TLDs and data sources, including, but not limited to, blacklist, popular domain lists, and
partner contribution. This section discusses how Active DNS data has been used by the
security community over the last five years and what advantages it provides over Passive
DNS data.
Breadth
The Active DNS datasets has a significantly larger breadth than Passive DNS data. Sec-
tion 4.5.1, p. 71 went into a detailed analysis of the difference between the Active DNS
dataset and Passive DNS data collected at a large University. The larger breadth of data
provides several advantages to Active DNS, like an exhaustive list of domain names for ev-
ery TLD Thales 2.0 has visibility into. Since domains resolved come from zonefiles from
popular TLDs, every domain that exists will have been resolved at least one day (even in
the event of a deletion). As we can see, Active DNS includes millions of domain names,
which cover 90% [112] of generic TLDs (gTLDs) and almost 70% [113] of every domain
name registered.
The larger breadth of data in Active DNS provides benefits in the analysis of infras-
tructure used on the Internet. Because of the larger coverage in domain names and RDATA
for those domains, Active DNS includes many more IP addresses and nameservers that are
used as part of the Internet’s infrastructure. Therefore, systems that depend on larger cover-
age to taint Internet infrastructure based on prior knowledge, can significantly benefit from
Active DNS. For example, the Combosquatting Rating System, discussed in Section 5.6,
p. 137, uses clusters of connected components of the IP space to group together domain
names that could be used for illicit purposes. Similarly, pivoting through infrastructure, ei-
ther IPs or nameservers, can expand knowledge we have on particular threats. For instance,
if we know that a certain domain name is malicious, we can use Active DNS to get every
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other domain immediately related to the malicious domain, when they share the same in-
frastructure. This would have been impossible in Passive DNS, unless all the domains used
on the malicious infrastructure had been resolved by the clients in the network monitored.
Hence, if an adversary is using multiple domain names for different targets to reduce expo-
sure, Passive DNS would only record the domains resolved in the network monitored, but
would have no visibility into the rest of the infrastructure. On the other hand, Active DNS
will be able to uncover as much of the infrastructure as the adversary has registered under
75% of TLDs on the Internet.
Finally, the large volume of domain names and the exhaustive lists under the TLDs
Active DNS has visibility into provide timely information about registrations of malicious
domains. As we saw in Sections 3.4.1, p. 40 and 4.5.2, p. 85, Active DNS includes domain
names several weeks, even months, before they appear in public blacklists or malware
network traces. Therefore, researchers can perform post-mortem analysis on threats and
the way they manifested themselves in the past, and utilize Active DNS data to better
detection systems or build new ones based on the dataset.
Active Queries
The Active DNS dataset is composed of domain name resolutions that have been made
by Thales 2.0. Hence, the dataset provides more granularity in the domains that are being
queried and a more stable resolution pattern, as we saw in Figure 4.4, p. 76. The consistency
of queries and resolutions allows for better completeness in the dataset across time. Passive
DNS data only includes domains that have been resolved in the network, which may be
prone to gaps when a domain is not resolved for a few days, or even mislead analysts if a
domain stops being resolved. Active DNS, however, will provide a more complete view
of the Internet, since a domain will be resolved, as long as it exists. At the same time,
changes to the RDATA for a particular domain will be recorded every day in the Active
DNS dataset, but only upon resolution in the Passive DNS data.
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Domains in Active DNS are being resolved daily and every specified QTYPE is queried.
Hence, the Active DNS data will have a steady supply of RDATA for every QTYPE, as long
as there is an associated response when a query takes place. As we saw in Figure 4.7, p. 83,
there are several QTYPEs, like MX, SOA, and TXT, where Active DNS will include from
two to four orders of magnitude more data than Passive DNS. Systems and analysis that
rely on QTYPEs not very popular in Passive DNS, can significantly benefit from Active
DNS, like the work from Portier et al. [114].
Since domains are actively resolved, this allows Active DNS to be tailored to particular
problems, as well. For example, it is easy to increase the query rate of specific domains of
interest when a malicious campaign is being monitored, by just adding the same domains
multiple times in the seed queue. Hence, if an event requires more thorough analysis, it
would be possible to approximate queries to a set of domains in a periodic fashion. It
would be as easy to include more domains from different partners and expand the list of
RRs in the Active DNS data at will. Similarly, if a partner requires data that has to be kept
private to them, Active DNS can flag domains and exclude them from the publicly released
dataset, but only keep the RRs for the parties they were meant to be used by.
Finally, since the data is queried by an automated system, there are no privacy concerns
that could be associated with Passive DNS. Thales 2.0 is resolving domain names that are
publicly available on the Internet, or provided under licenses that allow sharing for non-
for-profit use. Hence, the scientific community can benefit from the dataset without any
restrictions, allowing for research results to be publicly disclosed and experiments to be
rerun and independently validated, which is the cornerstone of the scientific process.
4.7.3 Combining Datasets
As mentioned earlier, each of the Passive and Active DNS datasets has its own advantages
and disadvantages, but they complement each other. Passive DNS is hard to obtain or
collect, and usually expensive to purchase. However, if one has access to Passive DNS, they
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can use Active DNS to enhance their studies and get comprehensive and more complete
results.
There are several cases where both Passive and Active DNS data has been used with
significant contribution. For example, the Combosquatting work, discussed in Chapter 5,
p. 108 and [80], showcases results of a five year study of combosquatting domain names,
with behavioral characteristics in the Passive DNS data, but coverage and prevalence data
from the Active DNS dataset. Similarly, the Mirai work from Antonakakis et al. [27], takes
advantage of Active and Passive DNS data to expand on the domain names that pointed to
IP addresses known Mirai C&C domains were pointing to. From that point, they utilize
Passive DNS to further identify the prevalence of the botnet in the population. Active DNS
provided more domain names that could be related to Mirai and Passive DNS allowed to
further identify clients that were running the malware.
When overlapping Passive and Active DNS data is available, like in the Mirai study [27],
Active DNS can be used to pivot from known malicious indicators and expand to more re-
lated domain names. Then, Passive DNS can be utilized to, first, identify potentially false
positives (FPs), and, second, further measure the impact of an attack or security problem.
The inverse is also possible; identifying an interesting trend in Passive DNS, like a new
domain name resolved in a network, then use Active DNS to validate whether that domain
name is indeed newly registered, if it has changed ownership, if the domain is pointing to
known benign or malicious infrastructure, or simply find other related domains. This piv-
oting approach can be also performed via other DNS datasets. For example, malware
network traces, DNS blacklists (DNSBL), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and other
datasets that include domains or RRs can be used to increase the knowledge an analyst has
about resolution requests that take place in their network.
Moreover, Active DNS can complement the visibility coverage Passive DNS has. For
example, Passive DNS data can be heavily biased by user behavior in a network. Passive
DNS will most often exhibit a diurnal pattern in the number of resolution requests through-
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out a day, with a peak during work hours and low at nighttime. Then, weekends can be very
harmful, when activity in the network is very limited and usually comes from automated
systems, like server updates, or email. On the other hand, Active DNS will sustain a stable
data rate across all days of the week. Hence, the local visibility that Passive DNS provides
in a particular network, can be complemented by the global visibility Active DNS can pro-
vide for every domain name it has resolved, and keeps resolving irrespective of weekends
or holidays. Hence, analysts can rely on Active DNS for features like existence, changes
in the infrastructure, detailed data for different QTYPEs, and on Passive DNS for features
like resolutions from their local network, time of resolution, client information. Therefore,
both datasets can be used by the security community to reason about hypotheses. Active
DNS can provide the yardstick to validate results that stem from Passive DNS and Passive
DNS can provide further insights into a local network that is being studied.
When it comes to DNS data collection, Active DNS can be a significant asset for more
granular analysis of particular infrastructure. Former work, like zmap [115], has demon-
strated how IPv4 scanning can take place in a scalable and timely manner. Such systems
allow for data collection that describes the IP infrastructure in use. Similar to zmap, the
Active DNS system can be used to target a predefined part of the Internet infrastructure
and collect detailed information around the way Infrastructure is used. This information
can span from reverse DNS pointer records (i.e., the host names assigned to an IP address)
to domain name tracking over small or large periods of time. More specifically, given a
set of IP addresses, the Active DNS system can be configured to perform reverse pointer
record lookups (PTR QTYPE) and horizontally scale to account for the frequency the user
requires. With post-processing of the Active DNS dataset, we can identify domain names
that point to that IP space and authorities in that IP space that serve domain names. Us-
ing that knowledge, we can then update the queue of the domains that are being resolved,
increasing the frequency with which we can collect data for infrastructure within the IP
space we care about. Hence, we can increase the data collected for part of the Internet we
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are more interested into and adjust the data granularity based either on external knowledge
(e.g., particular infrastructure known to be used by adversaries), or via a feedback loop
from the Active DNS system itself, where we observe changes and further enhance data
collection into networks of interest.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, Passive DNS provides a significantly larger depth into
DNS zones than Active DNS. This results into a variety of child labels in Passive DNS
datasets that are uncommon in Active DNS. At the same time, Passive DNS might also
include domains from ccTLDs that may not be part of the TLD zones that Active DNS
has visibility into. Combining the two datasets can allow for an increase in the Active
DNS seed, which in turn can result in much more data actively collected. However, in
both cases, potential privacy implications might rise. Several organizations are employing
DNS policies like DNS Response Policy Zones (RPZ) [116] and Split-horizon DNS [117],
under which a local recursive and authority will provide different answers based on the
domain queried and the Internet location of the client submitting the query. For instance,
a recursive might reply with a different IP address to clients from within the network it
serves for domains that network administrators would like to block. In that case, trying to
recreate such RRs in Active DNS might lead to a much different view of the Internet from
the two vantage points, rendering correlation misleading. Similarly, a local recursive might
be configured to reply for TLDs that do not exist on the Internet, but are used internally in a
network. Such examples include the very common .local TLD, which is used to resolve
IPs for local devices in the network. Domains under that zone might include host names and
device identifiers, that if used in the Active DNS seed, could end up in Passive DNS data
collected at different vantage points, like the root servers or Autonomous Systems outside
of our control. This issue can be generalized to arbitrary child labels found in Passive
DNS datasets in general. Even though DNS data is expected to be public, the structure
of a zone can be kept private if the domain owner does not wish to share it. However,
once an FQDN from that zone is resolved, the child labels are available in Passive DNS
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and could be used for network enumeration and reconnaissance. As we mentioned earlier,
Passive DNS usually comes with certain legal obligations to protect such leaks. Therefore,
extracting zone information and publicly disclosing it in a dataset like the Active DNS one,
might lead to privacy concerns, that could possibly fall into the realm of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [118].
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CHAPTER 5
COMBOSQUATTING DOMAIN NAME THREATS
5.1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) [13, 14], is a distributed hierarchical database that acts as
the Internet’s phone book. DNS’s main goal is the translation of human readable domains
to IP addresses. The reliability and agility that DNS offers has been fundamental to the
effort to scale information and business across the Internet. Thus, it is not surprising that
miscreants heavily rely on DNS to scale their abusive operations.
In fact, domain squatting is a very common tactic used to facilitate abuse by register-
ing domains that are confusingly similar [119] to those belonging to large Internet brands.
Past work has thoroughly investigated typosquatting (domain squatting via typographical
errors) [51, 50, 120, 121, 122, 123], bit squatting (domain squatting via accidental bit
flips) [124, 53], homograph-based squatting (domains that abuse characters from differ-
ent character sets) [125, 126], and homophone-based squatting (domains that abuse the
pronunciation similarity of different words) [54].
A type of domain squatting that has yet to be extensively studied is that of “com-
bosquatting.” Combosquatting refers to the combination of a recognizable brand name with
other keywords (e.g., paypal-members[.]com and facebookfriends[.]com). While some ex-
isting research uses other terms to describe combosquatting domains (i.e.,, “cousin do-
mains” [49]), this work only studies combosquatting in the context of phishing abuse, fail-
ing to capture the full spectrum of potential abuse. Thus, even though the general concept
of constructing these types of malicious domains is part of the collective consciousness of
security researchers, the community lacks a large-scale, empirical study on combosquat-
ting and how it may be abused. Therefore, the security community has little insight into
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which trademarks domain squatters commonly abuse, how well existing blacklists capture
such abuse, and which types of abuse combosquatting is used for.
In this chapter, we present the first large-scale, longitudinal study of combosquatting
abuse to empirically measure its impact. By combining more than 468 billion DNS records
from both active and passive DNS datasets, which span almost six years, we identify 2.7
million combosquatting domains that target 268 of the most popular trademarks in the US,
and we find that combosquatting domains are 100 times more prevalent than typosquatting
domains—despite the fact that combosquatting has been less studied. Our study also makes
several key observations that help better characterize how combosquatting is used for abuse.
5.1.1 Contributions
First, we study the lexical characteristics of combosquatting domains. We observe that
combosquatting lacks generative models and find that, while combosquatting domains vary
in overall length, 50% add at most eight additional characters to the original trademark
being abused. Furthermore, 40% of combosquatting domains are constructed by adding a
single token (Section 5.4.2) to the original trademark. Thus, while the pool of potential
combosquatting domains is very large, we find that many instances of combosquatting
try and limit the overall length of the combosquatting domain. Additionally, we find that
combosquatting domains tend to prefer words that are closely related to the underlying
business category of the trademark—resulting in combinations that are more targeted than
random.
Second, we analyze the temporal properties of combosquatting domains and, surpris-
ingly, we see that almost 60% of the abusive combosquatting domains can be found in
our datasets for more than 1,000 days—suggesting that these abusive domains can often
go unremediated. When combosquatting domains do become known to the security com-
munity, it is often significantly after the threat was seen in the wild. For example, 20%
of the abusive combosquatting domains appear on a public blacklist almost 100 days after
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we observe initial resolutions in our DNS datasets, and this number goes up to 30% for
combosquatting domains observed in malware feeds. To make matters worse, we observe
a growing number of queries to combosquatting domains year over year, which is in stark
contrast to better known squatting techniques like typosquatting. Thus, combosquatting
appears to be an increasingly effective technique used by Internet miscreants.
Third, we discover and analyze numerous instances of combosquatting abuse in the
real world. Through a substantial crawling and manual labeling effort, we discover that
combosquatting domains are used to perform many different types of abuse that include
phishing, social engineering, affiliate abuse, and trademark abuse (i.e., capitalizing on the
popularity of trademarks to sell their own products and services). By analyzing publicly
available threat reports, we also identified 65 combosquatting domains that were used by
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaigns. These findings highlight the wide reaching
impact of combosquatting abuse. Finally, we manually analyzed various techniques attack-
ers used to drop malware and counter detection—leading to some interesting discoveries
surrounding the use of redirection chains and cookies.
In summary, combosquatting is a type of domain squatting that has yet to be extensively
studied by the research community. We provide the first large-scale, empirical study to bet-
ter understand how attackers use combosquatting to perform a variety of abusive behaviors.
Our study examines the lexical characteristics, temporal behavior, and real world abuse of
combosquatting domains. We find that not only does combosquatting abuse often appear
to go unremediated, but its popularity also appears to be on the rise.
5.2 Squatting Background
In this section, we define combosquatting and discuss how it differs from other types of
DNS squatting. Additionally, we discuss how combosquatting is used to facilitate many
different types of abuse. For example, Internet miscreants use combosquatting to perform
social engineering, drive-by-download attacks, malware communication, and Search En-
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gine Optimization (SEO) monetization. Thus, even though combosquatting has not been
extensively studied, it has far reaching implications.
5.2.1 DNS Squatting & Combosquatting
Combosquatting refers to the attempt of “borrowing” a domain name’s reputation (or brand
name) characteristics by integrating a brand domain with other characters or words. Com-
bosquatting differs from other forms of domain name squatting, like typosquatting and
bitsquatting [52], in two fundamental ways: first, combosquatting does not involve the
spelling deviation from the original trademark and second, it requires the original domain
to be intact within a set of other characters. In this paper, we consider a domain name
being combosquatting based on the following definition.
Given the effective second level domain name (e2LD) of a legitimate trademark, a do-
main is considered combosquatting if the following two conditions are met: (1) The domain
contains the trademark. (2) The domain cannot result by applying the five typosquatting
models of Wang et al. [50].
For example, lets consider the trademark Example, such that it is served by the do-
main name example[.]com and the e2LD of which is example. Combosquatting domain
names, based on this e2LD, could include any combination of valid characters in the Do-
main Name System, whether they are prepended or appended to the e2LD. For instance,
secure-example[.]com, myexample[.]com, another-coolexample-here[.]com are cases of
Table 5.1: Examples of the different types of domain name squatting for the youtube[.]com
domain name.
Domain Name Squatting Type
youtube[.]com Original Domain
youtubee[.]com Typosquatting [123]
yewtube[.]com Homophone-Based Squatting [54]
youtubg[.]com Bitsquatting [52]
Y0UTUBE[.]com Homograph-Based Squatting [125]
youtube-login[.]com Combosquatting
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combosquatting. However, wwwexample[.]com and examplee[.]com are not, since they
violate the second clause mentioned earlier. Table 5.1 shows examples of the different
squatting attacks against the youtube[.]com domain name.
5.2.2 Combosquatting Abuse
In this section, we discuss the most common types of combosquatting abuse. Despite com-
mon beliefs, combosquatting domains are not only used for trademark infringement but
are also regularly used in a wide variety of abusive activities—including drive-by down-
loads, malware command-and-control, SEO, and phishing. We should note that all cases
mentioned next were reported to the registrars and law enforcement for remediation.
Phishing
In generic phishing attacks, where obtaining the user’s credentials is the final goal of the
adversary, the attacker would likely register combosquatting domains close to the targeted
organization. For example, in Figure 5.1a we can see one of those phishing campaigns
against Bank of America (BoA) users that employees the bankofamerica-com-login-sys-
update-online[.]com domain. It is worth noting that the phishing page that was hosted on
this combosquatting domain was nearly identical to the actual BoA website. We argue that
this visual similarity, when coupled with the bank’s brand name clearly embedded in the
combosquatting domain, makes it highly unlikely that everyday users of the web would be
able to detect this website as phishing.
Malware
Delivery of malware and drive-by attacks is another interesting case of combosquatting
abuse. For example, a combosquatting domain can be used to redirect victims to a page
showing fake warnings to lure them into downloading malicious software. Figure 5.1b





Figure 5.1: Examples of combosquatting abuse. (a) A typical phishing campaign against
Bank of America using the domain bankofamerica-com-login-sys-update-online[.]com. (b)
The airbnbforbeginners[.]com domain uses the AirBnB brand to lure users and drop a mal-
ware obfuscated as a Flash Update. (c) An example of trademark abuse against Victoria’s
Secret using the domain name victoriassecretoutlet[.]org.
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users land on the page, a Flash update request is shown to the end user in what looks like a
Windows dialogue prompt. Thus, the attack attempts to infect the user by using alerts that
suggest Flash Player is outdated and then entice the user to download a malicious update.
In Table 5.2, we can see malware related domain names that were used as Command
and Control (C&C) points for botnets created using popular malware kits (e.g., Zeus).
While it is hard to know for sure why attackers decide to use domains that contain popular
trademarks, such domains could evade manual analysis of malware communications. The
use of combosquatting domain names is not limited to common malware families, like the
ones in Table 5.2. As we will see in Section 5.3.2, using public reports around targeted
attacks and Advance Persistent Threats (APTs), we identified more than 60 APT C&C
domains that utilize combosquatting, abusing up to 12 different popular brand names.
Monetization
Next to malicious activities mentioned earlier, combosquatting domains have been heavily
exploited in trademark infringement and Search Engine Optimization (SEO). In this mon-
etization category, the combosquatting domains often advertise services similar or related
to the original services and products offered by the trademarks being abused. A real world
example of such a trademark infringing domain is presented in Figure 5.1c in which the do-
main name victoriassecretoutlet[.]org abuses the Victoria’s Secret trademark to offer likely
Table 5.2: Examples of combosquatting domains used by malware as Command and Con-
trol (C&C) points.
Domain Name Trademark Abuse Type
adobejam[.]in Adobe Artro C&C
norton360america[.]biz Norton Betabot Botnet
googlesale[.]net Google Etumbot
indexstatyahoo[.]com Yahoo Phoenix Kit
pnbcnews[.]ru NBC News Pkybot Botnet
wordpress-cdn[.]org WordPress Pkybot Botnet
youtubeee[.]ru YouTube Zeus Botnet
google-search[.]ru Google Zeus Botnet
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counterfeit products at a lower price.
5.3 Measurement Methodology
Measuring the extent of the combosquatting problem is particularly hard because of the al-
most unlimited pool of potential domains. However, given the definition of combosquatting
in Section 5.2.1, we provide a methodical way to identify combosquatting domains using
various datasets. Additionally, we discuss our rationale for selecting trademarks that are
most likely to be abused, the type of datasets we use throughout our study, and introduce
the necessary notation utilized from this point on.
5.3.1 Trademark Selection
While all trademarks could be the subject of combosquatting abuse, it is arguably not in
the best interest of an adversary to use a less known brand for abuse. In our hypothesis we
assume that the adversary would include the trademark name in the effective second level
domain (e2LD) as a way to lure victims into clicking and interacting with the combosquat-
ting domain and site.
To that extent, we first need to identify the set of popular domains that are used by major
brands (likely to be abused by adversaries). To assemble this list of domains, we extracted
the top 500 domain names in the United States (US) from Alexa [57]. Our decision to use
only the US-centric popular Alexa domains is due to the underlying datasets we will use for
our long-term study (which are mostly US-centric), as we will see in the following section.
Now, even with the top 500 Alexa list, not all domains are appropriate candidates for
our combosquatting analysis. This is because (1) there are several brands that employ
common words as their brand name and (2) there are several domains and trademarks that
are too short to be considered for combosquatting. Table 5.3 shows a list of trademarks that
were ignored in the Alexa Top 500 due to the previous considerations.
We manually inspected all 500 top Alexa domains to exclude domains that fall into the
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Table 5.3: Trademark examples that have been excluded from our study.
Trademark Domain Potential Squat
Apple apple.com applejuice[.]com
AT&T att.com attorney[.]com, attack[.]com
Bing bing.com plumbing[.]com, tubing[.]com
citi (bank) citi.com cities[.]com, citizen[.]com
IKEA ikea.com bikeandride[.]com
Cisco cisco.com sanfrancisco[.]com
Table 5.4: Summary of the raw datasets used in this study.
Dataset Type Size Records Time Period Notation
Passive DNS 18.1T 13.1× 109 2011–01–01 to 2015–10–14 PDNS
Active DNS 30.5T 455× 109 2015–10–05 to 2016–08–19 ADNS
Public BLs 26.7G 610× 106 2012–12–09 to 2016–09–13 PBL
APT Reports N/A 21,927 2008–10–01 to 2016–11–04 APT
Spamtrap 35M 965,911 2009–07–17 to 2016–09–13 SPA
Malware Traces 34.8G 1.1× 109 2011–01–01 to 2016–10–22 MAL
Alexa 42.9G 1.3× 109 2012–12–09 to 2016–09–13 ALE
Certificate Transparency 842G 271× 106 2013–03–25 to 2017–04–13 CERT
two aforementioned categories. The remaining set contains 246 domains that we will con-
sider in our combosquatting study. We will refer to this list of domains as seed throughout
the rest of the paper. The trademarks selected belong to companies that are active in differ-
ent business categories. Thus, we are able to group them together into 22 categories based
on the type of services/products they offer.
We derived this categorization using the Alexa list [57], the TrendMicro [127] website
and the DMOZ database [128]. We manually verified the categories and merged any dif-
ferences between the platforms to create a consistent list. The vast majority of the domains
had a stable Alexa rank over time. At the same time, we added seven domains that were
a priori chosen in the “Politics” category and 15 for the “Energy” category, following the
same process as before. We manually included the energy sector because it is part of the
critical infrastructure and the politics because of the US Presidential elections of 2016.
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Table 5.5: The combosquatting datasets, and their relational statistical properties. NoT :
Number of unique trademarks in a set of domains and NoC: Number of unique business
categories in a set of domains. Cabuse = {Cmal ∪ Cpbl ∪ Capt ∪ Cspa}.
Passive DNS Active DNS
α α ∩ CP NoT NoC α ∩ CA NoT NoV e2LDs Count
CP 2,321,914
CA 1,022,083
Cmal 9,283 179 21 6,886 174 21 9,472
Cpbl 3,750 135 21 4,787 128 21 5,844
Capt 59 11 8 56 12 8 65
Cspa 2,296 126 20 6,400 148 20 6,400
Cabuse 14,965 201 21 17,586 200 21 21,173
Cale 45,619 244 22 37,098 244 22 48,197
5.3.2 Datasets
Since our goal is to study combosquatting both in depth and over time, we require a variety
of different datasets. Table 5.4 summarizes the raw datasets used in this study, and Ta-
ble 5.5 lists the most important relationships between them. We provide more detail about
each of these datasets below.
Passive DNS: The passive DNS dataset (PDNS) consists of DNS traffic collected since
2011, above a recursive DNS server located in the largest Internet Service Provider (ISP)
in the US. Specifically, this dataset contains the DNS resource records (RRs) from all suc-
cessful DNS resolutions observed at the ISP, including their daily lookup volume.
Active DNS: We also utilize an active DNS (ADNS) dataset, which we obtain daily from
the Active DNS project [85]. Since the duration of this dataset is less than a year, it does
not have a complete temporal overlap with our PDNS dataset. While we will use the
PDNS and ADNS datasets for most measurement tasks, we will also use a variety of
smaller datasets to label and measure abuse in these combosquatting datasets. Again, in
Table 5.4 we can see these five different datasets used in this study.
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Public Blacklists: We collect historic public blacklisting (PBL) information about do-
mains that have been identified by the security community as abusive and placed in various
public lists [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 129]. These blacklists have been collected from
2012 until 2016 and overlap with our passive and active DNS datasets.
Advanced Persistent Threats: Using public Advanced Persistent Threat (APT ) reports 1,
we manually extract and verify domain names used in such documented attacks (APT).
Spam Trap: A security company provides us with spam trap [130] data that is labeled
using their proprietary detection engine (SPA).
Malware Feeds: The same security company and a university provides us with two feeds
of domains from dynamic execution of malware samples since 2011 (MAL).
Alexa List: To eliminate potentially wrong classification of a domain as abusive (false
positive) in the aforementioned datasets, we create a “whitelist” based on the Alexa list.
We take the domains that appeared in the top 10,000 of the Alexa list for more than 90
consecutive days in the last five years and create a set of domains as indicators of benign
activity (ALE).
Certificate Transparency: Google’s Certificate Transparency (CT) [131] project provides
publicly auditable, append-only logs of certificates with cryptographic properties that can
be used to verify the legitimacy of certificates seen in the wild. The official CT website
provides a list of known, active logs that can be publicly crawled. We used this list to





Next, we project the selected trademarks, into the raw datasets presented in Table 5.4, and
derive the trademark–specific datasets, which can be seen in Table 5.5. The datasets in Ta-
ble 5.5 will be used to study the combosquatting problem in depth since 2011. We begin by
extracting the Combosquatting Passive (CP ) and Combosquatting Active DNS (CA) set of
domains, which reflect combosquatting domains containing at least one of the trademarks
of interest in the Passive and Active DNS datasets, respectively. The cardinalities of these
two sets are of the order of millions of domain names (2.3M for the CP set and 1M for the
CA), and all combosquatting domain abuse should be bounded by the size of the two sets.
Following the same process, we identify the combosquatting domains in the PBL, APT,
Spamtrap, Malware and Alexa sets, deriving Cpbl, Capt, Cspa, Cmal and Cale, respectively.
The cardinalities of these sets can be seen in Table 5.5 where they span from a few domains
(Capt) to several tens of thousands of domains (Cmal and Cale). Finally, we will define
Cabuse as the set of domains in all malicious categories of combosquatting domains, namely
Cpbl, Capt, Cspa, and Cmal.
5.4 Measuring Combosquatting Domains
In this section we present short and long term measurements revolving around the com-
bosquatting domains in our datasets. We begin by investigating the differences between
typosquatting and combosquatting. At the same time we discuss which words attackers
choose to combine with popular trademarks more frequently. Then, we study the temporal
properties of the domain names in the combosquatting passive and active DNS datasets.
This analysis will help us understand how these combosquatting domains evolved since
2011.
In particular, we observe that the number of combosquatting domain names in our pas-
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Figure 5.2: Number of active Combosquatting and Typosquatting domain names per day.
The left hand side part of the plot depicts the passive DNS period, whereas the right one
reflects domains found in the active DNS dataset.
sive and active DNS datasets are steadily increasing; in contrast, the domains in the Cabuse
set remain stable over time. At the same time, we observer that the security community is
lagging behind the detection of malicious combosquatting domains, in many cases up to
several months, despite being an obvious target of abuse. Finally, we provide an analysis
of the DNS and IP hosting infrastructure that combosquatters tend to employ. The domains
in the Cabuse set tend to utilize significantly more agile hosting infrastructure, which could
be used as a signal to identify abusive combosquatting domains on the rise.
5.4.1 Combosquatting versus Typosquatting
Since typosquatting is, by far, the most researched type of domain squatting, we begin
our discussion of combosquatting by comparing it with typosquatting. Figure 5.2 shows
the number of active typosquatting and combosquatting domains targeting our evaluated
trademarks since 2011. To identify typosquatting domains, we use the five typosquatting
models of Wang et al. [50] to generate all possible typosquatting domains and search for
those domains in our DNS datasets. The left part of the plot is based on our passive DNS
dataset while the right part is based on the active DNS dataset. One can clearly see that,
even though combosquatting has evaded the attention of researchers, it is significantly more
prevalent than typosquatting, with the number of daily combosquatting domains being al-
most two orders of magnitude larger than the number of typosquatting domains.
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In comparison with other types of domain squatting phenomena such as typosquatting,
combosquatting has a unique property in that it lacks a generative model. For all other types
of domain squatting, researchers can start with an authoritative domain, and by performing
character and bit swaps, they can exhaustively list the possible squatting permutations for
a given type of domain squatting. For example, the dotted line in Figure 5.2 indicates
the maximum number of typosquatting domains possible when considering the evaluated
trademarks and typosquatting models [50]. In combosquatting, however, attackers are free
to prefix and postfix a trademark with one or more keywords of their choice, bounded only
by the maximum number of characters allowed for any given label by the DNS protocol [30,
31].
Another difference that is closely related to the lack of a generative model, in terms
of attack scenarios, has to do with the way attacks are rendered. Typosquatting can be a
passive attack for the adversary, who simply must wait until a user accidentally types in
a domain. However, combosquatting requires more active involvement from the attacker
because, while a user may accidentally type paypa[.]com instead of paypal[.]com, an at-
tacker cannot register paypal-members[.]com and reasonably expect users will accidentally
type those eight extra characters. Therefore, miscreants that rely on combosquatting must
coerce users (e.g. via spam emails and social networks) to visit combosquatting domains.
To increase the chances that users will interact with their malicious combosquatting
domains, attackers can use services like Let’s Encrypt [132] to both freely and automati-
cally obtain TLS certificates for their domains. In fact, Let’s Encrypt has recently come
under criticism for choosing to eschew any sort of security checks before giving domain
owners a TLS certificate [133]. To quantify the frequency with which attackers obtain cer-
tificates for their malicious domains, we searched the 271 million certificates obtained via
the Certificate Transparency append-only log (described in Section 5.3.2) and discovered
that 691,182 certificates were given to a total of 107,572 fully-qualified combosquatting
domains related to our trademarks, since 2013, with 41.5% of the certificates being issued
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by Let’s Encrypt. In contrast, only 3,011 certificates were issued for typosquatting do-
mains. This finding further confirms the intuition that typosquatting and combosquatting
are two distinct phenomena with different threat models and attack strategies.
In summary, we argue that existing domain squatting detection systems are not taking
combosquatting domains into account (since they cannot generate them) and combosquat-
ting requires its own analysis due to the scale of the problem and the different threat models
involved.
5.4.2 Lexical Characteristics
The lack of generative models for combosquatting, makes it hard to proactively create
and evaluate domains. Therefore, we utilize the DNS datasets mentioned previously, to
identify combosquatting domains and analyze their composition. In particular, we see
that adversaries do not usually register lengthy domains and do not use many words when
generating the domains. We also find that there are certain words that adversaries favor
when generating abusive combosquatting domains. Some words are independent of the
trademark’s business category, and other words are specific to a single category.
Figure 5.3a shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the length of all
identified combosquatting domains. There we can see that even though an attacker can,
in principle, construct very long domains, 60% of the identified combosquatting domains
were using less than ten characters and 80% of the combosquatting domains were using
less than 22 characters (excluding the original squatted trademark). This provides an early
indication that the vast majority of the attackers carefully construct combosquatting domain
names without attempting to reach the limits afforded to them by the DNS protocol.
To better understand the construction of combosquatting domains, we extract the non-
Top Level Domain (non-TLD) part of each domain (e.g. we extract facebookfriends
from facebookfriends [.] com) and use the word segmentation algorithm de-
scribed in [134]. This algorithm takes a string as input and outputs sequences of that string
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Figure 5.3: Lexical Characteristics of combosquatting domains. (a) Length of the Com-
bosquatting domain names, including and excluding the original trademark. (b) CDF of
the number of segments and words. We limit the x-axis of the outer plot for the sake of
readability. (c) Number of segments used in combosquatting domain names. For each
number of segments the percentage of English words is presented in blue color.
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Figure 5.4: Normalized and absolute size of the combosquatting domains in our datasets
per business category.
that have a high probability of being standalone tokens, along with a confidence score for
the provided tokenization.
We validate the output tokens provided for each combosquatting domain against four
dictionaries: (1) the PyEnchant en US Python dictionary [135] to identify English words,
(2) the No Swearing dictionary [136] to identify swearing-related words, and both (3) the
SWOPODS [137] and (4) No Slang [138] dictionaries to identify slang words in US En-
glish. Tokens that are found in any of these dictionaries are referred to as words and, when
not found, we simply call them segments.
Figure 5.3b depicts a CDF of the number of tokens and number of words that were
identified for each domain. We see that almost 80% of the domains have at most two
dictionary-words present, and 90% have at most three words. At the same time, we have
found a limited number of cases that contain up to 28 words and segments. These results
validate our earlier length-based claim that squatters appear to be methodical in their con-
struction of combosquatting domain names. We note that stop words and other short words
have not been removed from our datasets because they are frequently used by combosquat-
ting domains.
Figure 5.3c shows the correlation of segments (cyan) and actual words (blue). Every
bin in the radial histogram represents the number of tokens identified in each domain. The
presented percentage captures the number of actual words versus segments that we were
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able to distinguish. As we can see, the middle ranges of token counts (6 to 19) have a
lot more segments than words, whereas when the domain consists of fewer tokens, the
number of words found in the dictionaries mentioned earlier increases. On average, half
of the tokens are words and the other half are segments. This is likely an artifact of the
attackers’ attempts to register domains that might include typos or several strings close
to words, which could be overlooked by the targets, in order to increase their arsenal of
combosquatting domains. Consider, for example, the following list of domain names that









In terms of the words that attackers combine with abused trademarks, the top twenty
words across all trademark categories were: free, online, code, store, sale, air, best, price,
shop, head, home, shoes, work, www, cheap, com, new, buy, max, and card. Since the top
twenty words represent all of our 22 categories, they include terms that can be found either
in one or multiple trademark categories. For example, the word “free” can be found in 12
of the 22 categories, suggesting that attackers commonly combine the word “free” with
popular trademarks associated with paid goods (such as shopping, movies, and TV shows)
to lure users into interacting with their websites. Contrastingly, certain words appear in a
single category of trademarks, such as “cheap” which is found only in the online shopping
category.
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Table 5.6 presents the ten most frequent words for each trademark category. We see
that many of the popular words closely correlate with the type of trademark being abused,
like the words apple, game and phones being popular in the “Computers/Internet” category
and the words president, vote, and elect being popular in the “Politics” category. The word
selection by the adversaries clearly indicates that most registered combosquatting domains
have been carefully constructed to match the expected context of each abused trademark.
This is a property unique to combosquatting, since any other type of squatting is bounded
to the squatted domain name itself. For example, the search space in typosquatting, from
which adversaries can choose domain names is bounded to the length of the domain and
the characters used, limiting the agility and multiformity of the threat.
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Table 5.6: Most frequent words per trademark category.
Category Most Frequent Words
Adult Content free xxx porn sex gay live tube porno videos hot
Blogging fuck yeah love themes free theme life blog best just
Computers apple games phones galaxy phone office free online support home
Couriers office ground online freight delivery express shipping print services service
E-Learning club square school business university health group property online pilgrim
E-Shop (Auctions) cars car sale account south new post posting san jobs
E-Shop (Online) line store kindle online shop free deals best lay card
E-Shop (Physical) price sale store card online prices home stores shop cheap
Energy card cards online business tex credit energy account chemical gift
File Sharing movie movies file free archive user content login online watch
Financial bank online investment service account services card worldwide mortgage update
Lifestyle world land channel vacation games princess movie villa paris club
News news mike online zine foundation com family new trust media
Photography marketing photography photo buy time followers family com photos best
Politics president vote elect official campaign trump truth com stop sucks
Radio & TV free movies watch xxx movie chill account login canada new
Search Engines plus mail search glass free apps com play maps google
Social Networks marketing followers free login buy account page com business apps
Software & Web best county new online mobile home free sucks beach city
Streaming video videos free download music views converter best buy listen
Telecom wireless universal phone business wire center online phones free net
Travel head island paris hotel garden inn hotels estate real beach
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5.4.3 Temporal Analysis








































































Figure 5.5: Infrastructure characteristics of combosquatting domains. (a) A CDF of the do-
main name lifetime in the CP set. (b) The difference between the time a combosquatting
domain name was first seen in our datasets and the day it first appeared in a Public Black-
list, the Malware Traces dataset, or the security vendor’s spam trap. The plot shows the
cumulative volume of domains over time, normalized by the maximum number of domains
in each dataset. (c) The DNS lookup volume for the domain names in the CP set vs. the
malicious (Cabuse) domains.
In Section 5.3.1 we presented our process for selecting the trademarks we use in our
study, and in Section 5.3.2 we discussed the different datasets we use to measure the phe-
nomenon. Using these trademarks and the dataset notation from Table 5.5, we study the
temporal properties of combosquatting domains since 2011. We find that clients are in-
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creasingly resolving combosquatting domains and that more than half of all combosquat-
ting domains share a minimum lifespan of at least three months; in contrast, the majority
of abusive domains are active for more than a year. We also see that malicious domains
appear in the DNS datasets several months before they appear in our abusive dataset and
they even make it into the top thousands ranks in the Alexa list.
Figure 5.4 shows the number of combosquatting domain names we were able to place
in the passive (left) and active (right) DNS datasets. The orange color represents the total
number of combosquatting domain names we are able to identify in our datasets for each of
the trademark categories. Blue shows the normalized number based on the number of trade-
marks that appeared in each category. While most of the combosquatting domain names
are in “Information Technology” related categories, our dataset is not biased, as
the sets CP and CA contain a significant number of domains across all trademarks and
business categories.
By focusing our attention on the combosquatting passive DNS set, we can see the days
in which a combosquatting domain name is available in our datasets. Figure 5.5a shows
the CDF of this lifetime of the domains in the CP set. We measure the lifetime of a
combosquatting domain as the number of days between the first and last time we saw it
appearing in our passive DNS dataset. Almost 50% of the domain names in the CP set
were active for at least 100 days. In the same figure, we can observe the malicious class of
combosquatting domain names, which are in the Cabuse set (presented earlier in Table 5.5).
Interestingly, Figure 5.5a also shows that the lifetime of abusive combosquatting do-
mains is greater than the entire combosquatting passive DNS set. This makes intuitive
sense because a large number of abusive combosquatting domains facilitate malicious net-
work communication for prolonged periods of time.
Figure 5.5b presents how fast the community comes across these combosquatting do-
mains. In the cases of domains from the sets Cmal and Cpbl, we see that most domains are
active several months before they appear in malware traces, or get listed in public black
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lists. The only exception is the spam trap that the security vendor is operating, where more
than 50% of the domain names in the Cspa set appear in passive DNS either a few days
before, or on the same day that they appear in the spam trap. One reasonable explanation
for this behavior is that it is an artifact of the type of abuse (i.e., spam monetization and
social engineering) that these combosquatting domains facilitate.
In order to measure the overall popularity of the domains in the combosquatting passive
DNS (CP ) dataset over time, in Figure 5.5c we show the DNS lookup volume growth since
2011, according to our PDNS dataset. To put things into perspective, in the same figure,
we plot the lookup volume of domains in the Cabuse set. It is interesting to observe that
while the domains in the CP set have a steady growth over time, the lookup volume of
malicious domain names in the set Cabuse appears to be nearly uniform. Even though we
lack a definite explanation of this behavior, our earlier spam-trap-related results suggest
that this almost uniform activity is an artifact of the type of combosquatting abuse (i.e.
related to spam and social engineering) that the security industry can reliably detect.
Another interesting observation is related to the Alexa popularity of combosquatting
domains. Figure 5.6 shows the distributions of combosquatting domains across the top
1 million Alexa ranks, both for combosquatting domains that are known to be malicious
(present in any of our abuse datasets) as well as for all of the remaining combosquatting
domains. First, we can observe that, as we move from higher to lower rankings, the con-
centration of generic combosquatting domains increases. Even so, the overall number of
combosquatting domains that are present in the top 1 million Alexa list is limited. In terms
of the distribution of malicious combosquatting domains, there we see the presence of ma-
licious domains across all Alexa ranks, which suggests that the existing tools for detecting
malicious domains are finding only a small fraction of live attacks, regardless of the overall
number of combosquatting activity in any given bin of Alexa ranking. We should note that
Figure 5.6 shows aggregate statistics of 20,000 bins in the x-axis. Therefore, the far left
domains are cases of combosquatting domains that have made it into any of the top 20,000
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of the Alexa ranks for combosquatting domains since 2011. The
plot depicts the mean rank for the domain names over the period of our Cale dataset.
Alexa ranks.
5.4.4 Infrastructure Analysis
So far we have examined how the domains in the combosquatting passive DNS dataset
evolved over time. In this section, we turn our attention to the various DNS and IP proper-
ties that the domains in the combosquatting passive and active DNS dataset exhibit. We see
that the hosting infrastructure of malicious combosquatting domains is concentrated in cer-
tain autonomous systems and they are scattered across numerous different CIDRs—which
is different from the behavior of combosquatting domains in general.
Figure 5.7a shows the distribution of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) networks,
Autonomous Systems (AS), and Country Codes (CC) for the hosting facilities of CP and
CA combosquatting domains. As expected, generic combosquatting activity is spread
across the globe with no obvious concentrations.
We cannot claim the same for the domains in the Cabuse set. In Figure 5.7b, we can see
a higher concentration of malicious combosquatting domains from the Cabuse set in a single
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Figure 5.7: Infrastructure distributions for combosquatting Domains. (a) Number of com-
bosquatting domains per CIDR, ASN, and Country for all combosquatting domain names.
The inset plot shows the CIDR, ASN, Country Code frequency distribution per com-
bosquatting domain in the CP and CA sets. (b) Number of malicious domains (Cabuse)
per CIDR, ASN, Countries. The inner plot shows CIDR, ASN, Countries per malicious
(Cabuse) combosquatting domain. (c) CDFs for the number of IP addresses that domains in
the combosquatting (CP and CA) and malicious (Cabuse) utilize during their lifetime.
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CIDR and AS. That is, almost 58% of the malicious domains are in one CIDR, where only
38% of all combosquatting domains live in a single network. The preference that malicious
domains have a single CIDR/AS can be explained in the following two ways. There are
few CIDRs and ASes around the world that will permit the long term hosting of malicious
domains. At the same time, such malicious combosquatting domains eventually will be
remediated, as we saw earlier in this section. This will practically mean that they will be
pointed to a DNS sinkhole or a domain parking page.
With this behavior in mind, we tried to better understand both the bipartite graph be-
tween the domains in the combosquatting passive and active DNS datasets, and also in the
Cabuse set. With Figure 5.7c we observe that domains in the set Cabuse point to hosts that
are spread across more distinct CIDRs than the domains in the CP and CA set. While the
rotation on malicious IP infrastructure might not be a new observation, in the reduced space
of combosquatting domains, this behavior could be used not only as a way to both track
combosquatting domains over time, but also to alert us of potentially new abusive ones.
5.5 Combosquatting in the Wild
So far we have shed light to the combosquatting phenomenon over a period of almost
five years. We have shown the complexity of the combosquatting problem by studying
its lexical, infrastructure, and temporal properties in Section 5.4. This section focuses on
how combosquatting domains are being used in the wild. We study different aspects of
combosquatting abuse, at the time of writing, and show how combosquatting can be used
for many different types of illicit activities.
We show that combosquatting domains are currently being used for a variety of attacks
(e.g. phishing, affiliate abuse, social engineering, trademark abuse). While we study trade-
marks spread across different business categories, these attacks affect almost every cate-
gory. We manually analyze a set of combosquatting domains in order to further examine
their network behavior and the countermeasures the adversaries take to evade detection.
133
5.5.1 Exploring & Labeling Combosquatting Domains
In order to understand the current status of combosquatting domains and potential attacks
rendered using them, we built an infrastructure of 100 scriptable browser instances and
used them to crawl 1.3 million combosquatting domains, which were all part of CA (active
DNS dataset). The 1.3 million domains were comprised of 1.13 million initial seed domains
(note that we have slightly more domains than the ones reported in Table 5.5 since we may
crawl multiple subdomains per e2LD). On top of that, we also crawl 200 thousand domains,
which included daily registrations of new combosquatting domains and other domains that
switched to unknown NS server infrastructure (e.g. non-brand protection companies). Our
crawlers were tracking these changes for four weeks and were able to successfully crawl
approximately 1.1 million domains.
Due to the sheer size of the collected data and the need of manual verification by hu-
man analysts, we approach the dataset we collected through crawling in three sequential
steps. First, we scan our entire dataset for evidence of affiliate abuse, i.e., combosquat-
ting domains that redirect users to their intended destination but add an affiliate identifier
while doing so. This check will result in the scammer earning a commission from the
user’s actions [139]. Second, we look in the remainder of the dataset for phishing pages
by identifying login forms (from HTML inspection) and focusing on the web pages that
are “visually similar” to the legitimate websites. Finally, in order to understand the type
of abuse that is neither phishing nor affiliate abuse, we perform a combination of stratified
and simple random sampling on our remaining dataset and manually label 8.7 thousand
web pages.
All this effort will yield two important points for our study. First, this will help the
reader get a sense of how combosquatting is currently used in social engineering and affil-
iate abuse. Second, we augment the Cabuse set of malicious combosquatting domains that
escape the threat feeds we used in our study. The next paragraph will provide more details
about each step and the discovered abuse.
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Affiliate abuse First, we scan all pages of our crawled corpus focusing on the ones that,
through a series of redirections, navigated our crawlers to the appropriate authoritative
domains. By excluding domains that, through their WHOIS records and name servers, we
identified as clearly belonging to the legitimate owners of the authoritative domains, we
manually investigate the rest of the redirection chains and identify 2,573 unique domains
that were, for at least one day, involved in affiliate abuse.
Phishing We scan the HTML code of all the crawled pages that were neither legitimately
owned nor abusing affiliate programs, and identify 40,299 unique domains that contain at
least one login form. We then proceed to cluster these webpages by their visual appear-
ance using a hamming distance on the hashes produced by a perceptual hashing function, a
process which resulted in 7,845 clusters. We then focus on the clusters that contain screen-
shots that are similar to the look-and-feel of the targeted brands, so as to remove unrelated
pages that happen to have login forms. Through this process, we identify 174 domains as
conducting phishing attacks. Table 5.7 shows the trademarks that were attacked by four or
more combosquatting domains. Even though this number may appear to be small, these
were short-lived live phishing domains that we discovered in the wild targeting the users of
our investigated trademarks.
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Table 5.8: Types of combosquatting pages
Unknown 86.6% Unrelated 11.23%
Suspicious 1 88.77%




1 Includes under construction, error pages and parking
websites.
Other types of abuse Last, we focus on the top two Alexa domains of each of the trade-
mark categories (stratified sampling), resulting in the selection of 221,292 combosquatting
domains targeting the selected trademarks. Using perceptual hashing in the same way as
we did for the identification of phishing pages, we cluster 351 thousand screenshots of
websites (note that many of the 221 thousand combosquatting domains were crawled mul-
tiple times due to infrastructure changes that were deemed suspicious) into 50 thousand
clusters. The trademark responsible for the largest number of clusters (8.3 thousand) was
Amazon which, due to its name, “attracts” thousands of combosquatting websites which
are not necessarily related to each other, and thus create clustering singletons. To label the
screenshots, we randomly sample 10% of the domains of each affected brand and manually
label them, resulting in a manual analysis effort of 8.7 thousand screenshots.
The labeling was performed by the authors where each one chose among the follow-
ing labels: social engineering (surveys, scams such as tech support scam [140], malicious
downloads), trademark abuse (websites capitalizing on the brand of the squatted trade-
marks), unrelated (seemingly benign and unrelated websites), and error/under construction.
Finally, the resulting labels are then used to label the entire clusters in which each sampled
screenshot belongs. Table 5.8 shows the overall abuse of the investigated trademarks by
consolidating the results of the previous two steps, the manual labeling of the stratified
random sample and removing all the authorative domains from the list. Table 5.9 shows
the types of abuse for each category of trademarks by focusing on the abuse of its most
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Table 5.9: Types of combosquatting abuse for the most popular investigated domain within
each trademark category.
Affiliate Social Trademark
Category Trademark Phishing Abuse Engineering Abuse
Adult Content pornhub 0% 5.14% 25.73% 69.11%
Blogging wordpress 0% 0.06% 2.93% 96.96%
Computers microsoft 0.32% 11.0% 13.68% 74.39%
E-Shop (Online) amazon 0.36% 61.65% 1.47% 36.50%
Financial paypal 6.29% 0.78% 55.11% 37.79%
Radio & TV netflix 2.29% 5.74% 19.54% 72.41%
E-Learning wikipedia 0% 0% 32.58% 67.14%
Lifestyle diply 0% 0% 1.6% 98.4%
News reddit 1.49% 0% 1.49% 97.01%
Couriers fedex 0% 3.12% 25% 71.87%
E-Shop (C2C) craigslist 0% 0% 31.10% 68.89%
Photography pinterest 0% 0% 5.76% 94.23%
E-Shop (Physical) homedepot 0% 72.5% 2.5% 25%
Search Engines google 0.32% 3.58% 23.49% 72.32%
File Sharing dropbox 2.7% 16.21% 51.35% 29.72%
Social Networks facebook 5.24% 6.18% 18.74% 69.82%
Software & Web popads 0% 0% 0% 100%
Streaming youtube 0% 2.02% 14.5% 83.47%
Telecom xfinity 2.85% 14.28% 11.42% 71.42%
Travel airbnb 0% 4.04% 1% 94.95%
popular domain (grey cells denote the most popular type of abuse per trademark category).
There we see that while trademark abuse is usually the most popular type of abuse, the
exact breakdown varies across categories. For example, for both amazon and homedepot,
affiliate abuse is the most popular type of abuse, fueled by the fact that these two services
offer affiliate programs to their users.
5.6 Combosquatting Rating System
In the previous sections, we have discussed the following; 1) the combosquatting domains
are used in a variety of different illicit operations (i.e., Section 5.2.2) and 2) multiple
combosquatting domains could be used to support a single malicious campaign (i.e., Sec-































Figure 5.8: Combosquatting Rating (CSR) system. The system receives a daily feed of
the public Active DNS data (1) as input to identify combosquatting domains (2), builds
associations between them based on a bipartite graph of the domains and the IP address(es)
they resolve to (3), identifies clusters of connected components (4), applies known labels
and ranks the clusters (5), conducts majority voting on the raked clusters to derive a cluster
label (6) and finally publishes the output to the community (7).
detection of such combosquatting domains. We need a system to timely group together and
assist in the classification of emerging combosquatting abuse. To achieve that we introduce
the Combosquatting Rating system (CSR). The goal of the CSR system is to provide to
the community a daily, public, feed of ranked combosquatting clusters of domains that are
likely to be used for abuse or that have already been involved in illicit activities. With the
the permission of the team behind the Active DNS project, we will export our daily sys-
tem output here: https://www.activednsproject.org/combosquatting.
html.
Figure 5.8 depicts the overview of CSR. Briefly, the system begins by taking daily
DNS datasets from the Active DNS [85] project as input (Step 1). CSR will identify com-
bosquatting domains based on a seed of trademarks provided by the operator (Step 2). The
system is able to construct a bipartite graph between every combosquatting domain and
the corresponding IP address(es) (in Step 3). In Step 4, CSR will apply a simple con-
nected component discovery algorithm in order to both identify connected components in
the association matrix and then build clusters of related combosquatting domains.
The algorithm is a simple modification of the Breadth First Search (BFS). Each day,
Algorithm 1 is initialized with the set of combosquatting domains (D) and the set of IP
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Algorithm 1 Connected component discovery algorithm.
1: D ← {Combosquatting domains in a day}
2: IP ← {Resolved IPs of Combosquatting domains}
3: while IP is not empty do
4: Initialize a queue
5: Initialize IPc and Dc for a connected component
6: Remove a random ip from IP and add it to queue
7: while queue is not empty do
8: Dequeue ips from queue
9: for each d ∈ D that resolved to ips do
10: Dc ← Dc ∪ {d}
11: D ← D \ {d}
12: for each ipt ∈ IP that d resolved to do
13: IPc ← IPc ∪ {ipt}
14: IP ← IP \ {ipt}




19: Save the connected component IPc and Dc
20: Empty IPc and Dc
21: end while
addresses (IP ) they resolved to according to the Active DNS dataset (Lines 1 and 2).
The algorithm iteratively discovers connected components in the domain resolution graph
by using a queue until the set of initial IP addresses IP is empty (Lines 3 to 21).
Lines 4 and 5 initialize the necessary data structures for each component. IPc and
Dc will store the IP addresses and combosquatting domains, respectively, for the connected
component being discovered in each iteration.
Next, in Line 6 the algorithm will remove a random IP address from the remaining
(not visited yet) set of IPs and add it to the queue— so the process of identifying the current
connected component may begin. In the Lines 7 to 18 the algorithm will perform a
breadth first search (BFS) using the queue to store IP addresses needed for BFS traversal.
Every time the algorithm dequeues the current IP (ips) (Line 8), it discovers any not
visited yet domains that resolved to ips (Line 9). Then, these domains are added to the
component Dc (Line 10). At this point the algorithm also removes these domains from
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the not visited yet set D (Line 11), such that each domain name will only be visited
once. Afterwards, the BFS algorithm identifies more non visited yet IP addresses, saves
these IPs to IPc, removes them from IP and adds them to the queue to be processed later
(Line 12 to 15).
When the queue is empty, the algorithm has identified one connected component. It
saves the IPs and domains of the current connected component to the result set (Line
19) and flushes IPc and Dc to restart for the next component. The aggregated results of
Algorithm 1 are clusters of domains that share the same IP infrastructure seen in the Active
DNS dataset.
Taking advantage of public information around the domains in each cluster, the system
ranks the clusters based on the amount of labeling information that can be attributed to
them. Our intuition is that when we know that multiple domains in a cluster appear in a
public blacklist, or are known to be bad, then other domains hosted in the same infrastruc-
ture might be bad by association, as previous research has shown [16, 41]. At this point, we
should note that our goal is not to build a DNS reputation system. Rather, we care to rank
clusters of domains in a way that security researchers can quickly identify combosquatting
domain names that are likely participating in abuse.
We use three different labels for information that are derived from external sources. We
label as benign the domains we know are owned by the original owner of the trademark
(i.e. microsoftonline.com) or have been remediated. Any domain that appears in
a blacklist or we cannot be certain it is owned by the original owner, we label it as suspi-
cious. In the case where we know that a domain name is not related to either benign or
suspicious activity with respect to the trademark it was identified to abuse, we consider it
unrelated. Such cases can rise from domains that are lexically close to a trademark, but
have nothing to do with it. For example, westwitterringbeach.co[.]uk is an odd case that
falls into the ComboSquatting definition for Twitter, but has to do with a civil parish in
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Southern England 2.
The system utilizes these three classes to rank the clusters based on the amount of
known information available to the system (Step 5, in Figure 5.8). That is, for each com-
ponent, we compute the percentage of labeled combosquatting domains as p = L−1
N
, where
L is the number of labeled domains within a component, and N is the cardinality of the
component. This means that p is bounded between zero and one. Because we cannot prop-
agate labels from known domains to unknown domains in singleton components, we offset
L by one to give singleton components low ranks. After reversely sorting the connected
components based on percentage of labeled domains the system outputs a hierarchical list
of clusters and domains that can be then used to identify abusive cases.
Then, the system will conduct a majority voting operation on the ranked clusters using
all (at the time) known labels throughout the clusters (Step 6). This process will yield a la-
bel for each cluster as being benign, suspicious or unrelated. To break cases of ties between
voting, we are being conservative and favor the suspicious class over benign or unrelated.
When the tie is between unrelated and benign, we favor unrelated to avoid misleading an-
alysts. Clearly, the operator could provide to the system different (threat specific) lists of
labels, and the system will “bubble up” clusters of combosquatting domains that are rel-
evant with this the abuse described in these lists. Finally, the generated reports are being
pushed back to the Active DNS project and published to the community so we can increase
the situational awareness around the combosquatting abuse (Step 7).
Evasion and CSR We should begin by stating that CSR is not a modeling system. Rather,
CSR employs simple graph clustering techniques that are founded on the most basic prop-
erties of combosquatting domains; the fact that a domain fits the combosquating definition,
and two is hosted in an routable IPv4 IP. If the adversary manipulates the brand name, she
will instantly reduce the probability to masquerade the domain as brand related, and cer-
tainly not combosquatting. Thus, the only reasonable level of freedom for evasion that the
2http://bit.ly/2f0dYz7
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adversary has is to manipulate the IP(s) the domain points to. This can be done by having
a very stable profile (i.e., match one combosquatting domain per IP address). This will
force the system to exclude the domain as being a singleton. This is clearly something that
CSR cannot deal with, however, this adversarial tactic will exponentially rise the cost of
the attack, as the adversary will have to acquire new IP for every domain she uses.
The other way is to point the domain name to enough IPs that will force it to join a
“death star” in the CSR domain to IP graph. However, even in this case the adversary will
have to point and maintain for a period of time the domain to an IP that actually facilitates
the illicit activities. This will create a frequent traversal of the domain name between
different clusters with significant different purity scores and domain cardinalities. Clearly,
while this behavior could temporarily bypass CSR, a simple modification could capture
such adversarial behavior.
5.7 CSR Evaluation and Analysis
In Section 5.6 we introduced CSR system that uses connected component analysis to create
clusters of combosquatting domains that share similar infrastructure and compute a rating
score for each cluster to identify cases of suspicious domains. We begin by evaluating
the connected component clustering in CSR system. Then we provide operational analysis
around the number of ranked clusters that CSR produces daily, as the label list changes.
Last, we will show how threat researches could use the CSR system output in practice,
utilizing a threat console and an example of clustering threat research exercise.
5.7.1 Evaluating the Connected Component Clustering
To evaluate the performance of the connected component clustering of CSR (Figure 5.8,
Step 4), we use two metrics: (1) a clustering purity score as external criteria for clustering
quality (Section 5.7.1)) and (2) a confusion matrix for the predicted cluster labels verses
the actual domain labels (Section 5.7.1).
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We use three types of labels to classify combosquatting domains and the derived clus-
ters. A domain can be suspicious when there is indication that it has been used in malicious
or illicit activity in the past, or when that domain is taking advantage of the trademark it is
squatting for reputation purposes (e.g. google-experts[.]com). The other two la-
bels are unrelated, for domains that have nothing to do with the trademark, and benign, for
domains owned by the original trademark and not involved in any known malicious related
activities. We should note that the labels for malicious and illicit activity were gathered
from both the Cabuse set but also the domains we manually labeled in the Section 5.5.1.
For our evaluation, however, we only select domains that were in our CA datasets between
August 8th and August 19th.
Clustering Purity
Cluster purity is defined as the number of elements that are in agreement with the respec-
tive cluster label for the cluster they belong to, divided by the total amount of elements,
according to [141]. In our case, for every domain name in a cluster, we have one of the
three aforementioned labels (benign, unrelated and suspicious). The clusters are assigned
the label of the majority of the elements they contain. Given cluster C of size N = |C|,
assuming that B is the set of benign domains, U is the set of unrelated domains and S is
the set of suspicious domains, then the label of C, LC is equal to the label of the largest set:
LC = Lmax(|B|,|U |,|S|).




. This means that bad clustering will
result in purity scores close to 0, whereas good clustering should yield purity scores closer
to 1. If every domain is in its own cluster, the purity would be 1. To discount the fact that
singletons bias the purity score, we excluded all the singleton clusters before we compute
purity.
We used the aforementioned labeled domains to evaluate clustering purity. Table 5.10
shows the purity of our clustering results per day. The average purity is at 0.954195 (or
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Table 5.10: Cluster purity per day for our input data. The mean and standard deviation are
presented in the last row.
Date Score Date Score
2016-08-08 0.955160 2016-08-09 0.954754
2016-08-10 0.954813 2016-08-11 0.954961
2016-08-12 0.955107 2016-08-13 0.955175
2016-08-14 0.941748 2016-08-15 0.956664
2016-08-16 0.954902 2016-08-17 0.955351
2016-08-18 0.956209 2016-08-19 0.955497
Mean 0.954195 Standard Dev 0.003792
95.42%) and the standard deviation is 0.0038 (or 0.38%). It means 95% of domains from
non-singleton clusters are in agreement with the majority label. The high purity score in-
dicates that we can cluster related combosquatting domains together very reliably. This
also means that clustering makes the system easier to propagate labels from known com-
bosquatting domains to unknown ones. While we showed that CSR is able to achieve good
purity rates, we have not shown if the predicted cluster label fits the labels of each domain.
In an ideal case, we should have pure clusters with all the domains in the same label.
Confusion Matrix
To measure the confusion between cluster labels and the domain labels, we compose the
confusion matrix in Table 5.11. The rows refer to the CSR predicted cluster label (using
the previously described majority voting process) and the columns represent the labels
for the actual domains in the clusters. Thus, a benign domain name that is accidentally
clustered with a majority of suspicious domains, will be assigned the wrong label. The
confusion matrix shows us that CSR wrongfully placed 8 benign domains into cluster with
predominately suspicious domains. Despite that, most of the domain were placed into a
cluster with the same label (as we can see from the diagonal). The unrelated instances
do not represent benign or suspicious combosquatting domains and are out of the scope
of the system. However, CSR can successfully cluster a large portion of these domains
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Table 5.11: Confusion matrix computed on 2016-08-08, between the predicted cluster la-
bels and the actual domain labels in each cluster. For example, we can see that 1,031
suspicious domains ended up in clusters that were predicted as suspicious. However, we
had one suspicious domain in a benign cluster and 8 in unrelated clusters.
Domain Label
Unrelated Benign Suspicious
Unrelated 51 0 8
Cluster Label Benign 1 262 1
Suspicious 43 8 1031
together successfully. Lastly, there were six cases of a tie for the cluster label assignment,
for 14 domains. They only contained an even number of unrelated and suspicious labels,
thus the clusters were labeled as suspicious, based on the tie-breaker condition discussed
in Section 5.6.
5.7.2 Ranking Cluster Behavioral Analysis
Next, we will discuss how different input lists affect the ranking and majority voting of the
CSR system. We will provide real world results over five consecutive days as we operate
CSR with four different label lists, namely the Cpbl, Cmal, Cspam, Cabuse. In this very
typical operational scenario, we need to see how CSR will behave when the operators input
different lists for potentially different classes of abuse.
To conduct this experiment we employ the malicious lists already discussed in Ta-
ble 5.5, namelyCpbl, Cmal, Cspam, Cabuse as different seeds to the system. Then we measure
the number of labeled vs. unlabeled domains in the top 50 clusters over five consecutive
days of operating CSR. Figure 5.9 shows the probability distribution function (PDF) of
the percentage of labeled domain names over the size of each cluster (that is, labeled and
unlabeled) between August 8 and August 12. The columns represent one of the different
lists we use for label input.
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Figure 5.9: CSR ranking results over five days of data. Each column represents a different input labeled dataset. The rows depict days
from the past to the future (top to bottom). Recall Cabuse is the join of the other three labeled datasets.
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We can instantly make three key observations. The first is that, over time the percent
of the domains we have a label for in each cluster remains fairly stable per day and per
list. This means that the graph of combosquatting domain names we are taking under
consideration is fairly static if the observation window is in the matter of days.
The second observation we can make is that, when we combine all the lists together
(Cabuse set), CSR will yield daily results with the clusters that contain the most labels. We
see that up to 40% of the clusters will contain labels for 100% of the domains. Now, when
we only use more “noisy” lists (Cmal and Cpbl) we see that a very small number of clusters
(between 4% and 6%) will be fully labeled, and the rest will drastically have less amount
of domains that are labeled in them. However, when we use a higher quality list in terms
of detection accuracy (like, Cspa) we see that the percent of the fully labeled clusters is
picking up again ( 15% of the clusters are fully labeled for Cspa).
The third and perhaps most interesting for the users of CSR observation has to do with
the amount of clusters that are “mostly” labeled. That is, a threat analyst would like to
see clusters with mostly labeled domains, alongside a few unlabeled domains — which she
can quickly classify with the same label. In all cases, we see that CSR is able to yield a
reasonable amount of clusters (i.e., between 5-15% in the case of Cpbl) that have more that
40% of their domains associated with some known type of abuse. This means that CSR will
be able to daily produce relevant to the already known labels information for the system’s
operator.
5.7.3 Using CSR Operationally
In this section we will discuss how the CSR system can be used everyday by researcher.
We begin by describing a simple threat console that we implemented in order for the threat
researcher to properly interact with the ranked clusters. Then, we will practically show




Visualizing the ranked clustering results can help to quickly understand the structure of
clusters and provide insights that support and complement textual reports. With this pur-
pose, we built an interactive visualization tool that represents our clustering results using
a circle packing layout. According to the visualization literature [142], the main advan-
tages of this visualization technique are both the good overview of large data sets and the
clear representation of groupings and structural relationships. We have already made this
visualization public to the community 3 so threat analysts and other security practitioners
can easily analyze clusters of domain names related to specific trademarks using our visu-
alization tool. A short demonstrative video that shows how the threat console can be fully
utilized is also available at http://bit.ly/threat-console.
Particularly, we visually represent clustering results as tangent circles ordered by the
rating score of each cluster. Containment within each circle represents a level in the fol-
lowing hierarchy: 1) cluster; 2) trademark; and 3) domain name. For the first level of
the hierarchy, cluster, the color of each circle represents the three aforementioned labels
for ranking clusters, including benign, suspicious, and unrelated. We use blue for clusters
ranked as benign, red for clusters ranked as suspicious, and yellow for clusters ranked as
unrelated. For unlabeled clusters, we apply gray. For the second level of the hierarchy,
cluster, we just use containment to represent the different trademarks. Finally, for the third
level, besides using color to distinguish domain names’ labels, we also use the area of
each circle to represent the number of IP addresses pointing out to a specific domain name.
Thus, the bigger the circle representing a domain name, the more IP addresses it resolved
to. When a specific cluster is clicked, a detailed view is displayed on the right side of the
user interface. In the case of clusters, we display the set of related IP addresses to a cluster,
name servers, and the list of domain names grouped under such specific cluster. For IP
addresses and domain names, we automatically generate links to both Domain Tools and
3https://www.activednsproject.org/combosquatting.html
148
VirusTotal in order to assist user queries to WHOIS and AV detection.
Finally, a time-slider is provided in this visualization tool in order to allow understand-
ing the temporal evolution of our clustering results. For large volumes of clustering infor-
mation, it supports the experience of exploration over time. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show an
overview of the visualization and a specific cluster selected.
Figure 5.10: Threat console for clustering analysis showing an overview of clustering re-
sults for 2016-08-10.
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Figure 5.11: Drilling down to Cluster 14383, ranked as suspicious, has been selected, which
displays a detailed view of related IPs, name servers, and domain names on the right side
of the user interface.
Enabling Threat Research With CSR
Part of our analysis of the clustering results relies on looking into the output of CSR, as
it is being released to the community and identify abusive uses of combosquatting domain
names. On July 1st, 2016, we identified cluster 92, with a rating score of 0.009 that included
nine IP addresses and 606 combosquatting domain names, from 91 different trademarks,
including verticals like e-shops with physical presence, blogs, internet services, etc.
This cluster was particularly interesting because of the behavior the domains exhibit
when visited. To better understand how adversaries take advantage of combosquatting
domains, we setup a headless crawling engine based on the Python requests module, that
would try to collect Layer 7 (in the OSI stack) information. Our experimental setup was
twofold; first we crawled the domains using the default configuration of the module and
then we repeated the process specifying a Chrome User-Agent in the HTTP headers.
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Figure 5.12: The JavaScript redirection performed by some domain names in cluster 92.
This example is the result of visiting chevrontexacobusinescard[.]com. Line 5 had a 1,838
characters long string.
Redirection Games On October 30th of 2016, we crawled 505 that successfully resolved
and the corresponding service was online. We were able to identify 205 cases where the
HTTP server returned an HTTP error code (4xx), whereas 287 replied with 200 OK status
code. Based on our observations, the domains exhibited evasive behavior against our tools,
based on factors like HTTP headers, client’s IP address and cookies’ presence.
Most of the domains in the cluster were associated with a form of redirection, either
to a parking page, or to an abuse related website. A set of 114 domains were perform-
ing at least one redirection irrespective of the User-Agent HTTP header. When the User-
Agent was not set, 28 domains did not redirect and presented a parking page. This set
grew to 127 when User-Agent headers were used. Redirection to the parking page was per-
formed via a child label for the same domain name, following the same naming convention:
the child label starts with ww followed by a number (i.e. starbucksben[.]com redirects to
ww1.starbucksben[.]com).
Moreover, there was a set of 53 domains that was performing HTTP redirection without
User-Agent, but JavaScript redirection when the User-Agent was set. In the later case, the
HTTP response contained an HTML document similar to the one in Figure 5.12.
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Malware Drops One very interesting example that shows how adversaries are hiding the
behavior of a domain from automated systems and crawlers, is
http://zillowhomesforsale[.]com. When no User-Agent is present, the domain always redi-
rected to http://ww1.zillowhomesforsale[.]com/, which served us with a parking template.
When the User-Agent was set, the redirection would be to either the aforementioned URL
or to a completely different domain (i.e.
http://rtbtracking[.]com/click?data=Mm[...]Q2&id=8c[...]d3), based on a probabilistic al-
gorithm.
After we identified the attempt of the domains to hide their real behavior, we tried to
extract further information. We setup two Virtual Machines (VMs) on a MacBook Pro
running Mac OS 10.11.6 and Avast Mac Security 2015 Version 11.18 (46914) with Virus
definitions version 16103000. The first VM was an Ubuntu 14.04.1 and the second a Mac
OS 10.11.6. We started manually browsing to the domain names mentioned earlier and we
identified several instances of malicious websites and URLs we were redirected to.
For example, zillowhomesforsale[.]com this time redirected us to
http://www.searchnet[.]com/Search/Loading?v=5 which was blocked by Avast and classi-
fied as RedirMe-inf [Trj], a well known trojan 4. Similarly, when we browsed to the domain
name youtubezeneletoltes[.]net we came across an automatic downloader of a disk image
file named “FlashPlayer.dmg”. It contained a binary that we submitted to VirusTotal for
analysis. The results pointed to malware, since 15/54 Antivirus reports were suggesting
some type of Trojan or Adware (http://bit.ly/2ffwyW1).
Domains that we visited, may also redirect to an original website (not necessarily the
trademark they were abusing), after appending an affiliate identifier in the URL. For in-
stance, visiting jcpenneyoulet[.]com lands to




Social Engineering and Phishing Another type of abuse we identified was related to
social engineering and phishing types of attacks. After visiting some domains like staple-
seaseyrebates[.]com, we were redirected to http://viewcustomer[.]com/s3/p10/index-20
up-p10-cnf-t1-p4.php?tracker=wait.loading-links.com&keyword=staples1[...]. The land-
ing page presented us with a survey for Staples that would reward us with a gift after
completing it, clearly not related to the Staples business in any way.
We made two noteworthy observations while browsing these domains. First, the type
of abuse was not related to the domain in particular, or some class of domains; every
domain name that was performing redirections in this cluster was a candidate for every
type of abuse mentioned so far (downloaders, drive-by, social engineering, affiliate abuse).
Although it seemed that domains squatting trademarks related to e-shops (JCPenney, Toys
“R” Us, etc) would perform affiliate abuse, it was not empirically found to be true. On the
contrary, we were redirected to every type of abuse, from every domain we investigated,
something that we expected based on our clustering technique.
Our second observation has to do with the redirection chain itself for the domain names
when involved in affiliate abuse. We previously discussed how the adversaries are trying
to hide the suspicious behavior of their combosquatting domains from automated headless
crawlers. When manually visiting the domains however, we noticed that similar techniques




The goal of this thesis has been to show how to actively query domain names in order to
assist in detecting security threats and provide context around Internet Protocol addresses.
Through a novel dataset, publicly available to the scientific community and operational
researchers, it attempts to bridge the gap between data and information that was becoming
available through full packet inspection and the endured losses from the lack of it.
The first study presented in this thesis discussed issues revolving around IP intelligence
and introduced a system capable of collecting DNS data, namely Active DNS, that can
provide an adequate alternative to Passive DNS data. The system, Thales, is able to generate
billiond of resolution requests on a daily basis, collect the appropriate responses, and store
the data in a usable big data format for a prolonged period of time. We demonstrated how
the system operates and the stability of data collected over six months. By comparing the
newly collected Active DNS data to Passive DNS data, the study showed that Active DNS
can provide information around malicious domains much sooner than Passive DNS, and
applications built using Passive DNS data (e.g., Alembic [71], Section 3.4.2, p. 44), can
operate with Active DNS in an adequate capacity.
The next study focused on architectural changes and lessons learned around the system
that generates the Active DNS dataset. It discussed how Thales was upgraded over the years
to Thales 2.0, which provides a much more stable stream of data, higher query volume,
easier integration, horizontal scalability, and higher availability than Thales. Through a
series of measurements, we showed how the new system outperforms the older one, and
how the increased amount of data can further help researchers in the security community.
Finally, the last part of this thesis, showcased Combosquatting, a technique widely used
by miscreants to hide attacks in plain sight. Utilizing the Active DNS datasets mentioned
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earlier, the study showed how popular brand names and domain names are being used as
part of newly registered domains, in order to trick users into thinking they are interacting
with a legitimate website or service. With over two million combosquatting domain names
registered over the course of approximately five years, the study shows that adversaries use
combosquatting in a variety of different attacks and clients resolve those domains at a peak
of billions of times per day.
In summary, this thesis introduces a novel system to collect a large DNS dataset as an
alternative to the widely used Passive DNS data, that can help the community tackle emerg-
ing threats, in Chapter 3, p. 25. Then, it walks through changes to the Active DNS data col-
lection system (Chapter 4, p. 50) and lessons learned after operating the system for almost
five years. Finally, in Chapter 5, p. 108, this thesis utilizes the newly introduced Active
DNS data and older Passive DNS data to study the emerging Combosquatting threats and
how they are targeting unsuspected users and businesses in various different attack types,
ranging from phishing and social engineering, to Advanced Persistent Threats (APT).
6.1 Considerations and Limitations
System development and Internet measurements often have certain limitations and restric-
tions that can affect both performance and accuracy. While such impediments do not inval-
idate the results of this thesis, it is important to discuss them. This sections walks through
the limitations encountered in each of the three studies presented in this thesis.
6.1.1 Active DNS Limitations
The goal of this study was to build a system that can generate large DNS datasets that can
be used as an alternative to the widely used Passive DNS data. To that end, a distributed




The challenges we had faced in the past and limitations around the Active DNS data gener-
ation system, Thales, are discussed in Section 4.3, p. 56. Overall, the system could endure
potential data loss because of the way packets were collected off of the wire, was not able
to immediately validate that a DNS response arriving was part of a DNS query that was
submitted earlier, and the system could be overwhelmed by Internet Background Radia-
tion [105, 106] at times. Moreover, the system was mainly based on LXC containers that
were expected to perform resolution requests, which were hard to manage and automate
tasks they performed. Finally, scaling the system outside of the datacenter we used was
cumbersome, since the data collection through a network span made the topology fairly
static, as discussed in Section 4.3.4, p. 62.
Active DNS Data
At the same time, the study discusses the applicability of Active DNS data in security
research. Even though we demonstrate how this data can be used in certain measurements
and systems (Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, pp. 40 - 47), there are certain limitations in the
data itself that should be noted. First, the Active DNS data, since it is actively generated,
does not contain any client data, unlike Passive DNS, and cannot yield any behavioral
information regarding clients or applications. Second, the data includes very few non-
existent domain names (NXDOMAINs), since Thales mostly queries for domain names that
exist in zonefiles from TLDs. Third, the domains are queried periodically, at least twice a
day, which means that results of domain name to RDATA mappings will only be available
with approximately 12-hour intervals. Hence, if something changes on the Internet in the
meantime, the data might be late to reflect that change, but will do within the same 24-hour
period. Fourth, the Active DNS data does not include child labels under domain names
in zonefiles. The only child labels we find in Active DNS come from the (non-negligible)
lists partners share and public Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). These lists can compose
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up to 40% of the Active DNS seed data, however, the domain to RDATA associations in
Active DNS are much more sparse than Passive DNS. Hence, we can only query whatever
we know exists and we can only have data in the Active DNS datasets that we have queried
for.
6.1.2 Thales 2.0 Limitations
The redesign and new architecture of the Active DNS data collection system is expected to
solve the limitations and issues that had been faced with Thales in the past. Nevertheless,
the newly deployed Active DNS system, Thales 2.0, still has two limitations we should
acknowledge.
First, the highly distributed nature of the system makes it significantly dependent on
network connectivity and high bandwidth network connections. The current system is run-
ning on 10GbE network appliances without saturation. However, adding more nodes, dis-
tributed in different datacenters and geographic locations, will require a significantly fast
network connection between devices that generate data (Step 5 , Figure 4.1, p. 53) and the
centralized Kafka cluster (Step 7 , Figure 4.1, p. 53)).
Second, the system lacks a completely automated auditing framework. The first step in
our road map for the future of Thales 2.0 is automating audit controls for every individual
component on the system. Currently, the system has the ability to recover from random
errors (e.g., power outages, network disconnects, fragmentation, etc.), however, reasons
behind those issues need heavy manual effort to uncover. As we have seen in the past,
manual intervention can be harmful for the longevity of the system, hence, automation is
critical.
6.1.3 Combosquatting Limitations
The goal of the Combosquatting study is to shed light into the use of combosquatting
domain names in cyber threats. To do that end, we device a methodology that will identify
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combosquatting domain names, measure their prevalence in DNS data, and actively collect
website data to determine the way domains are used in attacks.
Combosquatting Identification
In order to identify the way combosquatting domain names are used, we limit ourselves to
268 domain names for popular brands and trademarks. Hence, it is difficult to generalize
to every trademark, since different domains might be abused in different ways, and iden-
tifying every single combosquatting domain can be hard. For instance, there are cases of
domains like comcast-universal[.]com, which includes two trademarks, Comcast
and Universal, but we do not know which one the attacker wanted to abuse. However, both
Comcast and Universal are brands owned by the same company, therefore, examples like
this do affect the same entity. In cases where the trademarks abused are from different
entities, it might be harder to single out the entity in question, without further investigation
(e.g., look at a website, if one exists, look at victims, etc).
Moreover, there are trademarks that have been excluded from our analysis due to the
very generic term trademarked. For instance, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, p. 115 and
Table 5.3, p. 116, the word apple can refer to Apple Inc. or the fruit apple. Hence, a
domain name like apple-wholesale[.]com could be either a fake e-shop trying to
lure customers into buying counterfeit products, or a wholesale business that sells apples.
Therefore, in order to avoid false positives in our analysis, we have removed such words and
focused only on trademarks that have a much lower false positive rate in our identification
methodology.
DNS Data
The datasets used for this study come from several sources, as mentioned in Section 5.3.2,
p. 117 and Table 5.4, p. 116. Our analysis related to Passive DNS data (PDNS) reflects
data collected and reduced at the recursives of a large ISP in North America. Client in-
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formation has been removed to protect users’ privacy, hence our measurements are purely
based on aggregate statistics. Thus, we cannot differentiate between one client making
billions of resolution requests for the same domain, versus millions of clients making thou-
sands of requests. However, since the data comes from an ISP that offers both residential
and business services, we expect a query distribution that would not be biased towards a
handful of clients performing an excessive amount of requests. Given that the requests we
see are for many different domains, and persist across days, we expect this behavior to
better fit organic, user-generated, traffic.
On the other hand, the Active DNS data (ADNS) is limited to domain names that the
Active DNS system has collected. As mentioned earlier, the Active DNS dataset is limited
to only domain names that have been found in a TLD zonefile, or were provided by an
external partner. Hence, there might be many other combosquatting domain names on the
Internet, which we have no visibility into. Because the overlap of the Passive and Active
DNS datasets is very small (only a few days), we cannot draw a statistically significant
conclusion in order to extrapolate from one vantage point to the other.
Web Crawling & Classification
The last part of our Combosquatting work attempts to identify the use of combosquatting
domains on the Internet. To do that, we collect daily screenshots of the websites hosted
on the domain names and then cluster them based on their visual similarity. Given that
websites can change radically before an attack, when an attack takes place, and after the
attack has concluded, there is a chance we may have missed an ongoing attack. Therefore,
we use the term Suspicious in Section 5.5.1, p. 134 and Table 5.8, p. 136, as a class of
domains for which we did not witness an attack, but the domain itself is not (1) owned by
the trademark it abuses, nor (2) served by the same authority (or a trademark protection
company, like MarkMonitor). Hence, when a combosquatting domain serves a parking
page, or an under construction page, we cannot safely assume it is benign. This page might
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change for a few minutes or hours to a phishing page and then back to the old parking page.
If we do not crawl the website at the right time, we may never know its real nature. Thus,
to avoid confusion, we label such domain names as suspicious.
6.2 Closing Remarks
This thesis showed how to actively query domain names in order to assist in detecting
security threats and provide context around Internet Protocol addresses. The first study
presented in this thesis provides a thorough description of a system that can actively col-
lect DNS data, made publicly available to the research community. The data is shown to
be adequate to use in security research, as an alternative to the widely used Passive DNS
datasets. Active DNS data is shown to provide a much better breadth of the Internet infras-
tructure than Passive DNS, and does so in a timely manner. The second study provides a
detailed analysis of the architectural changes the Active DNS data collection system went
through over almost five years. Several problems and issues that were faced over the years
mandated changes that made the system more robust and increased its availability. More-
over, these changes increased the quality and quantity of the data, both in raw numbers, and
when it comes to security research. Finally, the last study, takes advantage of the Active
DNS data and older Passive DNS data, to explore Combosquatting, an attack technique
used for over five years, in order to hide Internet threats in plain sight. Miscreants have
registered millions of combosquatting domain names, which have been resolved billions
of times, and have been used in several different attack types, ranging from phishing and
social engineering, to Advanced Persistent Threats (APT).
These studies provide novel datasets to the security community that can be used to
replace or complement very expensive proprietary datasets, and also demonstrate the ap-
plicability of such datasets, their growth over almost five years, and how they can be used
in security research. In summary, this thesis should assist network security researchers in
data collection, enable research through readily available big DNS data, and demonstrate
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Table A.1 shows a list of combosquatting domain names related to Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT). These domains were found in the public APT reports available at http:
//tinyurl.com/apt-reports and our CP and CA datasets (Table 5.5, p. 117).
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Table A.1: Combosquatting domains related to APT.
Trademark Domain APT Activity Period Attribution Reference
Adobe adobearm[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Adobe adobekr[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [144]
Adobe adobeplugs[.]net DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Adobe adobeservice[.]net TooHash Unknown - 10/14 Chinese Origin [145]
Adobe adobeupdates[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Adobe adobeus[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [144]
Adobe plugin-adobe[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
Amazon amazonwikis[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [144]
Delta deltae[.]com[.]br Comment Crew Unknown - 2/13 Unknown Actor [147]
Delta deltateam[.]ir Snake/Uroboros Uknown - 8/14 Unknown Actor [148]
Delta leveldelta[.]com MiniDuke 2/13 - 5/13 Unknown Actor [149]
Dropbox online-dropbox[.]com Asruex 10/15 - 6/16 Unknown Actor [150]
Facebook privacy-facebook[.]me Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Facebook users-facebook[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
Facebook xn--facebook-06k[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
Continued on next page.
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Table A.1 — Continued from previous page.
Trademark Domain APT Activity Period Attribution Reference
Google all-google[.]com SpyNet Unknown - 8/14 Unknown Actor [152]
Google drive-google[.]co Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [153]
Google drives-google[.]co Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [153]
Google google-blogspot[.]com Quartermaster/Sunshop 5/13 - 11/13 Chinese Origin [154]
Google google-config[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [155]
Google google-dash[.]com Turbo Twist 4/16 - 4/16 C0d0s0 Team [156]
Google google-login[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [155]
Google google-office[.]com Enfal Unknown - 9/11 Chinese Origin [157]
Google google-officeonline[.]com Enfal Unknown - 9/11 Chinese Origin [157]
Google google-setting[.]com Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [153]
Google google-verify[.]com Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [153]
Google googlecaches[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [158]
Google googlenewsup[.]net Roaming Tiger Unknown - 7/14 Chinese Origin [159]
Google googlesale[.]net Ixeshe 3/14 - 6/14 Chinese Origin [160]
Google googlesetting[.]com Sofacy 4/15 - 5/15 Russian Origin [161]
Continued on next page.
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Table A.1 — Continued from previous page.
Trademark Domain APT Activity Period Attribution Reference
Google googletranslatione[.]com Trochilus 6/15 - 1/16 Unknown Actor [162]
Google googleupdate[.]hk Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [155]
Google googlewebcache[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [158]
Google imggoogle[.]com DarkHotel 5/22 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Google privacy-google[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
Google webmailgoogle[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [158]
Google xn--google-yri[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
iCloud localiser-icloud[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
iCloud securityicloudservice[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Microsoft ftpmicrosoft[.]com Quartermaster/Sunshop 5/13 - 11/13 Chinese Origin [154]
Microsoft microsoft-cache[.]com Turbo Twist 4/16 - 4/16 C0d0s0 Team [156]
Microsoft microsoft-security-center[.]com Suckfly 7/15 - 5/16 Unknown Actor [163]
Microsoft microsoft-xpupdate[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Microsoft microsoftc1pol361[.]com Carbanak 10/14 - 2/15 Unknown Actor [164]
Microsoft microsoftmse[.]com Four Element Sword 10/14 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [165]
Continued on next page.
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Table A.1 — Continued from previous page.
Trademark Domain APT Activity Period Attribution Reference
Mozilla mozillacdn[.]com Poseidon Group Unknown - 2/16 Poseidon Group [165]
Reuters reuters-press[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Skype downloadskype[.]cf PoisonIvy 6/14 - 4/15 Israelian Origin [166]
Yahoo cc-yahoo-inc[.]org Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Yahoo delivery-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [167]
Yahoo edit-mail-yahoo[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Yahoo help-yahoo-service[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [151]
Yahoo newesyahoo[.]com Apt Against India Unknown - 8/13 Unknown Actor [168]
Yahoo privacy-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [167]
Yahoo settings-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [167]
Yahoo us-mg6mailyahoo[.]com Strontium Unknown - 11/15 Unknown Actor [169]
Yahoo yahoo-config[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [155]
Yahoo yahoo-user[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [155]
Yahoo yahooeast[.]net Hidden Lynx Unknown - 9/13 Unknown Actor [170]
Yahoo yahooip[.]net EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [171]
Continued on next page.
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Table A.1 — Continued from previous page.
Trademark Domain APT Activity Period Attribution Reference
Yahoo yahoomail[.]com[.]co Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [146]
Yahoo yahooprotect[.]com EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [171]
Yahoo yahooprotect[.]net EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [171]
Yahoo yahooservice[.]biz DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [143]
Yahoo yahoowebnews[.]com IceFrog Unknown - 9/13 Chinese Origin [172]
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